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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
135015
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article empirically examines how British 21st Army Group produced a functional doctrine by late 1944. How much weight to give Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery in the outcome remains unclear despite significant scholarly literature. This article shows his openness to the “bubbling up” of operational methods from subordinate commanders. He closely managed this process, actively promulgated its output, and determined when he had gleaned sufficient feedback from it. His doctrinal contribution to the British Army’s final push against the Germans developed into British doctrine for many decades, and many Commonwealth countries followed the British lead. This article examines its roots.
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| 2 |
ID:
137054
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a series of reports and meetings in Spring 2011, intelligence analysts and officials debated the chances that Osama bin Laden was living in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Estimates ranged from a low of 30 or 40 per cent to a high of 95 per cent. President Obama stated that he found this discussion confusing, even misleading. Motivated by that experience, and by broader debates about intelligence analysis, this article examines the conceptual foundations of expressing and interpreting estimative probability. It explains why a range of probabilities can always be condensed into a single point estimate that is clearer (but logically no different) than standard intelligence reporting, and why assessments of confidence are most useful when they indicate the extent to which estimative probabilities might shift in response to newly gathered information.
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| 3 |
ID:
136592
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At the end of the fifty-day Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip, neither Israel nor Hamas had achieved their stated goals there: the armed resistance was still standing (despite the massive damage the territory and its people sustained) and the crippling Israeli siege was not lifted. Rather, this essay argues, it was Israel’s far right that emerged the victor. Not only did religious nationalists and secular extremists outflank the right-wing establishment, they justified the brutality of their actions in the military battle zone with messianic pronouncements, and fanned the flames of genocide in the public arena. The far right’s wartime success represented the culmination of a strategy Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling has called “politicide,” a coinage denoting the partial or total destruction of a community of people with a view to denying them self-determination.
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| 4 |
ID:
134232
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| Summary/Abstract |
It was October 2009, just days after a brazen Taliban attack on a remote American military base in eastern Afghanistan killed eight of the 53 members of his unit and wounded 27 others. The trim 29-year-old had hauled ammunition to pinned-down U.S. troops and killed close to a half-dozen Taliban fighters. His acts of bravery helped keep the tiny base from being completely overrun and later earned him the Medal of Honor, the U.S. military's highest commendation. Carter didn't feel like a hero, however. Alone at night, tossing and turning in his bed, he couldn't escape the sounds of that fateful firefight and the sight of Spc. Stephan Mace -- immobilized after his legs had been blown away -- begging for help, tears streaming down his dirt-covered face. Carter had raced across the battlefield and treated the 21-year-old's wounds, but, ultimately, Mace died during surgery just hours later. Carter felt that he had failed his comrade; if only he'd moved faster, he thought, Mace would have lived. And though Carter's platoon sergeant encouraged him to feel proud about having helped save other troops, "I couldn't really hear him," he said during a recent speech in Maryland. "I was more focused on getting to my bunk, burying my head into a pillow, and not existing. I wanted to find a deep hole and just disappear."
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| 5 |
ID:
135922
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| Summary/Abstract |
Contemporary military organizations have undergone important changes in terms of values (converging with civilians) and expected performance (diverging from traditional tasks) in multi-national environments. Military leaders were the first to adapt to the changes, since they represent the core of the military profession. This article identifies professional skills and personal characteristics of contemporary military leaders, based on cross-national perceptions of Italian and Slovenian service members. A triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods reveals that: (1) the military organizational culture is the most important factor supporting multi-national leadership and (2) unlike traditional military leadership, which emphasizes traditional military values and skills, post-modern leadership assigns more importance to emotional and cultural intelligence. Both key findings indicate a cultural gap between the traditional masculine, hierarchical and the flexible, culturally open military organization
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