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| 1 |
ID:
136939
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| Summary/Abstract |
Europe is a profoundly flexible concept and, in Ernesto Laclau’s terms, a ‘floating signifier’ which is given various meanings depending on the speaker’s political aims. The article focuses on current populist and nationalist political discourses in Finland and the articulation of Europe and European identity in the political rhetoric of The Finns Party. In the rhetoric, Europe is given contradictory meanings. On the one hand, it is perceived as a cultural and value-based community which shares a common (Christian) heritage and values. Identification with Europe and the promotion of European communality are particularly pronounced when a threat towards ‘us’ is experienced as coming from outside the imagined European borders. On the other hand, the European integration process and Europe as a political project can be articulated as threats not only to national independence, identity and cultural particularity but to European cultural identity as well.
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| 2 |
ID:
134612
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This article reports and analyzes China's presence in Africa with an emphasis on how that has been perceived by the Africans. Based on the findings from surveys and field research conducted in eight sub-Saharan African countries and interviews with scholars and practitioners from other African countries as well as Chinese and Americans in Africa, we outline the diverse, complicated and evolving African perceptions about China's explosive presence in general and the booming Chinese business activities in particular that now range from love to suspicion. Our findings about how China is perceived in Africa suggest that Beijing has acquired substantial goodwill in Africa yet is developing deep issues and facing uncertain challenges and growing obstacles.
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| 3 |
ID:
134611
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Chinese engagement in African states has increased tremendously over the last decade, much in line with Chinese globalisation strategies and supported by state encouragement and financial support. The size and potential of China as a world power leads to the level of expectations the country faces from the developing world. However, some elements of these expectations are also created through political discourses which emphasise differences with Western countries. The types of promises that the Chinese leadership makes to create such enthusiastic welcome amongst African political leaders are linked closely to the discourse on South–South cooperation. Albeit different from Western development assistance promises and parallel attempts to produce moderate expectations, the current discourse is thus partly sowing the seeds for future disappointment. This article takes a closer look at the discussions around South–South cooperation in China–Africa relations and at key rhetorical features (‘mutual benefit’; ‘non-interference’) and at the practice of this cooperation. It concludes that the Chinese discourse is creating large public expectations in African countries and while China delivers on many projects, its impact on development is less certain. The overall development success of this strategy builds on longer-term success and is implicitly linked to the occurrence of more reforms in Africa. Chinese policy thus ‘bets on the future’ in their foreign relations with Africa; the success of this strategy is dependent on political circumstances among the partners that are largely beyond Chinese control. In a number of cases, it can thus be expected that currently up-beat political rhetoric is going to meet obstacles that will require adjustments in a discourse that, in its current form, might undermine Chinese credibility if not the core elements of South–South cooperation altogether.
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| 4 |
ID:
135336
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to explore the connection between the new 2013 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and Christian messianism in contemporary Russian intellectual thought. The ‘conservative turn’ in Russian politics is associated with the return to the cultural and political ideologeme of Katechon, which is proposed by several right-wing intellectuals as the basis for the Russia's new state ideology and foreign and security policy. The theological concept of Katechon (from the Greek ό Κατέχων, ‘the withholding’) that protects the world from the advent of the Antichrist originates in the Byzantine Empire. In Russian tradition, this concept is presented in the well-known doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome, dating back to the 16th century. The term ‘Katechon’ in contemporary Russian political discourse is relatively new and can be traced to the post-Soviet reception of Carl Schmitt's political theology. The concept of Russia as Katechon is directly connected to the national security and defence policy, because it is used as the ideological ground for the new wave of militarization and anti-Western sentiment, as well as for Russia's actions during the Ukrainian crisis. This analysis puts the internal political and cultural debate on Russia's role in international affairs and its relations with the West into historical perspective and demonstrates the right-wing intellectual circles’ influence on the Kremlin's new domestic and foreign policy
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| 5 |
ID:
134702
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This article argues that socio-political responses of Scheduled Castes in Jammu and Kashmir do not neatly fit into the category of “Dalit assertion.” Rather than simply prioritizing their caste concerns, Scheduled Castes manifest a diversified and ambiguous response, especially as they engage with the conflict-centered political discourse of the state.
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| 6 |
ID:
135337
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Alexander Dugin, the well-known public philosopher, entered Russia's intellectual and political life in the 1990s, with strongly anti-American and often anti-Western statements. Dugin's philosophy, especially in its early version, was of great use for foreign analysts with its emphasis on the irreconcilable conflict between the Eurasian civilization – with Russia in its centre – and the Atlanticist civilization led by the United States. While the image of Atlanticism and Americanism as despiritualizing forces ready for global predominance emerged in Dugin's work early on, it was later supplemented by another image, stressing Atlanticism as a desire to play God, to change the nature and the man himself. Consequently, Atlanticism and Americanism cannot live in peace until the Eurasian civilization is destroyed completely. While geopolitical Duginism of the 1990s had few direct translations into actual Russian foreign policy, it had an indirect relationship to Putin's posture in Crimea and Ukraine, and on the economically centred Eurasian Union. The importance of Duginism in the minds of segments of the American and British leadership is due, rather, not so much to the danger of an aggressive Russia, but to the waning of Washington's influence in Europe. Duginism is less a manifestation of Kremlin policy, than an ideological construction mostly belonging in the past. Instead, pragmatic nationalists are the most influential people in the present-day Russian elite.
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| 7 |
ID:
134757
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| Summary/Abstract |
The discourse on China’s rise and its implications for the world has attracted wide international interest and equally intense scholarly debates. While earlier studies predominantly focused on big-power relations, the “China threat” theory, military expansion and collective containment, another body of literature has grown in recent years that broaches new topics, such as soft power, public diplomacy, and new tides of emigration and their impacts on the realisation of China’s strategic ambitions. The proliferation of disciplinary approaches and focal points involved in these debates is reminiscent of the multifaceted dimensions of China’s rise, a prominent global phenomenon that has far greater implications than the country’s deeper involvement in global governance, the worrisome increase in its defence budget, or its rapid economic expansion.
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| 8 |
ID:
134253
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses the relevance of discourse in the analysis of EU foreign policy. Instead of using discourse as a structure, the discursive struggles in meaning production are emphasised. The article argues that the literature trying to make a contribution to the explanation of EU foreign policy has so far overemphasised the positive function of discourses in influencing policies in their substance. In contrast, the article focuses on the delimiting function of discourses in providing the boundaries of the kinds of policies which can be legitimately pursued. From this point of view, important discursive struggles take place exactly about these limits, and it is only through the setting of these limits that identities and norms are provided with clearer meanings. The article illustrates this framework by focusing on the debate about normative power Europe. It argues that an important aspect of this debate which has been missing from the literature so far is that it is indeed engaging in a struggle over what is acceptable as a policy of a normative power and is what not, and that it is therefore engaged in setting the limits of legitimate EU foreign policy.
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