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| 1 |
ID:
135140
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| Summary/Abstract |
Twenty years ago this month, North Korea and the United States concluded the Agreed Framework. That accord halted North Korea’s nuclear weapons program at Yongbyon in exchange for heavy fuel oil and the eventual provision of two light-water reactors (LWRs) at Kumho, North Korea.
The agreement was the result of prolonged negotiations during a tense period. Unfortunately, its success was temporary. Eventually it became clear that North Korea in the late 1990s was pursuing a clandestine program to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework. In October 2002, when an official U.S. delegation confronted the senior North Korean negotiator with this information during talks in Pyongyang, the negotiator admitted that North Korea was pursuing an enrichment program and other unspecified programs.
Subsequent to this admission, North Korean officials maintained that they did not have an enrichment program. They changed their story again in 2010, when they revealed to visiting U.S. nuclear expert Siegfried Hecker that they had an enrichment facility at Yongbyon with 2,000 spinning centrifuges. Hecker was permitted to visit this facility and was impressed with its sophistication.[1] Thus, the issue of North Korea’s clandestine enrichment program was finally put to rest. North Korea proudly admitted having the program, despite its past disclaimers and the skepticism of observers in the United States and China who questioned the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment that North Korea had a clandestine enrichment program for nuclear weapons development
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| 2 |
ID:
135136
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2007 the five recognized nuclear-weapon states convened for the first time to examine what nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures they could jointly pursue. The P5 process,^sup 1^ as it came to be known, was born in a nuclear policy environment vastly different from the one that prevails today.
It was established as a result of an initiative from the United Kingdom, which was eager to reverse the stagnation it sensed in the nuclear-weapon states' progress toward meeting their disarmament commitments under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In June 2007, UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett argued for the need to "engage with other members of the P5 on transparency and confidence-building measures," as well as to involve them in the testing of future verification regimes.
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| 3 |
ID:
135137
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| Summary/Abstract |
Iran’s persistent expansion of its uranium-enrichment program and its covert construction of an underground gas-centrifuge enrichment facility at Fordow have contributed to concerns that Tehran harbors nuclear weapons ambitions. Arrangements for constraining Iran’s ability to use its declared enrichment facilities for nuclear weapons programs are a particularly controversial element in the ongoing multilateral negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
Much of the discussion about Iran’s potential production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use in nuclear weapons has focused on its three previously secret enrichment facilities that now are under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The concern is that Iran could use these facilities to produce HEU, perhaps after withdrawing them from safeguards.
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| 4 |
ID:
135822
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.
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| 5 |
ID:
136412
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the announcement on November 24, 2014, that Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were extending the Vienna talks on Iran’s nuclear program, pressure has been building in Washington and Tehran against the negotiations. Domestic opposition in both countries has been empowered by this delay. Some in the U.S. Congress have even called for an end to the negotiations or threatened new sanctions
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| 6 |
ID:
135840
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| Summary/Abstract |
We construct an analysis framework for nuclear force structure where the ends are deterrence objectives, the ways are viable targeting strategies, and the means are nuclear forces. Deterring adversaries requires both capability and will that convinces them not to act. A country's will is perceived as credible only if the war plans and targeting strategies are consistent with a nuclear power's principles, such as the Just War Doctrine. The United States currently applies a counter-force targeting strategy; however, hardening, mobility, deceptions, and defensive systems continue to challenge the ability to target another's nuclear weapons. Alternative strategies, such as counter-economic (energy, transportation, financial center, or communications) and counter-leadership may be feasible. However, with fewer nuclear weapons, fewer targeting strategies are viable
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| 7 |
ID:
135316
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| Summary/Abstract |
Radioxenon is an important atmospheric tracer to detect underground nuclear explosions. The International Monitoring System is designed to provide worldwide continuous physical monitoring and detection of nuclear explosions and incorporates 40 noble gas monitoring stations. They are constantly sampling the atmosphere for concentrations of radioxenon. This work analyses how effectively the network of stations is able to detect unusual xenon-133 concentrations in the atmosphere. A large multitude of nuclear explosions, evenly distributed in space and time, is simulated and the detection rate is calculated. Atmospheric transport modelling is applied to calculate the source-receptor-sensitivities for each monitoring station. The approach includes the anthropogenic radioxenon background, station-specific detection criteria, different scenarios for surface and subsurface nuclear explosions, and a spatial as well as a time dependent analysis. Recommendations are drawn for the improvement of the detection capability.
