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ID:
138430
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has generally made only modest military troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. As it prepares to review its defence and security strategy after the end of its long commitment to combat operations in Afghanistan, however, troop requirements for UN peacekeeping activities may appear again on the radars of policy-makers. Adrian L Johnson argues that there are broadly four options that the UK could take, the most likely being modest re-engagement with the military dimension of UN peacekeeping.
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| 2 |
ID:
132268
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2011, the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence launched the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). This document sought to integrate cross-government activity as it related to conflict and security so as to 'take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it escalating and spreading'. At the heart of the strategy was the recognition that addressing instability and conflict overseas was morally right and in the UK's national interests. This confluence of foreign policy realism and ethical outlook most clearly found harmony in the acknowledgement that it was cheaper for the international community to avoid conflict than it was to try to manage it. Through an examination of three historical case studies (Uganda 1964-1972, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe 1979-1981, and Sierra Leone 2000-2007), this article seeks to demonstrate just how difficult this seemingly sensible strategic outlook is. In particular, the article shows there are historical parallels in British postcolonial history that very closely resemble contemporary policy choices; that these can be used to define what is different about past and present practice; and, which in turn, can be used to - at least tentatively - mark out the potential strengths and weaknesses in BSOS.
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| 3 |
ID:
132225
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
British attitudes towards military intervention following the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have undergone what appears to be considerable change. Parliament has voted against the use of Britain's armed forces in Syria and the public are unenthused by overseas engagement. Conscious of the costs and the challenges posed by the use of British military power the government has been busy revamping the way it approaches crises overseas. The result is a set of policies that apparently heralds a new direction in foreign policy. This new direction is encapsulated in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the more recent International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES). Both BSOS and IDES set out the basis for avoiding major deployments to overseas conflict and instead refocuses effort on defence diplomacy, working with and through overseas governments and partners, early warning, pre-conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Developing a number of themes that reach from across the Cold War to more contemporary discussions of British strategy, the goal of this special edition is to take into account a number of perspectives that place BSOS and IDES in their historical and strategic context. These papers suggest that using defence diplomacy is and will remain an extremely imprecise lever that needs to be carefully managed if it is to remain a democratically accountable tool of foreign policy.
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