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| 1 |
ID:
135183
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| Summary/Abstract |
Traditional monitoring of arms control treaties, agreements, and commitments has required the use of National Technical Means (NTM)—large satellites, phased array radars, and other technological solutions. NTM was a good solution when the treaties focused on large items for observation, such as missile silos or nuclear test facilities. As the targets of interest have shrunk by orders of magnitude, the need for other, more ubiquitous, sensor capabilities has increased. The rise in web-based, or cloud-based, analytic capabilities will have a significant influence on the future of arms control monitoring and the role of citizen involvement.
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| 2 |
ID:
135140
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| Summary/Abstract |
Twenty years ago this month, North Korea and the United States concluded the Agreed Framework. That accord halted North Korea’s nuclear weapons program at Yongbyon in exchange for heavy fuel oil and the eventual provision of two light-water reactors (LWRs) at Kumho, North Korea.
The agreement was the result of prolonged negotiations during a tense period. Unfortunately, its success was temporary. Eventually it became clear that North Korea in the late 1990s was pursuing a clandestine program to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework. In October 2002, when an official U.S. delegation confronted the senior North Korean negotiator with this information during talks in Pyongyang, the negotiator admitted that North Korea was pursuing an enrichment program and other unspecified programs.
Subsequent to this admission, North Korean officials maintained that they did not have an enrichment program. They changed their story again in 2010, when they revealed to visiting U.S. nuclear expert Siegfried Hecker that they had an enrichment facility at Yongbyon with 2,000 spinning centrifuges. Hecker was permitted to visit this facility and was impressed with its sophistication.[1] Thus, the issue of North Korea’s clandestine enrichment program was finally put to rest. North Korea proudly admitted having the program, despite its past disclaimers and the skepticism of observers in the United States and China who questioned the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment that North Korea had a clandestine enrichment program for nuclear weapons development
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| 3 |
ID:
135167
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rose Gottemoeller is undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. She previously was assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance. While in that position, she served as the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia.
During the Clinton administration, she held positions in the Department of Energy and on the National Security Council staff dealing with nuclear weapons issues in the former Soviet Union.
Gottemoeller spoke with Arms Control Today in her office on October 9. Much of the discussion focused on U.S.-Russian nuclear relations and U.S. progress in meeting its commitments under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
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| 4 |
ID:
135136
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2007 the five recognized nuclear-weapon states convened for the first time to examine what nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures they could jointly pursue. The P5 process,^sup 1^ as it came to be known, was born in a nuclear policy environment vastly different from the one that prevails today.
It was established as a result of an initiative from the United Kingdom, which was eager to reverse the stagnation it sensed in the nuclear-weapon states' progress toward meeting their disarmament commitments under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In June 2007, UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett argued for the need to "engage with other members of the P5 on transparency and confidence-building measures," as well as to involve them in the testing of future verification regimes.
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| 5 |
ID:
135137
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| Summary/Abstract |
Iran’s persistent expansion of its uranium-enrichment program and its covert construction of an underground gas-centrifuge enrichment facility at Fordow have contributed to concerns that Tehran harbors nuclear weapons ambitions. Arrangements for constraining Iran’s ability to use its declared enrichment facilities for nuclear weapons programs are a particularly controversial element in the ongoing multilateral negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
Much of the discussion about Iran’s potential production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use in nuclear weapons has focused on its three previously secret enrichment facilities that now are under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The concern is that Iran could use these facilities to produce HEU, perhaps after withdrawing them from safeguards.
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| 6 |
ID:
134536
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| Summary/Abstract |
After more than three years of corrosive wars, Syria no longer exists as a nation-state. It has been replaced by disparate entities and precarious arrangements – to the detriment of the Syrian population. The ‘Divided States of Syria’ are in large part the result of the survival strategy of the regime, aided by the futile pursuit of a ‘political solution’ by the international community. As the tragedy deepens, the recovery of Syria becomes more difficult, and the implications for regional stability increase in gravity. The West – the United States in particular – has abstained from forceful engagement. Yet, the price to pay today may in retrospect pale in light of the political, strategic and moral catastrophes that the current reserved approach is enabling.
