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| 1 |
ID:
134833
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| Summary/Abstract |
Al-‘Eizariya (Bethany) is one of East Jerusalem’s eastern neighborhoods located on the historic Jerusalem-Jericho route, two miles from Jerusalem. The reality of al-’Eizariya has changed dramatically in the last two decades. After the Oslo Accords (1993) were signed, al-‘Eizariya expanded to accommodate the flood of migrants who arrived due to an economic boom and the political expectation that it would be part of the future capital of the state of Palestine. All this economic growth has since been disrupted by the failure of the Oslo Accords1 and the construction of the Separation Wall beginning in 2002.2
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| 2 |
ID:
136185
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past decade, formerly close U.S.-Saudi relations have been under immense political pressure, in private and increasingly in the public media, as the two governments have dealt with the consequences of the 9/11 attacks, the 2003 Iraq War and the Arab Spring. However, there are significant U.S. interests at stake in the Middle East that require Washington to maintain at least a working relationship with Riyadh:
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| 3 |
ID:
136504
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| Summary/Abstract |
Even as protests spread across the Middle East in early 2011, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria appeared immune from the upheaval. Assad had ruled comfortably for over a decade, having replaced his father, Hafez, who himself had held power for the previous three decades. Many pundits argued that Syria’s sturdy police state, which exercised tight control over the country’s people and economy, would survive the Arab Spring undisturbed. Compared with its neighbor Lebanon, Syria looked positively stable. Civil war had torn through Lebanon throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s, and the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 had plunged the country into yet more chaos.
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| 4 |
ID:
135918
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent debates on societal transitions to democracy have focused their attention on the notion of “civil society,” putting great hope in its democratizing effects. This essay re- examines the notion’s utility in the context of the post-2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. It argues that at least in its conceptualization along the lines of the “transition paradigm,” the civil society framework is unable to capture the complex catalysts of the non-teleological, open-ended uprisings in North Africa. Not only does it largely ignore the importance of socioeconomic forces as well as the non-institutionalized, spontaneous forms of organization present in these democratization processes; the analytical failure of the civil society framework also takes up a transformative power in and of itself, structuring the empirical realities that it claims to describe. The concept of civil society therefore fails to accurately represent the dynamics at play in Tunisia and Egypt, and has negatively shaped them with respect to the outcomes of revolutionary contestation. “Civil society” has integrated an open and contingent arena into the closed structures of reproduced sovereign statehood. Rather than unleashing democratic energies in Tunisia and Egypt, it has sometimes even reinforced the very power structures it allegedly set out to challenge. Borrowing from the work of Hannah Arendt on revolution and Giorgio Agamben on the notion of “destituent power,” this essay argues for a conceptual opening in our analytical framework that corresponds to the radical contingency that lies at the heart of any revolutionary process.
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| 5 |
ID:
136466
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on a seeming contradiction between ‘Islamophobic’ and ‘Islamophilic’ approaches in contemporary Western policies and discourses on the Middle East. While Islamophobia continues to shape some domestic policies of Western states and provide ideological justification for the wars they wage abroad, ‘Islamophilic’ tendencies in foreign policy have also emerged, especially in responses to the ‘Arab Spring’. Not clearly noted in Western public discourse, this represents a historical continuation of Western support for Islamism common during the Cold War, but is also a shift from the Islamophobic discourse of the post-cold war period, especially since 9/11. While Islamophobic and Islamophilic discourses may appear to be opposites, the paper argues that they represent two sides of the Orientalist logic, continuing to reduce understanding of Middle Eastern societies and politics to a culturalist dimension. Unlike traditional Orientalism, they treat Middle Eastern people as political subjects, but approach them as defined by their culture and religion. They define ‘moderate’ Islamism as the typical (and preferred) politics of the people of the region. Focusing on specific recent developments, the paper suggests that, rather than paving the way to more peaceful relations with the region or to internal peace and stability there, the Islamophilic shift in Western policy may rather lead to new waves of catastrophes by further destabilising and fragmenting the region, threatening to evoke new waves of Islamophobia in the West.
