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| 1 |
ID:
117763
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 has been accused of being over-dependent on the counterinsurgency 'classics' Galula and Thompson. But comparison reveals that it is different in spirit. Galula and Thompson seek practical control; the Manual seeks to build 'legitimacy'. Its concept of legitimacy is superficially Weberian, but owes more to the writings of the American Max Manwaring. The Manual presupposes that a rights-based legal order can (other things being equal) be made to be cross-culturally attractive; 'effective governance' by itself can build legitimacy. The fusion of its methods with an ideology creates unrealistic criteria for success. Its weaknesses suggest a level of incapacity to think politically that will, in time, result in further failures.
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| 2 |
ID:
110863
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Caught between an arrogant European modernist elite and a proprietorial Indian nationalism, Tagore challenged the spatial dimensions of modernity by critiquing both Eurocentrism and a simplistic anti-imperialism. Tagore did build bridges with some Western intellectuals and social activists but much of his life illustrates the difficulties of meaningful cross-cultural relations and the shortcomings of a liberal 'politics of friendship'. If this is in part due to the inadequacy of translation, then we need more and better translations. Rather than resurrecting a platitudinous 'cosmopolitan' World Citizen, Tagore's work should require us to think more critically about parallel modernities and different ways of imagining our futures. As China and India, perhaps above all others, grow in economic, political and cultural strength, these questions are likely to become more pressing.
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| 3 |
ID:
021956
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| Publication |
May 2002.
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| Description |
263-287
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| 4 |
ID:
096861
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
British operations in Helmand province, Afghanistan, have been contextualised within the theory and practice of counter-insurgency. The theories of Sir Robert Thompson are held to represent the basis for successful counter-insurgency campaigning. This analysis takes the simple premise of posing the question as to whether British conduct in Helmand between 2006 and 2008 has represented the effective utilisation of Thompson's principles. Evaluating the evolution of British operations on the ground this analysis suggests that while the influence of Thompson's thinking can be clearly detected, in practice the implementation of his precepts have been undermined and negated by a variety of factors, most notably the weaknesses of the government of Afghanistan. The result has been an ever-greater focus on the prosecution of the military campaign to the exclusion of the multifaceted programme advocated by Thompson. In conclusion, it may be contended the campaign in Helmand does not resemble the ideals outlined by Thompson or, indeed, much of an effective counter-insurgency plan.
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