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ID:
132808
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The five pre-1998 nuclear powers have matured their Nuclear Command and Control Structures, and Nuclear Forces Structures (NFS) over a period ranging from 70 years for the US to 50 years for China.
The Cold War arms race created thousands of systems for command and control or functioning of military forces. The C4ISR systems deployed or under development provide 24 hours continuous surveillance of each other's areas/offensive weapons, detect movement of strategic systems or change of deployment patterns and allied/linked systems. The command and control of these powers are well developed, with state-of-the-art electronic systems to function under NBC conditions. The command centres are located in deep underground hardened shelters, capable of withstanding nuclear attacks, functioning 24x7.
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| 2 |
ID:
150113
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| Summary/Abstract |
I apply a dynamic systems approach to define strategic stability and classify strategic systems as stable, unstable, or neutral, based on the nature of forces that strategic capabilities exert under perturbation away from equilibrium. Conceptualizing stability in this manner is helpful when considering its relationship to mutual vulnerability, its role in extended deterrence relationships, and prospects for maintaining stability along proposed paths to disarmament. Traditional U.S. policy objectives do not appear to distinguish between true stability and neutral stability, and traditional definitions of strategic stability describe neutral stability. True strategic stability is an unlikely policy objective for the United States.
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