|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
130079
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Artillery modernisation in India implies the largest modernisation of this arm and needs to be given as much, it not more, importance commensurate with the man oeuvre arms it supports. The relevance is more in the Indian context because of the mountainous terrain where it needs to support infantry operations plus in counter insurgency and counter terrorist operations. Unquestionably, artillery units will continue to be used to support the infantry to the benefit at all. It is precisely in these sorts of operation that the new precision of artillery will become more telling and relevant. India has a long way to go in modernising its artillery. Presently, the artillery modernisation plan appears to be stymied. There is an urgent need to provide it an impetus considering the enhanced threat posed to us along a two and a halt front.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
130089
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Gandhi an philosophy at ahimsa has attested the Indian attitude towards war and use of force. Nehruvian distrust ot India's armed forces and military leadership has coloured the dispensation national defence and the armed forces get. Historical, intellectual, cultural and administrative neglect oi the need for national defence cause deep concern. The people and their elected representatives have indifference to and inadequate knowledge of defence matters, their imperatives, demands and consequences. Bhutto said, "We will eat grass, but produce an atomic weapon". This awareness and determination does not sink in our Indian thought. Indian attitude resonates to its cultural ethos - waiting tor something to happen, somewhere, somehow, some time and somebody to take care, without designing things.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
130092
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Experts estimate that about 80 different insurgencies are active around the world. Malaya, French lndochina, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, South Africa, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Congo, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, Xiniiang, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Chechnya have all seen the use of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in operations against insurgents in the past. Usage was limited in most cases because of the shortage of helicopters in the inventories of most military and para military forces barring perhaps the US and the Soviets, and not because their unique capabilities were not apparent.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
130094
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
As India's regional and global aspirations grow with its increasing economic clout, it will be forced to build up its capacity to project power in its national interest to ensure that the region is not destabilized by outside elements that may be inimical to it. The establishment of an effective and responsive RDF towards this end is inescapable. To be able to do so requires that India take a long hard look at its requirements and reassess its capabilities. It needs to quickly put in place structures that will ensure that its RDF is able to provide what is required at it so that in the words at Rahul Gandhi, "We stop being scared about how the world will impact us, and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
130100
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Maoist rebellion is a phenomenon, an adverse one at course, in which bands at armed local inhabitants, led by firebrand 'area commanders', assume a role that should truly lie within the constitutional mandate at the states The role at the third element at this phenomenon, the tar-ensconced communist ideologues, is limited to legitimizing the rebellion with a political, it rabid, cause tor the rebels to indulge in societal mayhem. The rhetoric of installing a 'people's government' over the country through armed revolution apart, their interim objective is to impose their 'system' over such territories where the state administration has nothing more than a national presence. In this, the Maoists have succeeded in establishing a tair degree of control, mainly over economic activities in areas remote, sparsely inhabited and undeveloped but endowed with mineral and forest wealth; the void at state administration makes it relatively simple to do so.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
130083
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
During the past decade, zIndia's Defence preparedness has steadily and inexorably deteriorated despite constant clamor by the Defence forces tor modernisation and up gradation to meet assigned roles and tasks. Meanwhile, Pakistan's anti-India stance and Chinese aggressive actions and iterations have neither helped to push away the trepidation of possible military conflagration with either one individually, nor done anything to liquidate the possibility of a two-front war. A combined and collusive threat from China and Pakistan would overstretch the Indian military machinery and, given the inordinately delayed modernisation in certain domains, could well be a recipe for an ignominious debacle reminiscent of the 1962 India-China War.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
130075
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Government's 'White Paper' relating to India-China Boundary issue, published between T951 and i960, clearly indicated the adversarial bilateral relations between India and China. The increasingly acrimonious exchanges on the boundary question indicated that it could precipitate matters and result in armed clashes. The incident in Longju on August 25, T959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, T959 were pointers to the determination and political will at China to stake her claims even at the cost at a war. This should have been the turning point for India; she should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial
integrity. Raising ot additional infantry and Artillery units and tormation Head Quarters, raising of Headquarters lV Corps, augmenting the transport tleet, inducting additional helicopters and transport aircratt, constructing roads, and redeploying torces to meet possible contingencies should have been commenced in right earnest then. Such preparation was mandatory to support a strategic decision at the magnitude as was emerging.
"Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one who thinks he will gain anything trom it is deterred by fear ..... ..when there is mutual tear men think twice before they make aggressions upon another" -Hermocrates as attributed by Thucydides
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
130077
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Clearly the aerospace needs at India, civilian as well as defence, are growing. The public sector which has so tar been tasked to meet these needs has tailed to deliver. What's more, as aerospace production becomes more complex, the public sector is likely to tail even further behind in the race. Vested interests have long fostered the myth that private sector companies are less likely to uphold the national interest than the PSUS. The private aerospace industry has been kept in a stranglehold and not allowed to realise its potential. Isn't it strange that reputed firms like Tata, Birla and M&M have been given the cold shoulder because HAL is supposedly more trustworthy when it comes to cletence matters? Yet Boeing is a reliable partner in America's detence, Airbus in Europe's and Embraer in Brazil's. The government must realise that both public and private sectors are national assets; both are necessary to achieve self-reliance in the shortest possible time.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
130086
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In his article on 'Special Operations Forces: Understanding the Dynamics of Change' (ruler lDR Jan-Mar 'l4 Vol. 29.l) Brigadier Deepak Sinha (Retd) makes an excellent case tor setting up a uniformed Special Operations Command (SOCOM]. While this is an idea whose time has come, Brigadier Sinha's article sellers from two major factual inaccuracies that leads to wrong conclusions. it is perhaps necessary to address those inaccuracies and also correct a few misconceptions that have a great bearing on the future and delicacy at Special Forces (SF) in India.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
130082
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The C-17 has transformed the IAF tromp a tactical to a strategic force. The acquisition at the C-l 7 Globe master lll, a truly strategic airlift aircraft, duly supported by the C-130], can rapidly airlift and sustain sizeable torcos across the region and even beyond. in addition to commitments in the region or other parts at the world, the requirement tor the movement at a large body at security forces ยป military, para-military and police within the country tor deployment on short notice, is also likely to increase. With its emerging status and new responsibilities associated with it, to ensure peace and stability in the region and globally, it called tor, the nation is well equipped with the C-1 7 lleet, to be capable of swift response and power projection to safeguard national security interests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
130095
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
On balance, the prospects of Sino-Indian conflict remain. What appears certain is that China's aggressive stance and the initiation of conflict will be aimed at undermining India's status as a regional power. It India tails to respond adequately, she will be projected as a 'Soft State' susceptible to coercion. Simultaneously, the Chinese aim would be to keep India embroiled in lighting internal/regional conflicts. In doing so, China may be expected to virtually abrogate any agreements such as Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement and Confidence Building Measures and BDCA leading to incremental build up and conflict.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
130096
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The essence of successful conventional defensive battle is in maintaining elasticity and cohesion; there attar debilitating the enemy's combat power to the danger zone of exhaustion and over- reach, then in launching own counter-offensive alter minimum pause or by use of the 'indirect approach' offensive stratagem to topple/unhinge the enemy's balance and make him reel back, and end up with the destruction of his main force and irrecoverable loss at his territory. This is where the inclusion of TSD at the Corps level will make a great diligence in our calculations. The TSD does not have active Combat Formations under it yet it plays the role at a force multiplier by attentively employing Tactical Reserves and deciding the right timing and objective for such Counter Strike. its main aim and battle extoll is to look deep into enemy territory and discern correctly his pattern of operations almost to a predictable certainty.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|