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| 1 |
ID:
181963
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| Summary/Abstract |
The strategic-military significance of the recent discovery of extensive natural gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean works against Israel’s traditional reluctance to become a sea power. But any “turn to the sea” will require adopting a broad national and strategic mind-set in the face of cultural constraints that keep Israel tied to the land.
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| 2 |
ID:
183987
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Israeli navy prepares to confront Arab non-state actors, mostly Hamas and Hezbollah. Hezbollah might attack Israel’s sea lanes in the Mediterranean Sea, while both Hamas and Hezbollah might strike Israel’s natural gas rigs and the Israeli coastline, where most of the Jewish state’s population and infrastructure are located. The Israeli navy will support ground forces by gathering intelligence and by striking targets. Yet, the Israeli navy does not have significant firepower so the IAF will assist in this matter. The Israeli navy also lacks the ability to conduct vast amphibious operations. The IDF can invest in this field sicne such a maneuver can be a game changer.
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| 3 |
ID:
133065
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is appropriate for the Naval War College Review to reprint the superb essay by Admiral Ya'ari, because
the things he foresaw nearly twenty years ago are all coming to pass-an analytical performance worthy of any Old Testament prophet. The growing hazards and deadliness of the littoral seas are something all navies must take into account, but particularly the U.S. Navy, because it is only just beginning to grasp the uniqueness of the littoral environment, the need for new tactics, and the value of warships better suited to fight in its clutter. For example, with Professor Don Brutzman of the Naval Postgraduate School, I have reached the conclusion that the goal of "networkcentric warfare" (NCW) is appropriate only for operating an aircraft carrier battle group, an expeditionary strike group, or a surface action group, none of which can perform its function without radiating almost continuously. But NCW is ill suited for more numerous, distributable, smaller, and less expensive ships intended to fight in the demanding environment described by Admiral Ya'ari.
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| 4 |
ID:
190992
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This article tells the extraordinary story of Fiorenzo Capriotti, the man behind the sinking of the Egyptian flagship the Emir Farouk in October 1948 and the birth of the Israeli navy commando unit. Using the same unconventional technique that the Italian navy special assault unit Decima Flottiglia MAS had pioneered against the British in World War II, the embryonic Israeli navy was able to defeat Egypt’s superior numbers and weaponry. Not only did Capriotti play a key role in the founding of the Israeli navy commando unit, but he also made a significant contribution in shaping the doctrine that the Israeli navy should overcome the unfavourable balance of power through the superiority of its naval commando units. The sinking of Emir Farouk in fact consolidated the notion that the Israeli navy should compensate for its small size relative to most of its enemies through greater agility and firepower.
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