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| 8 |
ID:
135168
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| Summary/Abstract |
In April 2011, Pakistan declared that it had tested a short-range battlefield nuclear missile, the Nasr.1 Since then, prominent purveyors of Pakistani nuclear doctrine, including Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai and former diplomat Maleeha Lodhi, have portrayed the Nasr missile as a counter to India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine.2
That doctrine supposedly aims at rapid but limited retaliatory incursions into Pakistan by the Indian army to seize and hold narrow slices of territory in response to a terrorism event in India involving Pakistanis. The rationale is that the seized territory would be returned in exchange for Pakistani extradition of extremists inflicting terrorism onto India. The doctrine is based on the assumption that Pakistan would not resort to the use of nuclear weapons in response to a limited Indian incursion, thereby offering space for conventional conflict even in a nuclearized environment.
Pointing to this Indian war doctrine, Pakistani decision-makers now argue that the deterrent value of their current arsenal operates only at the strategic level. According to this line of reasoning, the gap at the tactical level gives India the freedom to successfully engage in limited Cold Start-style military operations without fear of nuclear escalation. Development of the low-yield, tactical battlefield nuclear weapon, the Nasr missile, is seen as the solution providing “flexible deterrence options”3 for an appropriate response to Cold Start, rather than massive nuclear retaliation against India. Nasr proponents argue that by maintaining “a credible linkage between limited conventional war and nuclear escalation,” the missile will deter India from carrying out its plan.4
This approach might appear to be sensible, but it suffers from two important flaws. First, the Cold Start doctrine has not been actively implemented and therefore does not seem to represent a genuine threat to Pakistan. Second, battlefield nuclear weapons are a key part of the proposed solution, but it may be extremely difficult to establish a command and control system that would effectively preclude the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch.
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| 9 |
ID:
134537
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| Summary/Abstract |
Seen through the eyes of Syrian activists and other observers based in the Middle East, EU policy towards Syria could in some ways appear inconsistent and ambiguous. In Brussels, EU representatives remind us that the Syrian crisis is the most difficult one the European Union has had to face so far, for the unprecedented scope of the humanitarian catastrophe, its geographic proximity to the Union’s borders, and the difficulties in deciphering a fluid and multi-dimensional conflict. After more than three years since the eruption of violence, the EU is trying hard to play a pivotal role in the Syrian issue, despite the complexity of balancing its institutions, the different political sensibilities of its 28 member states, and the pressures exerted by influent external actors.
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| 10 |
ID:
134535
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the time of writing, representatives from Iran and the E3/EU+3 are trying to work out an agreement that will guarantee that Iran’s controversial nuclear programme, widely suspected of having a military purpose, serves only peaceful ends. As the negotiations enter their most crucial phase, the time is ripe to attempt an assessment of the role played by the only actor, besides Iran, that has been on stage since it all began over ten years ago: Europe. Throughout this long drama, Europe’s performance has had some brilliant moments. Yet the quality of its acting has decreased as a new protagonist, the US, has come on stage. Overall, the Europeans’ record is positive, albeit not entirely spotless.
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| 11 |
ID:
137044
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2003, the European Union (EU) launched its Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in which it sought the strengthening of an effective multilateral non-proliferation regime, with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as its cornerstone. Focusing upon the implementation of that strategy 10 years on, this paper considers the EU's navigation of the NPT negotiation environment and the structural conditions at play between the Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States and the Grand Bargain enshrined between them. It shows that the EU's “multilateralist combat” within the NPT has met with limited success due to the EU's lack of bargaining power – the EU has neither the will nor the capacity to make the bargaining concessions necessary to achieve its goals in this forum. Further challenging claims that the EU may offer a “benchmark” for the NPT community; this paper suggests that the EU is more a mirror of the imbalance of the Grand Bargain than a solution in how to resolve it.
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| 12 |
ID:
136410
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Iranian nuclear issue has long vexed Tehran’s political and economic relations with the international community. The talks between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) on Tehran’s nuclear program entered a transformative phase after Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, with the backing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appointed a new team to lead the Iranian delegation
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| 13 |
ID:
134655
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| Summary/Abstract |
“French nuclear diplomacy” is the French government's use of civilian nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) to advance specific commercial and strategic interests. During the heart of the so-called nuclear renaissance, the Élysée Palace aggressively peddled France's nuclear expertise and technology abroad, signing over a dozen new NCAs in an effort to bring in business for the French industry, forge diplomatic relationships, and promote global nonproliferation norms. Several years later, however, the outcomes of France's aggressive global nuclear power push appear nominal at best. This article explores the mixed results of this nuclear campaign, and through three case studies, illustrates how many of France's commercial and political disappointments stem from unrealistic expectations and the disorganization of the French nuclear complex.
