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| 1 |
ID:
135932
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| Summary/Abstract |
Japan has long played the role as the main operating base for Korean contingencies. It has also provided rear-area logistic support to the US forces fighting in Korea and helped South Korea build up its defense industrial base. However, the Japan-South Korea relationship has deteriorated in recent years due to short-term political and long-term economic and strategic reasons. At this point, South Korea is bandwagoning with China and deemphasizing its relationship with Japan. China-South Korea relations are not without problems, however, and Japan regards South Korea as one of the most important potential strategic partners in maintaining stability in Asia. In the future, the most decisive factor in determining the direction of the security relationship between Japan and South Korea will be China.
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| 2 |
ID:
134767
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| Summary/Abstract |
As a research institute based in Singapore, the EAI monitors developments in relations and interactions between China and the individual countries of Southeast Asia as well as the ASEAN grouping as a whole. This material is presented in the form of (1) a chronology of events and (2) important documents.
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| 3 |
ID:
136544
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines Kim Dae Jung’s 1998–2002 Sunshine Policy toward North Korea and the mutual reassurances between Taiwan and China from 2008 to 2013. Furthermore, it explores factors contributing to the failure of trust-building in the two cases, and the implications for reassurance theory as well as the prospects for inter-Korean and cross-Taiwan Strait relations.
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| 4 |
ID:
136649
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses the question of why regional cooperation among Afghanistan’s neighbours has been so difficult despite these countries’ common concerns. To answer this question, Afghanistan is conceptualised as placed at the core of overlapping regions: South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and, through China’s influence, East Asia. Over the past decade, interactions among different regions ‘through’ Afghanistan have increased, and overlap has intensified. Each of these regions is characterised by more or less intense balance-of-power security dynamics, which have played out in Afghanistan. The fact that the regions that overlap in Afghanistan are predominantly characterised by patterns of conflict helps to explain the difficulties of regional cooperation
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| 5 |
ID:
135319
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines changes in the location of economic activity in Cambodia between 1998 and 2008 in terms of employment growth. During this period, Cambodia joined ASEAN and increased trade with its neighbouring countries. Drawing on theoretical predictions made by New Economic Geography (NEG), we focus on frontier regions such as border areas and international port cities, and examine the changing state of manufacturing in Cambodia. Our results suggest that economic integration and concomitant trade linkages may lead to the industrial development of Cambodia’s frontier regions and metropolitan areas.
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| 6 |
ID:
137021
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| Summary/Abstract |
International relations and domestic politics are interlinked. States do not exist in a vacuum. States are unable to make policies without keeping in mind the intricacies of the environment in which they exist. The influence of domestic policy on international relations and vice versa has become even more crucial in the twenty-first century. Relations between neighbouring states have become so complicated with increasing political and economic globalisation that each state regards international influences to be having a lot of significance for its domestic policies. It is in this context that the present article aims to understand the impact of forced migration of a certain population within South Asia on Indian geopolitics. Providing a historical perspective as well as primary observation of residents in a refugee camp, this article will show how a state on the southern border of the country (Tamil Nadu), which shares ethnic commonality with a neighbour (Sri Lanka), has made it clear that neglect of its population in the former will only make relations between the two South Asian countries sour. This forces the Indian federation to rethink about the definition of a semi-federal and semi-unitary system that exists in the country.
