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ID:
131106
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The emphasis and visibility afforded analytic tradecraft in the Intelligence Community's analytic production has fluctuated throughout its existence. The explanation for this intermittent emphasis on tradecraft may lie in changes in consumer preferences and collection means, the role played by individual tradecraft advocates, and the lack of an intelligence failure matching the severity of 9/11 and the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Both failures served as a forceful reminder that while strong analytic tradecraft does not guarantee 'getting a judgment right', it increases the likelihood that the assessments produced are transparent, relevant, and rigorous.
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| 2 |
ID:
171243
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| Summary/Abstract |
Roughly a decade ago, in a commissioned report I wrote for the US National Research Council’s Committee on Behavioral and Social Science Research to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security, I characterized those rare and seminal contributors to analytic tradecraft – figures such as Sherman Kent, Jack Davis, and Richards Heuer – as mavericks.1 The term was meant to conjure a heroic image: mavericks are like mythical forces of good bursting upon an otherwise dreary set. They possess energy, brains and noble motives and act to save their communities while others around them are silent or worse. Notwithstanding those noble characteristics, I made the case for why intelligence communities should not choose or be forced to rely on the occasional maverick.
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