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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
175964
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| Summary/Abstract |
ALL MANNER of social processes, including sometimes those of international significance, are often closely connected to the personal contribution, energy, talent, knowledge, and life experience of specific individuals and their ability to lead others and inspire them with their enthusiasm and belief that a given idea is correct and a certain goal is achievable. In this article, we would like to tell about one such extraordinary individual: a talented scholar, organizer and promoter who lived a difficult but vivid, active and eventful life.
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| 2 |
ID:
131599
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A Hollywood, Florida, conference of specialists in preventing, detecting, and responding to money laundering might not seem to be the most likely spot for the next innovation in nuclear nonproliferation policymaking. Yet, a March speech by Jennifer Shasky Calvery, director of the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), suggested an approach that regulators charged with stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons would do well to study. Shasky Calvery stated that "FinCEN needs to find ways for more dynamic, real-time information sharing, both by and between financial institutions, and with FinCEN and law enforcement."[1] The information to which she was referring is transaction data related to money laundering that currently reside within banks, casinos, credit card processing companies, and many other types of financial businesses. Export control regulators could apply Shasky Calvery's approach to their own mission. In the nonproliferation context, FinCEN's anti-money laundering data would be analogous to the inquiries that potential buyers of dual-use commodities place over the phone or on commercial websites. Dual-use commodities have legitimate civilian applications, but can also be used to support nuclear weapons development. If a request appears suspicious, most firms will decline the request. Unlike their counterparts in the financial sector, however, export control regulators and private business have few tools with which to gather and disseminate this critical information about the networks illicitly seeking strategic commodities. Taking a page from the anti-money laundering playbook may help stop proliferation procurement.
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