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| 7 |
ID:
136412
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the announcement on November 24, 2014, that Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were extending the Vienna talks on Iran’s nuclear program, pressure has been building in Washington and Tehran against the negotiations. Domestic opposition in both countries has been empowered by this delay. Some in the U.S. Congress have even called for an end to the negotiations or threatened new sanctions
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| 8 |
ID:
136002
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scientist redirection-the process of shifting employees of foreign weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs to peaceful endeavors-has long been an important piece of U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs. Its goal has been to reduce the potential for scientists and engineers employed in WMD programs to disseminate their knowledge to other countries or to nonstate actors.
By assisting in the transition of WMD experts to peaceful employment, scientist redirection programs reduce the likelihood that these individuals will be targets of efforts to buy their expertise. In their simplest form, these programs provide a sense of hope for the future because the desperation associated with sudden unemployment can be a strong incentive for participation in nefarious activities.
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| 9 |
ID:
136876
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| Summary/Abstract |
Almost across the board, recent studies of small arms proliferation and policy in Africa seem to have disengaged from historical data and analysis. This article contextualizes current debates on small arms and how they relate to the African continent, by revisiting historical data and analysis. The article draws on the relatively large literature on firearms in African history from the slave trade to early independence to offer new ways of thinking about small arms imports, the impact and prospects for control. Despite the richness of historical studies, they tend to be treated as historical conditions, not assessed for their implications for the current small arms regime. Reflecting on the historical sequence, it appears as if the situation today resembles that of the beginning of the 20th century. Enforcement of local leadership is often weak and the arms trade is relatively large and liberalized. This review finds that historical conditions and structures are built into Africa's current arms control architecture, posing significant challenges for effectiveness and legitimacy. The large scale of old and obsolete small arms frequent in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that weapon destruction programmes, rather than marking, recordkeeping and safe stockpiling of old stocks or recovered weapons, would often be more manageable and offer greater improvements in local security. The positive aspects of external influences on African sub-regional arms control regimes in terms of financial and technical support should be carefully weighed against the risk of reinforcing old patterns.
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| 10 |
ID:
134656
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.
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| 11 |
ID:
135309
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| Summary/Abstract |
Gaseous diffusion was historically the most widely used technology for military production of highly enriched uranium. Since June 2013, all gaseous diffusion enrichment plants worldwide are permanently shut down. The experience with decommissioning some of these plants has shown that they contain large amounts of uranium particles deposited in the cascade equipment. This article evaluates the potential of using uranium particle deposition to understand and reconstruct the operating histories of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants. First, a squared-off cascade enrichment model is derived to estimate the enrichment capacity of a reference plant. Then, using a cross-flow filtration model, the mass of solid uranium particles deposited over time in the tubular separation membranes of the stage diffusers is calculated. Finally, potential techniques to characterize these uranium deposits and help reconstruct the operating history of the plant are assessed.
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| 12 |
ID:
134606
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| Summary/Abstract |
The traditional arms control approach is slow in dismantling nuclear arsenals. It is also a state-centered approach, and does not enthuse public opinion as it is rather technical and complex. The recent interest in the so-called humanitarian approach of nuclear disarmament can be explained by a growing frustration with traditional arms control. The humanitarian approach points to the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons for individual human beings, and recommends forbidding nuclear weapons. The step-by-step approach is replaced by a principled approach, which holds that nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used, just like chemical and biological weapons. A ban on nuclear weapons will turn the tables. The burden of proof will shift from the non-nuclear weapon states to the nuclear weapon states. Those nuclear weapon states that are not eager to eliminate their nuclear weapons will come under growing pressure from worldwide public opinion as well as their own public opinion. It is this stigmatizing effect of nuclear weapons as inhumane and therefore unusable that may bring all states to pursue Global Zero.
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| 13 |
ID:
134659
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines the failures of the William J. Clinton and Barack Obama administrations to secure ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It applies an integrated analytical framework for assessing treaty ratification that builds upon previous research in order to understand why the Clinton administration failed to achieve CTBT ratification in 1999 and why the Obama administration has so far failed to advance the treaty in the Senate. The study concludes that CTBT ratification, despite Obama administration pledges of support, remains highly unlikely. Finally, the study analyzes the common domestic political factors present in both cases and suggests areas for further research.
