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ID:
193056
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores shortcomings in military effectiveness in the war in Afghanistan. It focuses on three sets of problems: the failure to resolve internal contradictions in the training effort, the failure to integrate political considerations with military activity, and poor strategic and operational/tactical integration.
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| 2 |
ID:
145483
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Alpha Editions, 2016.
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| Description |
xiv, 473p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9789385505843
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058680 | 355.033073/HOO 058680 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
132560
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Given the importance of Central and East Asia to the current U.S. strategic landscape, it is curious that policymakers and historians largely overlooked the countries of South Asia during the Cold War, and especially the strategic import of Bangladesh. Nestled between the current con?ict in Afghanistan and threats of future competition with China or North Korea, and particularly vulnerable to "environmental emergencies," the region perhaps deserves a more strategic assessment than has previously been afforded A recent trove of studies on South Asia-focused on the Bay of Bengal writ large and Bangladesh speci?cally- illuminates the historical context for U.S. and global engagement in the region, accounting for the geopolitical, strategic and economic importance of the often- neglected Bangladesh.
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| 4 |
ID:
146449
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| Summary/Abstract |
As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy) we have. However, we do not necessarily win wars with the same armed forces or strategy with which we began them. Often, these forces initially are not optimized for the particular conflict in which they become engaged, and even when they are, adaptive adversaries present unanticipated challenges. Often throughout history, leaders have needed to recognize that their initial plans were not successful and that adaptation (organizationally, doctrinally, or in weapons and equipment) was needed.
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