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| 1 |
ID:
132313
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Like many ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa, the Dagaaba of northwest (now Upper West region) Ghana have regarded, and for the most part, continue to regard the payment of the brideprice as the cornerstone upon which marriage is built - without it a marriage contract is not considered legal. Since the 1980s, however, the significance or essence of the payment has been contested and challenged by many Dagaaba. While some (young men) argue for a reform of the payment, others (young women) argue that the practice should be abolished altogether. Yet a third group (mostly elders) believes that brideprice payment is a "tradition" passed down over generations that should be maintained. This article examines the origins and historical significance of brideprice payments, and how views about these payments have changed over time among the Dagaaba - from those born near the close of the last century, to those of marriageable age now. The goal of this examination is to contribute to the ongoing discussion among African scholars and governments on the importance of maintaining certain aspects of their cultural heritage.
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| 2 |
ID:
177267
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the process of the construction of a secular Kurdish perception of identity by Kurdish political elites since the 1960s. It argues that despite the variance in group-making tactics employed by different Kurdish political groups or figures, something has remained unchanged: the construction and promotion of a secular Kurdish identity perception, which dissociates Islam from the cultural content of Kurdish ethnic identity. Kurdish political and intellectual elites in Turkey, during and after the 1960s, took a radical stance against religion and started to construct and promote a Kurdish ethnic identity perception based only on certain myths, ruling out Islam from the cultural content of Kurdish ethnic identity. Although Kurdish political elites adopted a friendlier language towards religion after the 2000s, in response to certain political and practical challenges, they never gave up on this secular Kurdish identity perception.
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| 3 |
ID:
180290
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the process of the construction of a secular Kurdish perception of identity by Kurdish political elites since the 1960s. It argues that despite the variance in group-making tactics employed by different Kurdish political groups or figures, something has remained unchanged: the construction and promotion of a secular Kurdish identity perception, which dissociates Islam from the cultural content of Kurdish ethnic identity. Kurdish political and intellectual elites in Turkey, during and after the 1960s, took a radical stance against religion and started to construct and promote a Kurdish ethnic identity perception based only on certain myths, ruling out Islam from the cultural content of Kurdish ethnic identity. Although Kurdish political elites adopted a friendlier language towards religion after the 2000s, in response to certain political and practical challenges, they never gave up on this secular Kurdish identity perception.
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