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ID:
170556
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| Summary/Abstract |
The creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is a start to defence reforms. This should improve jointmanship in peacetime; however, joint wartime performance needs further reform and improvement. We face three problems: (i) historical lack of unified warfighting strategy formulation at the apex military level; (ii) the unclear division of responsibility and resources between service Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-Cs); and (iii) the differing natures of command and control between the three services, which manifest as differences in structural organisations. Treating India as one unified theatre can reduce these problems. It will allow the creation of a joint structure for strategy formulation at the apex level, resulting in one national strategy to guide subordinate strategy. Also, it will give ownership of all warfighting assets to a single commander who can centralise or decentralise at will, and yet not preclude formation of smaller military entities with collocated headquarters (HQ) of subordinate service formations. Examples from history support the arguments.
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| 2 |
ID:
142685
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article approaches the issue of jointness through new lenses. It first describes how and why arms of the military, the ‘Services’, are different from each other. Airpower is shown to be the emerging technological paradigm, triggering paradigm competition. Next, it draws an analogy between anarchy in international relations (IR) and the existence of the services. It then looks at game theory as used in IR to understand both why inter-organisational competition occurs and how cooperation can evolve with a certain kind of behaviour—reciprocity. It also uses the anthropological/biological lens to show how competition and cooperation will always coexist. The article concentrates on the behavioural solution towards cooperation, while commenting briefly on the alternative structural solution, which most writings on the subject focus on. Finally, it lays out some measures possible in the Indian scenario, in tune with cooperation behaviour theory
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| 3 |
ID:
144516
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using choice experiments, we estimate the willingness to pay for price insurance among cotton and paddy farmers in the Indian state of Gujarat. We also identify the interactions between the demand for price insurance and existing informal and formal risk management mechanisms. Our results indicate that cotton farmers value price insurance more than paddy farmers. Also, most of the existing informal risk management strategies seem to have a positive effect on the demand for price insurance, suggesting potential complementarities. Important policy implications on the design and bundling of innovative financial products follow from our findings.
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| 4 |
ID:
130812
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| 5 |
ID:
156735
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