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| 1 |
ID:
132706
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Instead of chauvinism and chaos Russia needs a third alternative. And that is a combination of moderate patriotism and moderate liberalism manifesting itself in the commitment to freer life by law, without corruption, but with mature self-government.
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| 2 |
ID:
132702
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The use of force is no longer legitimate like it was in the 19th and 20th centuries. Conservative-style action from the position of force cannot achieve anything in terms of boosting a country's position even within the traditional zone of influence.
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| 3 |
ID:
132711
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kiev's attempt to build an all-Ukrainian identity solely on the basis of the Ukrainian ethnos through political centralization, cultural unification, and forceful assimilation was a complete failure. Now, as part of the Russian Federation, which pursues an entirely different regional policy, Crimea has an opportunity to form its own regional identity.
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| 4 |
ID:
132710
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia will have to deal with the effects of Crimea being part of an independent Ukraine for 23 years. A Crimean political and business elite has emerged with its own values, bonds, and relationships. Russia is not the motherland of an entire generation of Russian-speaking youth, but the motherland of their ancestors.
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| 5 |
ID:
132705
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The new post-Crimean risk for Russia's political system is not so much in putting political participation on freeze as in forcing this participation, which might push the country onto the road to ideology-driven authoritarianism.
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| 6 |
ID:
132698
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| Publication |
2014.
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Debates over the ongoing crisis in relations between Russia and the West revolve around the incorporation of Crimea, the global reaction to that move, and the future configuration of the Ukrainian state if, of course, it manages to survive (and I hope it will). But I contend that these are not the primary issues in global terms. There are other crucial questions. The first is what the European security system will be like. I repeat: the Old World was not allowed to withdraw from the Cold War, and now it may see a new round of tension. The second important question is whether Russia will be able to overcome the impasse in its development, in which it found itself after it restored statehood at the end of the 2000s. The third and closely linked question is whether Russia will wish to remain part - even an independent and very special partner - of Europe or will it opt for cultural-civilizational isolation and increasingly lean towards the East economically. It is obvious that Russia is firmly determined to change the rules of the game that have been dictated to it for the past twenty-five years. Unable and reluctant to toe the line, Russia has given up attempts to become part of the West.
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| 7 |
ID:
132709
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Armenia, opting for self-restraint of its own accord, minimized its risks and losses. As to whether the Armenian-style Finlandization can be an example for other former Soviet republics would depend not only on their own choice.
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| 8 |
ID:
132712
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The participation of Donetsk representatives in the government corresponds to the "horizontal principle," but domination does not. There will be neither real reform nor a modern and efficient state in Ukraine unless regions feel that they are equal.
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| 9 |
ID:
132699
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the existing world order proves to be so manifold that it is hard to predict its consequences, irrespective of its outcome. This short article touches upon only a few aspects of the problem.
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| 10 |
ID:
132697
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| Publication |
2014.
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It is already becoming habitual: yet another turn in world politics - and a fondly prepared portfolio of materials has to be shelved, and new ones made in an emergency mode. Witnessing epoch-making events is fascinating, but it takes a lot of nerve…
The period from February to April 2014 marked the sharpest turn in history since the end of the Cold War. We have witnessed the actual collapse of the Ukrainian statehood which emerged after the abolition of the Soviet Union, Crimea's entry into the Russian Federation, and an upsurge in confrontation between Moscow and the West. No wonder life made us revise our plans and devote the entire issue of Russia in Global Affairs to the changes which someone has already dubbed "Russian spring."
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| 11 |
ID:
132704
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Until spring 2014, discussions about the new Russian national identity, including the Russian world concept, had little to do with Russia's foreign policy and national security agenda. The revolution in Ukraine made it one of the issues critical for the survival of the Russian nation and statehood.
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| 12 |
ID:
132713
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| Publication |
2014.
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Ukraine's main chance of entering Europe not as a source of labor force, but as a moderately developed industrialized country will be to go ahead with exports to Russia and other countries where Ukrainian manufactures are in demand.
Ukraine's socio-political and economic crisis did not emerge out of nowhere and it will not die down all by itself. It has lasted throughout the period of post-Soviet transformation, and there are no immediate reasons to hope it will end soon. Our observations made from the very outset of this process1 provide ample reasons to postulate that the original expectations of progress have failed to materialize. In 2007 we maintained that Ukraine had very good chances of taking a worthy place in Europe by virtue of the potential competitive edges of the Ukrainian economy, but that would require hard work, patience, time and a coherent policy. Over the past five to ten years, in particular, in the context of the current political crisis, that chance has been wasted and, regrettably, another one may offer itself only in the distant future
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| 13 |
ID:
132701
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
International law doesn't work well in in a world with unipolar tendencies and when its interpretation is dictated from a unipolar center. But the world is simply too big, complex and diverse for that.
There are many causes of the current conflict in and around Ukraine. Due to the presence of all-pervading corruption that since 1991 has constantly increased from President to President, from administration to administration, and the absence of any meaningful efforts to bridge the potentially explosive historical, religious, ethnic and geographic divides of the country, Ukraine was on the edge of becoming a failed state even before it finally exploded on the Maidan. Neither the Ukrainian political elite nor those external actors, which have supported or continue to support the respective governments or oppositions, have ever acted in the best interests of the Ukrainian people as a whole.
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| 14 |
ID:
132707
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The U.S. should follow the British wise policy of the early 20th century which implies the accommodation and sharing of power with an adversary. Reality would impose this transition anyway.
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