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| 7 |
ID:
136098
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| Summary/Abstract |
EU citizenship is often regarded as the culmination of a process whereby the transnational mobility of “workers” has led to the granting of rights to “humans” qua citizens, with both legal scholars and ethnographers emphasizing its normative significance in this respect. Challenging such a narrative, this study sets out to highlight the contingent nature of a postnational EU citizenship, with reference to the lived experiences of migrant Roma. As a first step, we highlight the conditionality within EU law associated with the granting of rights to those enacting EU citizenship by residing within EU territory beyond their own member state. In a second step, we highlight the variable ways in which such conditionality is deployed in different national contexts, with reference to the frameworks in France and Spain. While the former has deployed these conditions in a manner that has excluded EU citizens, particularly migrant Roma, the latter—at least for a time—was more permissive in its granting of rights to EU citizens than EU law required. However, in a third step, we suggest that the lived experiences of migrant Roma in these two national contexts have not been as different as the legal differences suggest. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork on Romanian Roma in two municipalities near Barcelona, we demonstrate the ways in which a local politics of exclusion is legally possible, even within an ostensibly permissive juridical framework of citizenship. We highlight how the ambiguity of a multilevel citizenship not only opens up possibilities for multifaceted forms of exclusion, but also for various forms of resistance, both within and beyond a juridical citizenship framework.
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| 8 |
ID:
136655
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nepal shares an open border of 1,868 km with five Indian states (Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim) and 1,415 km with Tibet. Under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India, Nepali citizens enjoy ‘national’ treatment and Nepali businesses unhindered rights of trade, transit and movement. An estimated six million Nepalese live and work in India and contribute to their inward remittances. Social intercourse along the Gangetic plane is described by people as ‘roti-beti ka sambandh’ (a RELATIONSHIP based on sharing of hearth and marriage). Predominantly a land of believers of Hinduism and Buddhism, Nepal shares a long and enduring cultural history with India. The Hindus of India hold Pashupatinath in high esteem and those of Nepal the Char Dham of India (the four important abodes of the Hindu pantheon in India, namely Jagannath Puri, Dwarka, Rameswaram and Badrinath). Lumbini and Bodhgaya join the common ethos of Buddha’s life and teachings. About 40,000 Gurkha soldiers serve in the Indian army today.
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| 9 |
ID:
136787
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| Summary/Abstract |
The optimist views South Asia as a half-full glass while the pessimist views it as half-empty. The realist, however, drinks the water in the glass, and wisely quenches his thirst. If we remain stuck in a quagmire of despondency over runaway population growth, grinding poverty of a huge section of the population, and endless squabbles over historic wrongs, the future looks grim. But, if we think of the region as overwhelmingly youthful, charged with vitality and a can-do mentality, well-integrated into the global economy thanks to its large diaspora, brilliantly positioned between the energy rich West Asia and the manufacturing hub of East and South-East Asia, and fully committed to inclusive developmental goals, then South Asia can be the region of the future.
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| 10 |
ID:
134490
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| Summary/Abstract |
US–Brazilian relations sunk to one of their lowest points ever following last year's exposure of the US government's massive surveillance of the South American giant—including the correspondence of President Rousseff and the business operations of Brazil's national oil company, Petrobras. Brazilian authorities responded angrily. The Brazilian president called off a highly valued state visit to Washington, denounced the US for violations of sovereignty and human rights, and proceeded to bypass the US to purchase nearly $5 billion worth of fighter aircraft from Sweden. In fact, US–Brazil ties have not been constructive for more than a generation. Yes, relations are mostly amiable, but with limited cooperation, considerable discord and some open clashes. Washington views Brazil primarily as a regional actor, and wants its cooperation mainly on inter-American issues. For Brazil, regional collaboration means working with other Latin American nations—not the United States. Brazil usually wants the US to keep a distance from the region. The US is no more enthusiastic about Brazil assuming a global role; differences over some of the world's most dangerous political and security challenges have made Washington uneasy about Brazil's engagement in international affairs and critical of its foreign policy judgements. Relations will probably improve, but they could get worse. The two governments need to acknowledge that their relationship is fragile and troubled, and take steps both to rebuild trust and to avert further deterioration and new confrontations. They have to be more careful with each other.
