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| 1 |
ID:
132706
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Instead of chauvinism and chaos Russia needs a third alternative. And that is a combination of moderate patriotism and moderate liberalism manifesting itself in the commitment to freer life by law, without corruption, but with mature self-government.
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| 2 |
ID:
132710
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia will have to deal with the effects of Crimea being part of an independent Ukraine for 23 years. A Crimean political and business elite has emerged with its own values, bonds, and relationships. Russia is not the motherland of an entire generation of Russian-speaking youth, but the motherland of their ancestors.
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| 3 |
ID:
132705
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The new post-Crimean risk for Russia's political system is not so much in putting political participation on freeze as in forcing this participation, which might push the country onto the road to ideology-driven authoritarianism.
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| 4 |
ID:
132709
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Armenia, opting for self-restraint of its own accord, minimized its risks and losses. As to whether the Armenian-style Finlandization can be an example for other former Soviet republics would depend not only on their own choice.
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| 5 |
ID:
132712
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The participation of Donetsk representatives in the government corresponds to the "horizontal principle," but domination does not. There will be neither real reform nor a modern and efficient state in Ukraine unless regions feel that they are equal.
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| 6 |
ID:
131994
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article evaluates, through statistical analysis, China's foreign policy of non-intervention, and answers the question of whether or not China has kept to its declared policy regarding intrastate wars relative to the other four powers that are permanent members of the UN Security Council. The evidence in this article suggests that the Chinese policy of non-interference was more a declaration than a policy. China significantly lower only from the United States and the USSR/Russia and differs solely in numbers of interventions, their extent, and diversity. Yet China is the only power that has not sent troops to interfere in intrastate wars. The country's share among the powers in supporting actors in intrastate wars is significantly less as time passes, although China exhibited no significantly different trends between the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. It is, on the contrary, the United States and UK among the powers that have significantly increased their relative share of interference.
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| 7 |
ID:
134093
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama administration seems to believe that Vladimir Putin should not be taken too seriously. The annexation of Crimea and belligerence over Ukraine are, to quote the president and his secretary of state, a sign of "weakness," the hallmark of a "regional" power stuck in "the old ways of doing things," leading no bloc of nations and having "no global ideology." These assumptions may be comforting rationales for a lack of response to the Kremlin's recent moves, but they misread the game Putin is playing-and underestimate its significance.
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