| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much of today's intelligence literature emphasizes the role of cognitive bias and organizational pathologies in the explanation of intelligence failure. Adversary deception complicates the problem, not only for intelligence analysts and managers but for intelligence theorists as well. Operation Bodyguard, the deception plan covering Allied landings in Normandy in northwestern France in June 1944, is a case in point. Although German intelligence and decisionmaking displayed flaws, Bodyguard was such a monumental and masterful counterintelligence and deception operation that even perfectly rational individuals and organizations might have struggled to divine the truth through its fog and misdirection. Much of its deceptive power derived from the exploitation of human psychological traits that have come to be understood scientifically only in recent decades.
Although a famous historical event (associated with one of World War II's most famous quotations), Bodyguard warrants re-examination in light of modern psychology and intelligence theory. This battle between intelligence and deception is valuable as a case study in the general theory of deception and its underlying cognitive factors, understanding and mastery of which are vital to success in information-age conflict.
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