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ID:
168557
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.
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| 2 |
ID:
193165
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the strategic decision-making of the South African regime between 1975 and 1989. Existing scholarship argues that Pretoria was a regional hegemon and that this position underwrote its security strategy. We suggest that scholars have overstated the implications of its regional strength. Using archival documents and interviews with retired military and political elites, we show how Pretoria’s threat perception, conventional military operations, and nuclear strategy were in fact conditioned by an awareness of the limits of its power within the global distribution of power; its isolation in the international system; and fears of conflict escalation vis-à-vis extra-regional threats.
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| 3 |
ID:
134480
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| Summary/Abstract |
In response to Somalia's decades-long political and humanitarian crises, the African Union has deployed a peace support operation known as the African Union Mission in Somalia. Tasked to help eliminate an ongoing insurgency, the mission has seen heavy combat as it fights to reclaim territory held by the al-Shabaab militant organization. This article applies the techniques of open source campaign analysis to assess the mission's prospects for long-term success. The prognosis is not good. Analysis reveals a range of vulnerabilities that threaten the deployment's core security objectives, suggesting that the optimism many have expressed for the mission is misplaced.
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| 4 |
ID:
146428
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been fighting a violent campaign to reclaim territory held by jihadist militants known as al-Shabaab. Military successes, including the liberation of a number of Somali cities from the insurgent group’s control, have generated considerable optimism that al-Shabaab is on the decline.
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