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| 1 |
ID:
163385
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Executive Director of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy contends that the concept that has guided the U.S. military for a generation–the two-war construct, or the ability to fight two simultaneous wars against regional powers–is no longer the central basis to evaluate the potential performance of the U.S. military.
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| 2 |
ID:
133488
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2009, the United States has released numerous strategic documents outlining the U.S. interests and national objectives in the Arctic. Although these documents recognize increasing interests of the United States in the region, they do not adequately address all the strategic risks at stake in the Arctic and do not provide clear guidance to the Department of Defense for defensive lines of effort. The strategic approach of the United States to the Arctic is one that accepts the current stable and conflict-free Arctic region and assumes that these conditions will remain the same in the future. This outlook ignores important trends that may create challenges for the United States far sooner than national policy makers expect. Without adequate defensive posturing, competition over Arctic resources could present the first direct existential threat to U.S. sovereignty. The four issues at stake that will likely require a combatant commander to use military capabilities to protect U.S. national interests in the Arctic include mineral and resource protection, freedom of navigation, sea lines of communication, and militarization of the Arctic.
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| 3 |
ID:
134927
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| Summary/Abstract |
While a lot has been written about the Department of Defense's (DoD) ongoing Strategic Choices and Management Review and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, 1 far less attention has been paid to the role of intelligence and the Intelligence Community (IC) in both processes and, more broadly, in informing both defense and grand strategy.
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