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| 1 |
ID:
157350
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| Summary/Abstract |
How does the acquisition of latent nuclear capabilities—in the form of enrichment and reprocessing facilities—affect a state’s military security and bargaining power? On the one hand, nuclear latency might serve as a “virtual deterrent” against would-be aggressors, as well as a bargaining chip in international negotiations. On the other hand, some research holds that states cannot deter military challenges without at least a deliverable nuclear device. Other scholarship suggests that a state’s pursuit of latency invites nonproliferation sanctions and preventive strikes. We address this debate by quantitatively investigating the conditions when latency benefits or burdens states in their international interactions. To do so, we analyze a dataset of latency measures and a variety of military and bargaining outcomes. The results suggest that latency invites coercion without producing deterrence. Our findings imply that post–Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), latency is more likely to undermine Iran’s economic and military well-being than it is to benefit its prosperity or security. That, in turn, suggests that the JCPOA will not increase Iran’s deterrent capability or its international influence, a fact that should temper fears about the negative consequences of the agreement.
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| 2 |
ID:
171457
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2020.
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| Description |
xv, 243p.: figures, tableshbk
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| Series |
Bridging the Gap
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| Standard Number |
9780197536209
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059868 | 327.1747/MEH 059868 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
131240
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A substantial literature examines the causes of nuclear proliferation, but few studies have addressed why states decide on a particular portfolio of weapon systems once they have acquired a basic nuclear capability. We advance a portfolio theory of nuclear force structure, positing that states seek a diverse set of capabilities for nuclear deterrence, but that they also face major resource and organizational constraints. A number of factors may help to explain the portfolio of nuclear forces that states ultimately field, including resource availability, experience as a nuclear power, bureaucratic politics, the conventional threat environment, the presence of nuclear rivals, and the maintenance of nuclear alliances. We test the influence of these factors on force structure using a new data set of nuclear weapon platforms fielded by nine nuclear nations between 1950 and 2000. Our findings represent an important step in understanding the drivers of nuclear behavior after states have joined the nuclear weapons club.
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| 4 |
ID:
183162
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do emerging technologies impact strategic stability in the international system? I focus on how one aspect of strategic stability, extended deterrence commitments inherent to alliances, may be impacted by the development of new technologies and capabilities. I ask how technological innovations will impact the market deterrence and assurance dynamics in particular. I argue that while technologies may enhance the ability to provide extended deterrence, allies may be less assured by these new capabilities. To test these hypotheses, I explore emerging capabilities in new domains such as drones and hypersonic glide vehicles on international stability.
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| 5 |
ID:
165275
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| 6 |
ID:
163452
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| Summary/Abstract |
Do “nuclear umbrellas” create a moral hazard that can increase the risk of war? In this article, we investigate whether situations of extended deterrence in which a nuclear patron makes a defensive commitment to a nonnuclear client state can inadvertently increase the likelihood that a client will initiate a crisis with another state. Using data on the crisis behavior of states from 1950 to 2000, we estimate the impact of a nuclear umbrella on various crisis outcomes, including the initiation and escalation of militarized conflict. Interestingly, we find no evidence that such commitments increase the risk of war or even two-sided violence at lower levels. However, consistent with both the moral hazard logic and bargaining theories of war, we show that this appears to be because potential target states offer increased policy concessions to client states to avoid costly fighting. Thus, the link between nuclear umbrellas and moral hazard appears to be real, but it is reflected in the division of benefits rather than a greater likelihood of war. The results have important policy implications as the US contemplates extending its nuclear umbrella.
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| 7 |
ID:
150969
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| Summary/Abstract |
On July 14, 2015, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international community, led by the United States and the European Union, signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ensuring for the next 10–15 years that Iran's nuclear program was entirely peaceful. In the subsequent months, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified that all signatories to the agreement had fulfilled their obligations. The deal allows Iran to retain a substantial portion of its nuclear infrastructure—specifically its ability to indigenously enrich uranium into fissile material, the material required in nuclear weapons.
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