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ID:
133518
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Did participants in small wars in the period 1775-1831 learn from previous or contemporary examples? While this is difficult to prove for participants who left no written records, there is considerable evidence in existing publications by practitioners that they did indeed draw out lessons from recent insurgencies, either from their own experience or from events elsewhere which they studied from afar, especially the Spanish Guerrilla, which had already become legendary. Most authors showed an interest in how to stage insurgencies rather than in how to quell them. Even then, transfer did not come in a package of tactics-cum-values, but in each case in different configurations.
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| 2 |
ID:
038698
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| Publication |
London, WeidenFeld and Nicolson, 1982.
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| Description |
xvi, 331p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0297780549
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 021627 | 923.151/BIO 021627 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
133517
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article modifies the associations made by historians and political scientists of Spanish guerrilla warfare with revolutionary insurgency. First, it explains how the guerrilla phenomenon moved from a Leftist to a reactionary symbol. Second, it compares the insurgency and counter-insurgency features of the Carlist War (1833-1840) with those of the better-known Peninsular War (1808-1814). Third, it shows how erstwhile guerrilla leaders during the Carlist War made their expertise available to the counter-insurgency, in a socio-economic as well as military setting. This article revises the social banditry paradigm in nineteenth-century Spain in the under-researched context of Europe bloodiest nineteenth-century civil war.
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| 4 |
ID:
134093
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama administration seems to believe that Vladimir Putin should not be taken too seriously. The annexation of Crimea and belligerence over Ukraine are, to quote the president and his secretary of state, a sign of "weakness," the hallmark of a "regional" power stuck in "the old ways of doing things," leading no bloc of nations and having "no global ideology." These assumptions may be comforting rationales for a lack of response to the Kremlin's recent moves, but they misread the game Putin is playing-and underestimate its significance.
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