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ID:
132325
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines compliance with international laws prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants in interstate war, specifically focusing on the role of third-party states in enforcement. We argue that the expectation of third-party coercion, when sufficiently high, can induce war participants to comply with this body of law. We identify the conditions under which combatant states will anticipate a high likelihood of coercion, demonstrating that third-party states are most likely to coerce combatants when they have both the willingness and opportunity to do so. Democratic third parties that value the rule of law and human rights possess the willingness to coerce war participants, while strong allies, trade partners, and intergovernmental organization (IGO) partners with existing ties to the combatant state have the opportunity to engage in coercion by linking combat-ant behavior to the provision of benefits or imposition of costs. Based on this logic, we hypothesize that war combatants who have ratified the Geneva/Hague Conventions prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants during war are more likely to comply with the legal obligations included in those conventions when they interact with relatively strong democratic alliance, trade, and IGO partners. In a series of quantitative tests on a data set of all interstate wars from 1900 to 2003, we find strong statistical and substantive support for the role of third parties in inducing compliance with the law.
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| 2 |
ID:
132468
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Putin's exploitation of the tension between the principles of non-intervention and self-determination is in the tradition of great-power interaction with international law. But Russia's interpretation sets dangerous precedents.
Crimea is Russia's. The March 2014 referendum and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea are now events of history, even while the territorial borders and political future of the rest of Ukraine remain contested. Yet, as international attention has moved from Sevastopol to Kiev and more recent crises elsewhere, a key balance between two of the most fundamental principles of the post-Second World War international legal and political order remains at stake.
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| 3 |
ID:
131694
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
'Naming and shaming' those accused of abuse and misconduct is one of the most common strategies of transnational activists. Yet both qualitative and quantitative studies show that the policy and behavioural effects of naming and shaming are often contradictory. Named and shamed actors do respond at least partially by adjusting their policies and behaviour to some extent, but the actions challenged publicly as human rights violations may not cease and can even become more widespread. This ambivalent outcome is usually explained by the uneven capacity of the target to reform or by its 'strategic' response to escape the consequences of naming and shaming. By contrast, I show that naming and shaming can be brought to a standstill when the frame used by transnational activists is ambiguous. I trace the role of framing ambiguity during the Human Rights Watch (HRW) 'naming and shaming' campaigns against the Israel Defence Force (IDF) in the course of the July-August 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war (Lebanon war), and the December 2008-January 2009 Israel-Hamas war (Gaza war). I argue that HRW's use of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as a frame led to an argumentative deadlock (frame implication contest). This legal frame, and the process of legal framing, did genuinely constrain the IDF, affecting its operations and behaviour. However, the ambiguity of the frame also provided the IDF with a range of material and ideational assets that gave it scope to claim that its actions were actually in conformity with applicable law, and to justify continuing to use force in densely populated areas.
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