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ID:
136776
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| Summary/Abstract |
The nature of warfare has undergone a major change over the last few decades, brought about by rapid advancement in technologies combined with changes in doctrines and organisational concepts. This has resulted in enhanced focus on integrated and joint operations. Unified structures have been put in place by all major militaries in the world to optimise their defence capabilities. India appears to be reluctant to adapt wholeheartedly to the changing nature of war-fighting despite facing a wide variety of threats to its internal and external security. This article makes a case for establishing unified commands in India to enhance integration and jointness at the strategic and operational levels. In doing so, it examines various available models for implementation in the Indian context. Finally, it suggests a viable model for unified commands for India keeping in mind the geo-political realm and the external and internal threats to its security.
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| 2 |
ID:
134744
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to argue that identity is an important variable in determining the motivational disposition of the Indian state’s external security behavior. It offers a constructivist explanation to India’s increasing engagement with the Asia-Pacific region and argues that India’s deepening engagement with the region is a reflection of its desire to craft a new external identity for itself – the identity of an “Asia-Pacific player.” The desire for an “Asia-Pacific identity” is in part precipitated by Indian political elite’s perception of a crisis in India’s external identity immediately after the end of the Cold War, along with its intuitive desire for recognition within the international system. This ongoing identity shift offers to explain many visible changes in India’s post-Cold War foreign security behavior.
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| 3 |
ID:
134275
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| Summary/Abstract |
Governmental support for nonstate actors designated as terrorist organizations is not only a policy that carries significant international and domestic costs; it further poses a theoretical challenge to structural realist thinking about alliance politics in international relations. By debating, firstly, the utility of terrorism as a means to influence systemic power distribution, and, secondly, the functional equality of nonstate actors, this article considers under what conditions state sponsored terrorism occurs despite the expected security loss. Drawing on the example of Iraq between 1979 and 1991, the assumption that the interplay of external security challenges—as well as domestic dissent as an intervening, unit-level factor—affects governmental alignments with terrorist groups will be reviewed in the cases of the Iranian Mujahedin al-Khalq Organization, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and armed Palestinian factions. The article concludes by addressing whether state sponsorship of terrorism is inevitably linked to policy failure or whether it could be seen as a good investment to balance external and internal security challenges successfully.
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