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ID:
134582
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| Summary/Abstract |
The drift and incoherence of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration has not gone unnoticed in the Arab world and the Middle East, especially among America's Arab Gulf allies. Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas Freeman could have been channeling Gulf elites when he said: “Americans no longer command the ability to shape trends in the Middle East. Almost no one expects us to do so.”1 The United States and its strategic allies in the Gulf have increasingly divergent visions of how regional politics should operate. The “marriage” between Washington and the Gulf has been long and beneficial to both sides, though not without its ups and downs. Neither side really wants a divorce, but Gulf elites increasingly worry that this episode of tensions is qualitatively different from those that came before. They fear that, this time, Washington not only disagrees with their view of the region, it does not care about their opinions, because America's strategic commitment to the Gulf, and the Middle East more generally, is no longer solid. For them, the “pivot to Asia” looks increasingly like a retreat from the Middle East. The renewed talk in American policy circles about “energy independence,” this time with more credible evidence to back it up, just adds to Gulf worries that Washington has downgraded the Gulf region and that the pivot is really a retreat.
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| 2 |
ID:
136809
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The recent U.S. visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in words of many experts has galvanized the Indo-U.S. relations once again which was being accused of having slipped into dormant conditions throughout the period of UPA-II Government. The recent visit of PM Modi had its own gains and losses for the country. The high point was revival of Indo-US Defense Cooperation Framework Agreement apart from agreements reached in areas covering TRADE and economy, civil space and technology, education and skills development, energy and climate change and security partnerships.
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| 3 |
ID:
134231
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| Summary/Abstract |
A top diplomat from one of America's most dependable Middle Eastern allies said to me in July of this year, "but you no longer know how to act like one."
He was reflecting on America's position in the world almost halfway into President Barack Obama's second term. Fresh in his mind was the extraordinary string of errors (schizophrenic Egypt policy, bipolar Syria policy), missteps (zero Libya post-intervention strategy, alienation of allies in the Middle East and elsewhere), scandals (spying on Americans, spying on friends), halfway measures (pinprick sanctions against Russia, lecture series to Central Americans on the border crisis), unfulfilled promises (Cairo speech, pivot to Asia), and outright policy failures (the double-down then get-out approach in Afghanistan, the shortsighted Iraq exit strategy).
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ID:
134547
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the United States, at stake is its leader’s declining reputation and the risk of yet another humiliating defeat. The stakes are high also because Russia stands as a symbol of a rising and increasingly anti-Western “non-West.”
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| 5 |
ID:
136901
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| Summary/Abstract |
To counter China’s recent actions and maintain stability in the Western Pacific, the United States must find an effective strategy—soon.
China is implementing a well-designed cost-imposing strategy in the Western Pacific that is inexorably undermining the position of the United States and its partners in the region. We need a competitive response if we are to maintain peace and stability in an area the Obama administration has made a top priority for U.S. security planning. 1
Policymakers faced with an emerging and perhaps ambiguous threat must make two assessments. First, what military capacity might the potential adversary eventually develop? And second, what are the potential adversary’s intentions? Is it at least plausible that the opponent could put at risk the United States’ goals and interests? Policymakers are wise to keep their attention focused first on the adversary’s future capacity for military action for the simple reason that intentions can change rapidly and unexpectedly. Benign intentions today can become malign actions tomorrow. But those actions only become a problem if the adversary has the military capacity to carry them out.
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