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1 |
ID:
130994
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Given the considerable sovereignty costs involved, the adoption of modern investment treaties by practically all developing countries presents somewhat of a puzzle. Based on a review of leading explanations of investment treaty diffusion, the article advances a new theory using behavioral economics insights on cognitive heuristics. In line with recent work on policy diffusion, it suggests that a bounded rationality framework has considerable potential to explain why, and how, developing countries have adopted modern investment treaties. To illustrate the potential of this approach, the case of South Africa is studied in depth.
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2 |
ID:
133279
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
We undertake an individual-level analysis of mass political behavior toward sovereign debt resettlement by leveraging the unique circumstances of a 2011 referendum on debt repayment in Iceland. This allows us to engage broader questions about mass international political economy. Against the recent thrust of a growing literature, we find evidence of material economic "pocketbook" effects-self-interest-on voting behavior, operating alongside symbolic/sociotropic and partisan/political logics. Contrary to expectations, these self-interest effects are not conditional on voter sophistication. We conclude that conventional sampling frames may be inappropriate for understanding contemporary democratic contestation over international economic policy.
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3 |
ID:
131888
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
In the 1990s Multilateral Development Banks created accountability mechanisms (AMs) that allowed people affected by development projects redress. Currently undertheorized, this paper examines how and why the Asian Development Bank (ADB) created an AM, and whether the AM serves its purpose to hold the ADB to account and to provide 'fair hearing of the views of the affected group'. This article argues that the ADB created a new AM because of institutional isomorphism, borrowing the idea of the AM from the World Bank as a result of coercive and mimetic isomorphic processes. Further, that the ADB introduced a mechanism ill-suited to the pre-existing (old) organizational culture of the ADB, which is based on consensus and hierarchical rule-following in the context of ADB operations to further economic growth while upholding state sovereignty. Despite its restructure and recent review, the mechanism's weakness was revealed through a stand-off between China and the AM over an investigation begun in 2009 (creating something 'blue'). The paper concludes that the AM's ability to serve its purpose will remain hampered as long as ADB maintains consensus around economic growth and state sovereignty over providing recourse to affected people.
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