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ID:
134380
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| Summary/Abstract |
For over a decade, Arab governments have been enrolled into EU initiatives aimed at promoting democratic reform in the region. Common to these initiatives are their claims to be uninvolved with power and external imposition, professing instead to be based on voluntary notions of local demand and ownership. This article challenges this core liberalist assumption of the absence of power. Drawing on Foucault's reflections on liberal governmentality, it shows how power operates through a technology of “contractualization” which produces a distinct Arab subjectivity in the form of a lack (of reform will). Yet governing technologies are never complete, and possibilities of reversal and resistance always exist. In the second part, the article engages with the emerging debate on Foucault's concept of counter-conduct, opening up the concept to more subtle and less spectacular forms of resistance. Drawing inspiration from Derrida's analysis of (in)hospitality and Baudrillard's logic of simulation, the article shows how the liberal assumptions of “invitation,” “ownership,” and “gradualism” inherent in European reform initiatives enable resistance in the form of: (i) selection of entry; (ii) setting conditions; and (iii) simulating reform.
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| 2 |
ID:
139484
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyzes the impact of spiralling growth in usage of contractual labour, in the context of stringent pro-worker labour regulations, on industrial labour productivity and employment generation. We obtain a quantitative measure of ‘stringency of labour regulations’ by applying majority rule on three different measures used in the literature. The results show that average labour productivity increases with the increase in the ratio of permanent workers to contractual workers, unless the industries are not operating in states having rigid/pro-worker labour regulations—which implies a negative impact of contractualization on labour productivity. Besides, the results show that the rigid/pro-worker labour regulations have negative impact on employment generation; it is especially discernible in labour-intensive industries.
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