Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
132183
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
This article looks at the European Communities' efforts against terrorism in the 1970s. It argues that in spite of the high ambitions to improve European legal integration, the attempts to develop an antiterrorism agreement were quite obviously a failure. Although the Dublin Agreement was adopted in 1979 after cumbersome and lengthy negotiations, it fell short of showing the member states' unity and resolve to fight terrorism, and it never entered into force. The tedious negotiations drained the member states' energy and willingness to such an extent that no other steps toward judicial integration or antiterrorism treaties were taken.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
ID:
132184
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is committed for strategic reasons as a form of costly signaling to an audience. However, since over half of terrorist attacks are not credibly claimed, conventional wisdom does not explain many acts of terrorism. This article suggests that there are four lies about terrorism that can be incorporated in a rationalist framework: false claiming, false flag, the hot-potato problem, and the lie of omission. Each of these lies about terrorism can be strategically employed to help a group achieve its desired goal(s) without necessitating that an attack be truthfully claimed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
ID:
132181
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
This article studies a singular aspect of the urban insurgency of Uruguay's MLN-Tupamaros: the tactic of armed propaganda. The Tupamaros applied the method mainly at the peak of their existence, in the years 1969-70. Afterward they opted predominantly for others, such as terrorism. By comparing the two periods, I argue that armed propaganda helped the organization to thrive, while the latter was an important cause of its demise. The conclusion suggests that armed propaganda led the Tupamaros to significant accomplishments, but also that switching tactics was a major determinant in their defeat.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4 |
ID:
132186
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
The 2012 Toulouse and Montauban shootings and the grisly murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013 are stark reminders of a continued terrorist threat posed by jihadist terrorists in Europe. Whereas the 2011 death of Osama bin Laden and the advent of the "Arab Spring" fed expectations that international jihadism was a spent force, attack activity in Europe does not only seem to persist, but as will be shown here, the region has actually faced an increase in terrorist plots over the past few years.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|