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ID: 133118

Elements of surprise: assessing Burma's double-edged détente / Slater, Dan

Slater, Dan	Journal Article
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Publication

2014.

Summary/Abstract

If anything is more surprising than Burma's recent adoption of democratic reforms, it is that military rule lasted so long without such reforms in the first place. This article considers this paradox from both a country-specific and comparative-theoretical perspective, and argues that both perspectives are essential for analysing Burma's uncertain reform process as it unfolds or unravels. It portrays the top-down reform process as one of double-edged détente between the ruling Tatmadaw and its internal rivals as well as its external critics. This détente is inherently fragile because it rests on the current regime's confidence that democratization will produce neither serious instability nor even its own decisive defeat. Events that shake the Tatmadaw's 'victory confidence' and 'stability confidence' should thus pose the greatest risk that reforms will be stalled or reversed.

Key Words

Burma ; Political Reforms ; Military Rules ; Democratic Reforms ; Reform Process ; Political Paradox ;
External Critics ; Comparative-Theoretical Perspective - CTP ; Internal Rivals ; Current Regime's ; Greatest Risk ; Uncertain Reform

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ID: 151271

Rebel leaders, internal rivals, and external resources: how state sponsors affect insurgent cohesion / Tamm, Henning

Tamm, Henning	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

Civil wars often feature insurgent groups with external sponsors. Yet, we know little about the impact of such sponsorship on insurgent cohesion. Indeed, researchers disagree about the conditions under which state sponsorship encourages or discourages organizational splits. This article presents a theory that reconciles these disagreements. I focus on how the allocation of external resources affects the intra-group distribution of power between rebel leaders and their internal rivals. Sponsors that help maintain an imbalance of power in favor of the leader foster cohesion; those that help flip the imbalance in favor of a rival increase the likelihood of an internal coup within the group. Only when sponsors contribute to a shift from an imbalance of power to balanced power is the rebel group more likely to split into competing organizations. I further argue that sponsors reallocate their resources in favor of a rebel leader’s internal rival in order to punish the leader for undesired behavior. Case studies of two major insurgent groups—the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and the Lebanese Hezbollah—illustrate the explanatory power of my argument.

Key Words

Internal Rivals ; Insurgent Cohesion ; Rebel Leaders ; External Resources ; State Sponsors ; Civil Wars and Violence

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