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ID:
132829
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a regulated world where government seeks to decarbonize the energy sector, firms face both indirect and direct costs of emitting CO2. This study seeks to take the perspective of the firm, which needs to maximize profits implying minimization of (carbon) cost as well. In this study, the firm can compose the cost-optimal portfolio of (a) investing into carbon-saving technology, which is currently expensive, (b) investing into carbon-saving technology R&D and adopt this technology at a later point, (c) buying allowances per ton of emitted CO2 in a carbon market (alternatively this could be formulated as a tax), and (d) buying offsets traded in the same market, which are based on reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+). Uncertainties in the cost of carbon coming from a lack of commitment in policy-making leading to fluctuations in markets and uncertainty in the payoff of R&D activities could provide disincentives to incur large up-front sunk cost and raise the economic value of being flexible. We apply a real options approach with stochastic carbon-saving technology costs and stochastic CO2 costs. Assuming that firms are risk-averse, they will not only value flexibility, but also risk reductions from diversification over the different (carbon mitigation) options.
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| 2 |
ID:
147625
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| Summary/Abstract |
We study how the presence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) distorts private firms' decision on interprovincial sales in China. Using data from World Bank Investment Climate Survey and Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms in China, we find evidence that the prevalence of SOEs in a city-industry where private firms reside will affect these firms' decision on the allocation of sales between interprovincial markets versus adjacent market. The direction of the effect on private firms, however, depends crucially on the private firms' access to credit. Specifically, the prevalence of SOEs leads to a higher propensity to sell to remote markets for firms with adequate financial access, whereas the opposite is true for firms who are credit constrained. We build a parsimonious model which links political/market distortion, market access, and credit constraint to explain these patterns, and argue that remote markets can serve as shelters for local distortions resulted from SOEs presence for some private firms.
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