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| 14 |
ID:
136390
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| Summary/Abstract |
French shipbuilding and systems group (DCNS) is investing in the maturation of a series of platform innovations and systems technologies designed to improve the performance and safety of conventionally powered submarines.
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| 15 |
ID:
135308
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Future of nuclear archaeology: reducing legacy risks of weapons fissile material
/ Wood, Thomas W; Reid, Bruce D ; Toomey, Christopher M ; Krishnaswami, Kannan, Burns, Kimberly A, Casazza, Larry O, Daly, Don S, Duckworth, Leesa L
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| Summary/Abstract |
This report describes the value proposition for a “nuclear archaeological” technical capability and applications program, targeted at resolving uncertainties regarding weapons fissile materials production and use. Central to this proposition is the notion that one can never be sure that all fissile material is adequately secure without a clear idea of what “all” means, and that uncertainty in this matter carries risk. We argue that this proposition is as valid today, under emerging state and possible non-state nuclear threats, as it was in an immediate post-Cold-War context, and describe how nuclear archaeological methods can be used to verify fissile materials declarations, or estimate and characterize historical fissile materials production independent of declarations. Methods for accurately estimating plutonium production from graphite reactors have been demonstrated and could be extended to other reactor types. Proposed techniques for estimating HEU production have shown promise and are under development.
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| 16 |
ID:
135839
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is a worldwide system for detecting illicit radiological or nuclear (R/N) material and R/N weapons. The technical and nontechnical detection capabilities of the architecture can contribute to the deterrence of nuclear terrorism by increasing the risks and costs of mounting an R/N attack. Risks include the danger of one or more encounters with elements of the architecture, uncertainties about the locations and other characteristics of detection capabilities, discovery upon encounter with detection capabilities, and attack failure upon discovery. Among the costs are the added manpower, money, materiel, time, and operational difficulties entailed by attempts to evade or defeat detection capabilities. The deterrent effect of the detection architecture—part of a broader effort to counter nuclear terrorism—warrants greater attention and emphasis.
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| 17 |
ID:
134586
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a major intelligence failure, distorted by a pervasive policy climate that assumed that Iraq did indeed have active WMD programs, including nuclear weapons. What has remained unknown, however, is that intelligence assessments on Iran's nuclear program displayed the same systemic distortions that led to the Iraq WMD fiasco. As was the case in the errant Iraq estimate of 2003, two NIEs — in 2001 and 2005 — effectively reversed the burden of proof and reached the conclusion that Iran had been carrying out a covert nuclear weapons program in the absence of hard, verifiable evidence.
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| 18 |
ID:
134487
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| Summary/Abstract |
India's nuclear breakout in 1998, foreshadowed as early as 1974, may have been understandable for reasons of global nuclear politics, a triangular regional equation between China, India and Pakistan, and domestic politics. Yet the utility of India's nuclear weapons remains questionable on many grounds. Nuclear deterrence is dubious in general and especially dubious in the subcontinent. Nuclear weapons are not usable as weapons of compellence or defence. They failed to stop the Pakistani incursion in Kargil in 1999 or the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008. They will not help India to shape the military calculations of likely enemies. And India's global status and profile will be determined far more crucially by its economic performance than nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, they do impose direct and opportunity costs economically, risk corrosion of democratic accountability, add to global concerns about nuclear terrorism, and have not helped the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Because the consequences of a limited regional war involving India could be catastrophic for the world, others have both the right and a responsibility to engage with the issue. For all these reasons, a denuclearized world that includes the destruction of India's nuclear stockpile would favourably affect the balance of India's security and other interests, national and international interests, and material interests and value goals.
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| 19 |
ID:
136794
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States of America while redefining its priorities in South Asia, in post 9/11 phase, when India emerged as a key player, set aside its long standing nuclear policy and signed civil nuclear deal with India. United States persuaded the dissenters, prominent among them being China, to drop their objections within NSG. The then US President Bush and Secretary of the State Condoleeza Rice took keen interest to convince members of NSG for granting exemption to India for enabling it to carryout nuclear commerce with international community.
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| 20 |
ID:
136800
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| Summary/Abstract |
The emerging triangle between Russia-India-China is being closely watched in the strategic and academic quarters of the West and in the three countries involved. This idea was mooted by the then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov at a time when India has been internationally isolated after its May 1998, nuclear tests. This was also the time when Russia was facing intense pressure from the West on the issue of human rights violation in Chechnya and on the establishment of true democratic system in Russia.
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