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ID:
132215
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Given the onset of a violent rebellion by an armed non-state group, how do states re-establish intra-state peace and hence fulfill their basic function as providers of internal security? In this article I argue that one way governments perform this core function is by recruiting non-combatants into local self-defense units called civilian defense forces (CDFs). By providing for local security, leveraging their superior local knowledge, and provoking insurgent reprisals against civilians, CDF units facilitate the influx of tactical intelligence as well as isolate insurgents from non-combatant populations physically as well as politically. Consistent with the argument, statistical analyses of two different cross-national data sets of insurgencies from 1944 to 2006 reveal that a state is 53 percent more likely to vanquish a guerrilla threat if the incumbent deploys CDFs. The analyses also cast doubt on a recent claim in the literature that incumbent force mechanization adversely affects the states' ability to counter insurgent threats. Given that CDF deployment is a more easily manipulable variable than most other elements of state power, CDFs appear to be an effective instrument of counterinsurgency deserving of further academic and policy attention.
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| 2 |
ID:
181744
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent research suggests that civilian defense forces (CDFs) – a distinct type of pro-government militia – can help states suppress insurgent movements. Considering the potential benefits, it is understandable why governments would want to use them. However, viewed from the perspective of civilian recruits, militia duty is a perilous side job that pays very little. So, why do civilians sign up to serve in them? This paper argues that civilian private agendas play a major role in facilitating the recruitment of CDFs. Because private agendas are difficult to observe directly, I examine their impact indirectly by identifying tribal groups as a population segment with particularly strong private incentives stemming from intertribal feuds and the concomitant desire to gain an upper hand relative to local rivals. The argument is tested on a novel province-level data set of CDF deployments in Turkey and the Philippines. Statistical analyses of these data show that states recruit over 50 percent more CDFs in regions with even modest tribal presence than in comparable areas without any tribal populations. These findings suggest that private agendas play a significant role in motivating militia recruitment. Private agendas thus help governments to combat macro-level insurgent movements by exploiting micro-level social tensions. The research also sheds light on the makeup of recruits and points to intensification of civilian disputes as likely ramification of CDF deployment in counterinsurgency campaigns.
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