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MULTILATERAL REGIMES (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   131024


Chemical and biological weapons: multilateral regimes and China's compliance / Chansoria, Monika   Journal Article
Chansoria, Monika Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract In a March 2014 report, the United Nations human rights investigators con?rmed that chemical weapons were indeed used in Syria in 2013, which apparently came from the stockpiles of the Syrian military, whose chemical weapons stash reportedly included mustard gas. The report con?rmed that the deadly nerve agent Sarin was used in three separate incidents: the Damascus suburb ofal-Ghouta in August 2013, Khan al-Assal in March 2013 and Saraqeb near the northern town of ldlih in April 2013. While the Bashar al-Assad government and the Syrian opposition indict each other of using chemical weapons, which are strictly banned as per existing international law and convention, the incidents amount to being the deadliest chemical attacks the world has witnessed in almost a quarter of a century.
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2
ID:   135249


Distributive justice and treaty efficiency: impact of dual-use research restrictions on BWC Implementation / Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia Ben   Article
Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia Ben Article
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Summary/Abstract This article evaluates the security value of controls over biotechnology transfers and of new restrictions on the spread of scientific results: to what extent do they improve the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (bwc)? Although the questions of justice that have plagued the bwc regime since its creation in 1972 have been analyzed extensively, the effects of current controls over dual-use research and the propagation of scientific results on the implementation of the bwc have not been fully addressed. It is argued that although controls over biotechnology transfers increase security because they delay covert programs by creating integration challenges, controls on the spread of scientific results have no security value. They instead may lead to a decreased implementation of the bwc.
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