|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
135091
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The author uses the latest theoretical and conceptual approaches to world politics and international security to analyze the Afghan problem. He suggests that certain commonly accepted ideas about the strategic situation in Afghanistan should be reviewed to arrive at more exact interpretations of the “traditional” and “non-traditional” threats and other concepts. He also formulates a concept of systemic securitization for Afghanistan’s future.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
135686
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Islamic movement of Uzbekistan has focused primarily on Afghanistan over Central Asia, hoping that Taliban fighters will returns north to help fight its caused. Antonio Ciustozzi examines the group’s strategy and relations with Jihadist Network
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
135342
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
We need to remember that we went into Afghanistan to eject Al Qaeda, not to improve women's rights. But the very success of our mission left us with responsibilities. Much has been achieved in health, in education, in creating a tax base and in governance-the recent elections were a conspicuous success, largely ignored by the media. But many problems remain, not least corruption. And there is the ongoing struggle with the Taliban Now, after more than ten years of engagement, NATO combat troops will withdraw at the end of 2014. This does not mean the Afghans will be abandoned. There will still be high levels of support for training and logistics. But what will happen? On the evidence so far, the Afghan Forces are likely to be able to prevent the Taliban taking over as long as the international community continues to pay the multi-billion dollar bill to sustain them. There are some grounds for thinking that a negotiated settlement with the Taliban is not impossible, partly because over the last decade, much has changed in Afghanistan. But It is still a poor country, not (yet) a liberal western democracy. One prophecy can be made with some certainty: if we do not continue to provide support, especially financial support, the result will be a rapid reversion to instability and conflict.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
135198
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In the concluding pages of his fascinating memoir, War Comes to Garmser, Carter Malkasian, a Pashto-speaking U.S. diplomat who was stationed in a volatile region of Afghanistan in 2009–11, voices a fear shared by many of the Westerners who have participated in the Afghan war during the past 13 years: "The most frustrating thing about leaving Garmser in July 2011 and now watching it from afar is that I cannot be certain that the [Afghan] government will be able to stand on its own. ... The British and the Marines had put the government in a better position to survive than it had enjoyed in the past. What they had not done was create a situation in which the government was sure to win future battles against Taliban [fighters] coming out of Pakistan."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
135857
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After having participated in the civil war and later ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, the current Taliban have a third life as insurgents against the Afghan government and its foreign supporters. Their aim is to return to power and establish an Islamic system. Pakistani shelter and support, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist tactics allowed the Neo-Taliban to extend their influence, particularly to the south and east of Afghanistan. They used the weakness of the Hamid Karzai regime to set up shadow governments. Since even the coalition forces have abandoned the aim of defeating them, the Taliban are guaranteed survival after foreign combat troops leave Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Due to the different interests of the main stakeholders—the Afghan government, the Taliban, the United States, and Pakistan—it is unlikely that the conflict will end by negotiations any time soon. Thus, the civil war will continue. When the Taliban try to extend their reach beyond rural areas and into non-Pashtun districts, they will meet tough resistance. Therefore, it is likely that the fragmentation of Afghanistan will persist and that the Taliban will not return as rulers of a united Afghanistan.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
136425
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The authors analyze Islam as one of the most important, if not decisive, factors responsible for the country’s future; they reveal the specifics of its functioning in Afghan society as the state religion, investigate in great detail the contradictions between individual groups and organizations involved in the conflict of the last quarter of the twentieth century, and examine their impact on the social and economic relations in the region. The sides in the conflict belong to different ethnic, confessional, and political groups. The continued disagreements between the official Muslim clergy and government in Afghanistan are a truthful reflection of the degree to which Islam affects the state’s life-supporting spheres and figure prominently in ethnic strife and tribal enmity, along with all kinds of external factors that keep the conflict alive.
The article looks at the main Islamist organizations that will figure prominently on Afghanistan’s domestic scene for several decades to come.
