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INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   133147


Influence of directive strategies on settlement duration / Gartner, Scott Sigmund   Journal Article
Gartner, Scott Sigmund Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract Are Directive Strategies in international disputes the most effective mediation method for obtaining durable peace? A standard statistical analysis shows no effect of Directive Strategies on settlement durability. This result however, is misleading, failing to take selection and indirect effects into account. In this article, I identify when selection and process effects reinforce or oppose each other. Directive Strategies have opposing negative selection and positive process effects, which can distort inferences about their influence. Strategies' direct and indirect effects are also examined. Directive Strategies are more likely to lead to Full Settlements - the most comprehensive form of agreement, which improve the settlement durability (an indirect effect). However, Directive Strategies are used in more intractable disputes that result in fragile settlements (a direct effect). A statistical analysis of international disputes that takes these conflicting dynamics into account demonstrates the efficacy of Directive Mediation Strategies in producing durable agreements.
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2
ID:   133277


Who gets to be in the room: manipulating participation in WTO disputes / Johns, Leslie; Pelc, Krzysztof J   Journal Article
Johns, Leslie Journal Article
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Publication 2014.
Summary/Abstract Third parties complicate World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement by adding voices and issues to a dispute. However, complainants can limit third parties by filing cases under Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), rather than Article XXII. We argue that third parties create "insurance" by lowering the benefit of winning and the cost of losing a dispute. We construct a formal model in which third parties make settlement less likely. The weaker the complainant's case, the more likely the complainant is to promote third party participation and to settle. Article XXII cases are therefore more likely to settle, controlling for the realized number of third parties, and a complainant who files under Article XXIII is more likely to win a ruling and less likely to see that ruling appealed by the defendant. We provide empirical support using WTO disputes from 1995 to 2011.
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