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| 1 |
ID:
136227
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, China׳s leaders have sought to coordinate official energy intensity reduction targets with new targets for carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity reduction. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) included for the first time a binding target for energy intensity, while a binding target for CO2 intensity was included later in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). Using panel data for a sample of industrial firms in China covering 2005 to 2009, we investigate the drivers of energy intensity reduction (measured in terms of direct primary energy use and electricity use) and associated CO2 intensity reduction. Rising electricity prices were associated with decreases in electricity intensity and increases in primary energy intensity, consistent with a substitution effect. Overall, we find that energy intensity reduction by industrial firms during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan translated into more than proportional CO2 intensity reduction because reducing coal use—in direct industrial use as well as in the power sector—was a dominant abatement strategy. If similar dynamics characterize the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), the national 17 percent CO2 intensity reduction target may not be difficult to meet—and the 16 percent energy intensity reduction target may result in significantly greater CO2 intensity reduction.
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| 2 |
ID:
137534
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper investigates the impacts of ISO 14001 adoption on the performance of firms using a sample of Chinese firms. The results show that adopting ISO 14001 has insignificant impacts on the financial performance of Chinese firms. A further investigation shows that the adoption of ISO 14001 increases sales and costs of firms in similar magnitudes, thus causes insignificant net effects on the financial performance. Despite negligible financial gains, the adoption of ISO 14001 provides implicit non-financial benefits, such as promoting export and relieving coercive environmental inspections from the government.
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| 3 |
ID:
132605
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There are extensive governmental rent-seeking activities in safety supervision of the Chinese coal industry. The rents come from industry safety barriers, low resource taxes, and privilege policies for coalmining enterprises. The rent-seeking mechanism was analyzed using a model comprising dynamic games with incomplete information. The equilibrium results indicate that the probability of national supervision is influenced by penalties and bribery: there is negative correlation with penalties and positive correlation with bribery. The rent-seeking probability of a governmental safety supervision department is influenced by several factors, and positively correlates with the cost of national supervision. The probability of bribery of coalmining enterprises is influenced by several factors, and positively correlates with wages of governmental departments and a reasonable rent-seeking range. Reversed rent-seeking reduces the probability of bribery, but it×s not worth recommending. Some recommendations are proposed.
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