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| 6 |
ID:
135905
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the spring of 2011 when citizens in Arab countries rose up against their regimes, it appeared that the “third wave” of democratization had begun in the Middle East and the Maghreb, and that countries would embark on successful democratic transitions. Issues such as the gendered nature of the uprisings, how gender relations and women’s mobilizations have shaped trajectories, as well as how women and their rights have been affected, have been under-researched. In this article, I put the spotlight on North Africa—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—which saw different protest dynamics and political outcomes subsequently. Drawing from mainstream literature on determinants of democratization and feminist literature on women and democratic transitions, I examine how women’s preexisting legal status and social positions, as well as the broad structural, institutional, and cultural contexts, shaped the course and immediate outcomes of the Arab Spring in the countries examined. I argue that those countries that saw advances in women’s participation and rights prior to the Arab Spring are the ones most likely to transition successfully to democracy, and indeed, to establish a more women-friendly democracy; and that women’s growing political leadership will influence the quality of ongoing democratizations in the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
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| 7 |
ID:
135904
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a brief characterization of the transformational consequences of the Arab Spring for global policy frameworks and democracy promotion efforts regarding Internet infrastructure. To do so, we begin with unpacking the battle that took place in Dubai in December 2012 at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) between competing state powers, technology policy regimes, and civil society activists jockeying on the global stage to promote Internet freedom. Particular emphasis is placed on the discourses and controversies carried over from the Arab Spring surrounding Internet freedom as democracy promotion, including the growing importance of transnationally-organized and tech-savvy civil society activists who have joined these opaque policy debates. The next section focuses on highlighting the new practices and ideologies of this particularly novel “community of practice” comprising transnational tech-savvy activists who have joined the Internet freedom proto-regime. The final discussion elucidates the policy innovations and frameworks born from the interactions of this diverse stakeholder network since the Arab Spring, and contrasts them with those of the state and private sector stakeholders who traditionally hold sway in shaping information infrastructure policies. We conclude by outlining the opportunities and challenges facing these policy entrepreneurs and the democratic interests of global Internet users.
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| 8 |
ID:
134234
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| Summary/Abstract |
On a single day in July, when ambient tensions escalated, Palestinian militants fired more than 180 rockets into Israel, and the Israelis launched airstrikes against towns throughout the Gaza Strip. Dozens of Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed. The order of daily urban life was disrupted, yet again, by warfare.
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| 9 |
ID:
134610
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to advance understanding of strategic nonviolent action through providing a more comprehensive assessment of the factors that may contribute towards the failure of nonviolent campaigns than has been undertaken to date. It disaggregates the wide range of international and national circumstances relevant to the failure of nonviolent action, illustrated with reference to experience of nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria since 2011. Through exploring these cases, the article proceeds to reveal how adherence to the assumed principles of nonviolent strategy may be insufficient in contributing towards success. It concludes by outlining four pathways by which nonviolent strategy may contribute towards its own failure, including its supersession by armed conflict.
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| 10 |
ID:
136629
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| Summary/Abstract |
The latest war in Gaza—from the beginning of July to the end of August 2014—is over, but both Israelis and Palestinians believe it will not be the last one. Israelis believe they must deter Hamas from conducting additional attacks and keep it weak should a conflict occur. This is an approach that more pro-Western Palestinian leaders and Arab states like Saudi Arabia, fearing the political threat Hamas poses, often quietly applaud. For their part, Hamas leaders remain hostile to Israel and feel politically trapped by the extensive blockade of Gaza—and all the while, Gaza lies in ruins. The combination is explosive. Israeli security analyst Yossi Alpher put it succinctly: “It is increasingly clear that the Gaza war that ended in August will soon produce…another Gaza war.”1 The Economist also gloomily predicted that “war will probably begin all over again, sooner or later.”2
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| 11 |
ID:
134456
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis uses survey data representing three of the world’s most populous Muslim majority countries to challenge conventional wisdom on what shapes Muslim public opinion on political violence against the United States. It improves previous analysis by clearly distinguishing support for violence against civilians from support for violence against military targets and by featuring independent variables that clearly separate views on US foreign policies from views on US culture. Logistic regression shows that, among Egyptian, Pakistani and Indonesian Muslims, perceptions of controversial US policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern oil, or the perceived attempt to weaken and divide the Muslim world are not related to support for attacks on civilians in the United States, but only to support for attacks on US military targets. Approval of attacks on US civilians is shaped, instead, by negative views of US freedom of expression, culture, and people, disapproval of the domestic political status quo and the notion of general US hostility toward democracy in the Middle East. This last finding has important implications for US and Western policies toward the post-Arab Spring Middle East in particular and the broader relationship with the Muslim World in general.
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| 12 |
ID:
134580
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| Summary/Abstract |
Dr. Chomsky is [emeritus] Institute Professor in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (1983). The following interview was conducted by Anne Joyce, editor of Middle East Policy, on October 18, 1984 (when the title of this publication was American-Arab Affairs).
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| 13 |
ID:
137042
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Gulf states have preferred to adhere to the basic Arab position vis-à-vis Israel, albeit supplementing such positions with their own, sometimes significant, adjustments. However the common threat from Iran has become a source of rapprochement between them and Israel, even if the establishment of ‘normal relations’ remains dependent on progress in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab consensus and GCC politics. The two sides, each with their own logic, seem to prefer to maintain a dual policy that on the one hand accepts the lack of normalization but on the other hand maintains active, albeit tacit, ties.
