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| 1 |
ID:
164292
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the historical impact of foreign fighters and how the international community has sought to counter this threat. It argues that foreign fighters have contributed significantly to the metastasis of Salafi-jihadism over the past 30 years. They have globalized local conflicts. They have brought advanced skills to battlefields. Further, the logistics infrastructure built by foreign fighters has allowed Salafi-jihadism to expand rapidly. The challenge for security officials today is how to prevent the foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq from expanding the threat of Salafi-jihadism further. To inform this effort, this article derives lessons learned from past efforts against Arab Afghans in Bosnia (1992–1995) and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s foreign volunteers in Iraq (2003–2008).
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| 2 |
ID:
155266
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides an in-depth analysis of the role of foreign fighter returnees in the attacks by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Western Europe. To do this, it focuses primarily on the operatives and logisticians responsible for the November 2015 attacks in Paris. The threat from foreign fighter returnees remains under-appreciated in expert and policymaking communities. ISIS’s rhetorical emphasis on the caliphate, combined with a series of attacks by lone actors, has made it easy for policymakers to misinterpret ISIS’s true intentions against the West. This case study illustrates that ISIS leaders have been able to plan and execute parallel strategies within the Middle East (Islamic caliphate) and Western Europe (terrorist campaign). Moreover, they have pursued these parallel strategies through using foreign fighters.
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| 3 |
ID:
154976
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Daesh fighters have taken hostage over 100 foreigners in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere since 2012. The kidnappings drew international attention in August 2014, when American journalist James Foley was decapitated and a video of his death was posted online. But the pattern of kidnappings and gruesome videos distributed by violent Salafi-jihadists extends back over a decade to the killing of Daniel Pearl in 2002. This article traces shifts in the strategic rationale of Al Qaeda and Daesh for beheading Western hostages. It argues that terrorists altered their calculations on foreign hostages beginning in 2012 and U.S. counterterrorism policy does not take these shifts into account.
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| 4 |
ID:
155265
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides an in-depth analysis of the role of foreign fighter returnees in the attacks by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Western Europe. To do this, it focuses primarily on the operatives and logisticians responsible for the November 2015 attacks in Paris. The threat from foreign fighter returnees remains under-appreciated in expert and policymaking communities. ISIS’s rhetorical emphasis on the caliphate, combined with a series of attacks by lone actors, has made it easy for policymakers to misinterpret ISIS’s true intentions against the West. This case study illustrates that ISIS leaders have been able to plan and execute parallel strategies within the Middle East (Islamic caliphate) and Western Europe (terrorist campaign). Moreover, they have pursued these parallel strategies through using foreign fighters.
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| 5 |
ID:
179974
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| Summary/Abstract |
Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) signify a unique threat. Islamic State leaders recruited many of them specifically to conduct terrorist attacks against the West. Many of these external operations have proven to be sophisticated and deadly, such as the November 2015 attacks in Paris. Yet the threat posed by FTFs goes beyond orchestrating attacks. In the past, they returned home to build networks that, in turn, facilitated a new generation of FTFs. Even more challenging, today’s FTFs can interact with recruits on social media to inspire attacks. This article addresses the threat of a new wave of FTFs and potential countermeasures. It presents findings from a comparative analysis of Tunisia and Algeria, concluding that to reverse the compounding nature of FTFs, countries must identify the potential threat from the outset, put appropriate legal measures in place, adequately fund judicial systems, and institute re-integration programs.
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| 6 |
ID:
132303
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although much has been written about how and why individuals become terrorists, very little research has focused on why individuals choose not to become involved in political violence. Some assume that these non-radicalized individuals simply have not had the same life experiences as terrorists. Yet one only has to explore areas of conflict, such as the Gaza Strip, northwest Pakistan, or the southern Philippines, to wonder why more individuals have not joined local militant groups. This article presents a conceptual model ofnon-radicalization in an attempt to move the discussion forward on this topic. It argues that it is impossible to understand radicalization pathways, or design policies to preempt them, without a complementary knowledge ofwhy individuals resist the influence ofviolent extremism.
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| 7 |
ID:
138892
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda's organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL's behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
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| 8 |
ID:
175447
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Islamic State (IS) ruled over 11 million people at the height of its power. It also orchestrated over 250 terrorist attacks against the West. Thus, by any measure, IS surpassed the ambitions held by its predecessor al-Qaeda. Yet the United States (US) did not deploy tens of thousands of troops to confront it. It instead used surrogate forces to evict IS from its strongholds. Drawing on interviews with senior policymakers, diplomats, and military officials with knowledge of Operations Inherent Resolve in Syria and Odyssey Lightning in Libya, this paper confronts commonly-held perspectives on the “by, with, through” approach to warfare. It argues that will-to-fight and skillset play important roles in US military partnerships with irregular forces. Nevertheless, these two characteristics alone cannot overcome interference by other nation-states. To be successful, these partnerships should either be limited to short-term objectives or the US and allied forces should be prepared to deter opposition to their surrogates over the medium-to-long term.
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