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| 1 |
ID:
060212
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| Publication |
London, Pluto Press, 2005.
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| Description |
xiv, 258p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0745322824
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049436 | 935.02/COO 049436 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
126202
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| 3 |
ID:
068588
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| Publication |
New Delhi, LeftWord Books, 2006.
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| Description |
xviii, 262p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
8197496533
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051084 | 956.70443/ALI 051084 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
044591
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| Publication |
London, Palasira, 1992.
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| Description |
xxvi, 591p.: ill., abbre., mapspbk
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| Standard Number |
0586092366
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Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 033476 | 956.7043/HIR 033476 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
021319
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| Publication |
May 13, 2002.
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| Description |
22-35
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| 6 |
ID:
093576
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| 7 |
ID:
094255
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| 8 |
ID:
101123
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US Department of Defense (DOD) has made available to scholars a significant collection of documents captured from the files of the Saddam-era Iraqi intelligence services. DOD is also studying ways in which further such documents can be released. These documents paint a picture in many ways reminiscent of the intelligence services of the totalitarian Soviet Union. These and forthcoming documents may enable important research on Iraq and on the role of intelligence services in totalitarian states. One newly available document gives the Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate's assessment of Iran on the eve of the Iran-Iraq War.
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| 9 |
ID:
074328
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| Publication |
London, SAQI, 2006.
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| Description |
275p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
0863567703
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051837 | 956.70443/GAL 051837 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
048277
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| Publication |
Chichester, Sussex Academy Press, 1996.
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| Description |
vi, 279p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
1898723206
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041022 | 956.94054/INB 041022 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
050333
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| Publication |
London, Simon and Schuster, 2003.
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| Description |
368p.Pbk
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| Standard Number |
0743257235
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 047499 | 909.8300942/COO 047499 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
121404
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Saddam's Iraq has become a cliché in the study of military effectiveness-the quintessentially coup-proofed, personalist dictatorship, unable to generate fighting power commensurate with its resources. But evidence from the later years of the Iran-Iraq War actually suggests that the Iraqi military could be quite effective on the battlefield. What explains this puzzling instance of effectiveness, which existing theories predict should not have occurred? Recently declassified documents and new histories of the war show that the Iraqi improvements stemmed from changes in Saddam's perceptions of the threat environment, which resulted in significant shifts in his policies with respect to promotions, training, command arrangements, and information management in the military. Threat perceptions and related changes in these practices also help explain Iraq's return to ineffectiveness after the war, as evident in 1991 and 2003. These findings, conceived as a theory development exercise, suggest that arguments linking regime type and coup-ridden civil-military relations to military performance need to take into account the threat perceptions that drive autocratic leaders' policies toward their militaries. After discussing how to define and measure battlefield effectiveness, the article reviews Saddam's changes and their effects; addresses alternative explanations for the improvement in Iraqi effectiveness; and explains how further research based on this initial exercise could generate a better understanding of the observed variation in states' battlefield effectiveness, including variation within and across autocratic regimes.
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| 13 |
ID:
071900
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| Publication |
London, I B Tauris, 2006.
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| Description |
xviii, 198p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
1845110706
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051287 | 956.043/ALM 051287 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
051852
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| 15 |
ID:
143110
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the drivers behind Saddam Husayn's decisions to target civilians during the Iran-Iraq War. Comparing the intensity and casualty rates of Saddam's counter-city campaigns, the study asks whether their variation was linked to Iraqi battlefield performance, the type and intensity of Iranian offensives, or international attention to the matter. Analysis is based on Saddam Husayn's taped conversations with his advisers, media reports from the period, and public records from Saddam's 2004 interrogation sessions.
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| 16 |
ID:
131607
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the successful denuclearization of Iraq by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the early 1990s and the apparent failure of the US Intelligence Community (IC) to rethink its assessments of Saddam's desire for nuclear weapons despite Baghdad's co-operation with the IAEA inspectors, and clear evidence from the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification team that this was a highly successful process. US policy towards Iraq, from the Clinton administration onwards, was hyper-politicized; it relied on a default, unchanging view of Saddam Hussein as a rogue leader bent on WMD acquisition and regional domination in an area that was of vital importance to the United States. The article also considers the impact of the fractious UNSCOM inspections process and argues that this was severely compromised by political intrusion, which was also ignored by the US IC in its assessments of Saddam's intentions. Ultimately, US intelligence on Iraq was filtered for a decade through a hyper-politicized lens that tended to discount evidence from the IAEA that disproved pre-existing assumptions.
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