The authors believe that in the current conditions, Islam has ceased to be a factor of social stability and unity in Afghanistan.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
135175
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The drone is the latest tool to promote interests of a nation-state. It is clear that USA as well as other major powers anticipate that robotics will play a key role in future warfare. Today, more than 70 countries have already acquired drone technology and many others are desperate to join the ranks. This urge for drone technology will ultimately lead to a “boundless and borderless war without end.” In the case of Pakistan, the US drone campaign has raised some important issues regarding how their use could, or should, be regulated in the future. This article analyses the legal issues raised by the US's use of drone technology in non-combat zones, such as Pakistan. It is argued that a reckless disrespect of Pakistan's sovereignty has had adverse implications and consequences for the legitimacy of the Pakistani government. Drone strikes have prompted instinctive opposition among the Pakistani population, hurt their feelings and estranged them from the government. This in turn has added to Pakistan's instability and stimulated a ground-swell of animosity toward the USA.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
136495
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Given the recent successes of the “Islamic State,” it is unclear how well the Western-trained Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will perform against a resilient Taliban. This article recommends expanding the Afghan Local Police (ALP) to improve security, compensate for high Afghan Army attrition, and boost Pashtun recruitment in Afghanistan’s south and east.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
136364
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Taliban commander Mullah Zakir was promoted rapidly to a position of seniority within the group before precipitously falling from grace. From Afghanistan, Antonio Giustozzi provides a unique insight into the nature of the group’s senior leadership structures.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
134232
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
It was October 2009, just days after a brazen Taliban attack on a remote American military base in eastern Afghanistan killed eight of the 53 members of his unit and wounded 27 others. The trim 29-year-old had hauled ammunition to pinned-down U.S. troops and killed close to a half-dozen Taliban fighters. His acts of bravery helped keep the tiny base from being completely overrun and later earned him the Medal of Honor, the U.S. military's highest commendation. Carter didn't feel like a hero, however. Alone at night, tossing and turning in his bed, he couldn't escape the sounds of that fateful firefight and the sight of Spc. Stephan Mace -- immobilized after his legs had been blown away -- begging for help, tears streaming down his dirt-covered face. Carter had raced across the battlefield and treated the 21-year-old's wounds, but, ultimately, Mace died during surgery just hours later. Carter felt that he had failed his comrade; if only he'd moved faster, he thought, Mace would have lived. And though Carter's platoon sergeant encouraged him to feel proud about having helped save other troops, "I couldn't really hear him," he said during a recent speech in Maryland. "I was more focused on getting to my bunk, burying my head into a pillow, and not existing. I wanted to find a deep hole and just disappear."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
135405
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This has been a roller-coaster year for Afghans. It has included vigorous presidential and provincial election campaigns, a protracted political crisis, the formation of a government of national unity, the inauguration of a president with big new ideas, a financial crunch, devastating natural disasters, widening Taliban attacks and a surge in the number of Afghans being killed. Meanwhile, the US-led International Security Assistance Force is winding down and will conclude in December.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
137019
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
With the end of Cold War the relative dominance of the military–political notion of security plummeted reflecting the widespread recognition of the sources of security being diversified away from the centre stage, that is, the state. In recent years what have catapulted into the centre stage of both policy and strategic thinking are the environmental apocalypse, poverty, economic decline and other social crisis of identity, drug and human trafficking and politics of racism, minority, human rights and feminist indignation and population age structure brushing aside the political–military construct of security hovered around state and its apparatus to the fringe. Out of all these non-traditional security threats population age structure stands preeminent in view of its impact on stability and liberal democratic character of a state. The very word people is no longer a homogenous term. If the number of youths of a particular age group surpasses the other age groups in a nation it has serious implications on its security, and political stability. This is termed as ‘youth bulge’ which can turn into violence and civil war in case of failure of the state in providing them jobs, education and economic sustenance. This article explains how youth bulge in Afghanistan can greatly affect its transition to liberal democracy in the context of American withdrawal from Afghanistan and failure of the government to address the socio-economic challenges the people face in the society. When state fails as a constitutional and institutional device to meet all these challenges, slipping into the hands of Taliban which provides better economic prospects can become a fait accompli. Then the devil is easily identified in the demography. The stranglehold of America on Taliban seems to be waning with its decision to withdraw and involvement of Taliban in the peace talk. This will aggravate the situation further in Afghanistan as its youth bulge is very much disenchanted with the existing socio-economic landscape casting a shadow over its stability and transition to democracy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|