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| 14 |
ID:
134687
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arab League Summit in Beirut on March 27/28, 2002, adopted an initiative to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab Peace Initiative (Mubadarat al-Salam al-‘Arabiyya), as it soon became known, was a modified version of a Saudi initiative, and was first unveiled in an interview of Crown Prince ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia by American journalist Thomas Friedman, on February 17 of that year. Israel learned of the API at the height of the second Palestinian uprising, the al-Aqsa Intifada, and therefore it did not elicit a serious response. However, it remained on the Arab League agenda ever since, regularly reaffirmed by successive league summits. In other words, the API has been an available policy option for more than a decade, yet no Israeli government has embraced it as a viable peace option.
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| 15 |
ID:
136491
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| Summary/Abstract |
Jordan has weathered a number of political challenges inspired by the Arab Spring in a way that has preserved the regime’s control. The Jordanian military’s role in these developments has been neglected but is critical to understand, particularly as the United States and its coalition partners continue to deal with violent extremist threats in the region
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| 16 |
ID:
134507
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the beginning of the twentieth century attempts were made by the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Territorial Organization (JTO) to promote Jewish settlement in the region between the two rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris. The settlement plans never reached the practical stage, and the plan disappeared without a trace. One hundred thousand Jews from Russia were not sent as planned in the train from Odessa to Iraq, and Jewish settlements were not established in it. Nevertheless, although the settlement plan was never carried out, it had great import not on the practical level but on the ideological one. The article is divided into three parts. The first part is an attempt to gain an in-depth understanding of Territorialist ideology and of Zionist thinking; the second part traces the efforts of the Zionist Movement and of the JTO to promote a comprehensive settlement plan in Mesopotamia; the third and last part examines the arguments and explanations of the Territorialists against Palestine and for Mesopotamia and other territories in East and Southwest Africa, Canada and Australia.
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| 17 |
ID:
136670
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| Summary/Abstract |
In general, the position of Indonesia within the roadmap for peace in the Middle East has not been highly regarded internationally‘. However, as a Muslim—majority nation, Indonesia’s international appeal derives from its success in managing transition to democracy, the friendly and tolerant form of moderate Islam practiced
by the majority of Indonesian Muslims, and the active participation of civil society in the efforts of democratic consolidation. This paper reviews Indonesian foreign policy m the Middle East during the ten years of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s leadership. This paper addresses the following questions: How does Yudhoyonds “a million friends, zero enemy” policy apply to the Middle East? Is there any domestic factor that shaped Yudhoyono’s policy toward the Middle East? Is there any electoral or national interest objective behind the conception Yudhoyono’s policy? This paper focuses on Yudhoyono’s policy toward l\/[iddle Eastern countries before and after the Arab Spring and it will also include a thorough analysis on Yudhoyono administrations stance in regards to the Israeli—Palestinian conflict.
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| 18 |
ID:
136168
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| Summary/Abstract |
National Security Council is a real-time, semester-long simulation of the senior advisory group to the US President on national security and foreign policy. The simulation requires undergraduate students to role-play policymakers charged with long-range security planning and responding to actual events and crises as they happen. Students are encouraged to exercise their own judgment, but must operate within the political, bureaucratic, and organizational confines of the office (for example, Secretary of State, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.). Students conduct briefings, develop initiatives, and debate policy positions and proposals. Weekly meetings are supplemented with occasional special sessions to deal with real-world developments (for example, Arab Spring protests, military crisis with North Korea, major humanitarian emergency). The simulation course promotes accountability, independent and team learning, and oral communications skills, and forces students to grapple with bureaucratic turf battles, time pressure, and rapidly changing real-world situations. Several iterations between 2007 and 2012 yield insights into best practices for pedagogy and assessment, but also raise questions about the appropriate roles of technology, social networking, and the Internet.
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| 19 |
ID:
137081
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| Summary/Abstract |
If democracy promotion is a ‘fashionable international art’ (Burnell 2000, 339), then there are many artists involved in it. It is impressive to observe, for instance, how the voices that offered assistance in the course of the Arab Spring appeared to sing from the same hymn sheet:
The EU [European Union] stands ready to assist the countries of the Arab spring to achieve deep democracy and the rule of law based on full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also economic development and social justice. (Council of the EU 2011a)
First, it will be the policy of the United States [US] to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy. (Obama 2011)
Once again, let me say: we are at an historic moment. Democracy is on the march across the Arab world. It is in the interest of the international community and the United Nations [UN] to help you on your way. (Ban Ki-moon 2011)
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| 20 |
ID:
137074
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper advances the proposition that post-Arab Spring politics are a product of globalisation’s economic and social liberalisation. The global market and privatisation have fundamentally deconstructed centralised autocratic rule over state and society, while facilitating corruption and selective development, culminating in public outrage. The political order of the Middle East and North Africa since the Arab Spring synthesises globalisation’s dialectic duality, in which economic integration has contributed to the demise of national authoritarianism, inciting communalism and political fragmentation. This paper analyses emerging political trends and challenges based on a comparative analysis of Egypt and Tunisia.
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