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| 14 |
ID:
135170
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the negotiations between P5+1 and Iranian diplomats at a critical juncture and U.S.-Russian tensions halting progress on further nuclear arms reductions, this year's meeting will feature speakers and panels on solving the Iranian nuclear puzzle and jump-starting progress on global nuclear disarmament
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| 15 |
ID:
134657
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| Summary/Abstract |
Australia's interest in nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 60s is usually explained in terms of high politics and grand strategy. This proliferation case study explores, in greater detail than hitherto, the important part played by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in pressing for a nuclear capability. It seeks to understand the reasons behind the RAAF's lobbying, in particular its previous experience with air power, its visceral desire for advanced manned bomber aircraft, and its strong institutional link to the British Royal Air Force. The decision in 1963 to acquire the supersonic US F-111 strike aircraft, instead of rivals including the British TSR.2, is also considered. Once the RAAF's bomber ambitions were satisfied, interest in nuclear weapons was greatly reduced. Finally, some comments are included on the nuclear interests of other air forces in the British Commonwealth.
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| 16 |
ID:
134495
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past 20 years, social scientists, government officials, and investors have expressed mounting interest in the BRIC countries, which include Brazil, Russia, India, and China.2 This acronym was originally coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs official who was concerned with the increasing role these countries were playing in global finance (Hounshell 2011). Recently, there has been a growing recognition that the effects of the BRICs on the global economy are not limited to finance. It is also clear that these countries are key political actors: all but one of them possess nuclear weapons, they are regional powers, and many observers view China as a potential challenger to the United States in global political-military affairs.
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| 17 |
ID:
134981
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| Summary/Abstract |
Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article argues that economic and political sanctions are a successful tool of nonproliferation policy, but that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. Since the late 1970s—when the United States made the threat of sanctions credible through congressional legislation and began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states—sanctions have been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but they have succeeded in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit. The logic of the argument is simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic and security dependence on the United States—states with greater dependence have more to lose from US sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to US-sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the late 1970s, only insulated, inward-looking regimes have pursued nuclear weapons and become the target of imposed sanctions, thus rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanctions low. I find support for the argument based on statistical analysis of a global sample of countries from 1950 to 2000, an original data set of US nonproliferation sanctions episodes, and qualitative analysis of the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear weapons programs.
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| 18 |
ID:
134483
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines US President Barack Obama's foreign policy rhetoric on Syria, specifically in relation to the threat of chemical weapons and the prohibitionary taboo surrounding their use. It contends that Obama's rhetorical construction of the taboo is not simply a commitment to the control of these horrific weapons (where such arms have been comprehended as so extensively vile as to preclude their employment), but that this also represents the strategic linguistic exploitation of these normative ideals in order to directly shape policy. By analysing of presidential speeches made during the conflict, it demonstrates that Obama has manipulated pre-existing conceptions of chemical weapons as taboo, and also as forms of weapons of mass destruction, to deliberately construct policy in line with his own political ambitions—most notably as a way of forcing a multilateral solution to the situation in Syria. This article challenges existing perceptions of the chemical weapons taboo as an inherently normative constraint, arguing that this instead comprises a more agency-driven construct. Static notions of the taboo must be abandoned and subsequently replaced with a framework of understanding that recognizes how the taboo can be used as a deliberate driver of foreign policy.
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| 19 |
ID:
136001
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| Summary/Abstract |
Just one year after Syria’s formal accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international body responsible for implementing the treaty, announced this October that almost all of Syria’s declared chemical agents and precursor chemicals had been safely and irreversibly destroyed.[1]
Workers in protective clothing carry a dummy grenade into a bunker during a media day at the GEKA facility in Münster, Germany, on March 5. The liquid waste from the neutralization of Syrian sulfur mustard agent aboard the MV Cape Ray was brought to the GEKA facility last summer for further treatment. (Nigel Treblin/Getty Images)Workers in protective clothing carry a dummy grenade into a bunker during a media day at the GEKA facility in Münster, Germany, on March 5. The liquid waste from the neutralization of Syrian sulfur mustard agent aboard the MV Cape Ray was brought to the GEKA facility last summer for further treatment. (Nigel Treblin/Getty Images)This was an enormously ambitious and difficult effort, especially in light of the ongoing civil war in Syria, the refusal of Syria to cover the costs of demilitarization, the strong reluctance of any other country to destroy the Syrian chemical stockpile on its territory, and the ongoing allegations of continued and indiscriminate chemical weapons use against rebel forces and civilian populations in Syria
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| 20 |
ID:
135703
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As relations between the US and Russia grow more tense, uncertainty is increasing over the future of bilateral agreements limiting nuclear arsenals. Wyn Bowen examines the prospect for US – Russia arms control in light of alleged treaty violations.
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