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| 11 |
ID:
137119
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| Summary/Abstract |
South Asia’s environment, both internally and externally, has been changing rapidly. The growing Chinese presence in South Asia can be seen both positively as ‘a benign extension of influence’. Or negatively as ‘ingress’ with ‘a larger strategic purpose’. However, the important point is that it cannot be ignored. Nor can it be addressed with the mindset of yesterday. A judicious blend of resilience and the steady accretion of internal strength seem to be the best pathway for India.
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| 12 |
ID:
135154
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite long historical ties, post-colonial relations between India and Myanmar have fluctuated between magnanimity and mistrust. While India often stood for high moral grounds and promotion of democracy, it did so at the cost of losing Myanmar to China. This affected both India and Myanmar adversely: while New Delhi’s economic, energy and security interests were hurt, isolated Yangon became more China-dependent. However, since the early 1990s, domestic developments in Myanmar and post-Cold War structural changes in the world order necessitated conditions for cooperation and mutual gains. It appears that blatant domestic suppression in, and international seclusion of, Myanmar is not desirable. Having witnessed two eras of magnanimity and mistrust, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Myanmar in 2012 heralds a prospective era of market interdependence while opening Pandora’s box: can India get a better share of Myanmar’s commercial possibilities without compromising its core interests in promoting democracy, development and diaspora protection?
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| 13 |
ID:
137091
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| Summary/Abstract |
The EU is one of the most prominent democracy promoters in the world today. It has played an especially important role in the democratization of its Eastern European member states. Given the acknowledged success and legitimacy of EU democracy promotion in these countries, it could be expected that when they themselves began promoting democracy, they would borrow from the EU's democracy promotion model. Yet this paper finds that the EU's model has not played a defining role for the substantive priorities of the Eastern European democracy promoters. They have instead borrowed from their own democratization models practices that they understand to fit the needs of recipients. This article not only adds to the literature on the Europeanization of member state policies but also contributes both empirically and theoretically to the literature on the foreign policy of democracy promotion. The article theorizes the factors shaping the substance of democracy promotion—how important international ‘best practices’ are and how they interact and compete with donor-level domestic models and recipient democratization needs. Also, this study sheds light on the activities of little-studied regional democracy promoters—the Eastern European members of the EU.
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| 14 |
ID:
136289
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the first press conference as the elected president Hassan Rouhani pledged good relations with neighboring countries, which he considered a main priority for his administration. The president stated, the Persian Gulf has strategic importance both in terms of politics and economy”
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| 15 |
ID:
134815
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the last five years Israel was blessed with significant natural gas discoveries in the deep water of its Mediterranean coast. The Tamar and Leviathan gas fields were the largest discovered in the world in the past decade. The use of this gas will benefit Israel directly to the tune of US$6 billion per annum. In addition to the potential boost to Israel’s economy, it gives the country a unique opportunity to meaningfully change its economic and energy relations with the region — as long as politics do not stand in the way.
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| 16 |
ID:
134955
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| Summary/Abstract |
India and Bangladesh are interrelated in geopolitical relations but their core objectives are different. While geopolitical compulsions introduce the never-ending challenges of proximity to the two parties, including crucial issues of security, migration and resource sharing, Bangladesh is yet to form its own identity in which the perceived image of India figures predominantly, and the attitudes and expectations they develop towards each other shape the pattern of bilateral interactions between the two countries. Solutions to a number of vexed problems remain elusive and irritants in relations out-number gestures of goodwill. While the warmth in relations has frequently fluctuated with the change of regimes, a sustained pattern of uneasiness and mistrust persists. Analysed at three levels of geopolitics, attitudinal effects and functional exchanges, India–Bangladesh relations appear as a reflection of normal big country–small country power relations where policies are formulated on the basis of the primary principle of self-help but are further shaded by the quest for transforming itself into a nation-state by Bangladesh.
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| 17 |
ID:
136783
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| Summary/Abstract |
When the new government assumed office there was a general expectation, both within the country and outside, that there would be a new vigour in India’s foreign policy. Led by Narendra Modi, the new government did take steps to reinvigorate the external relations. While it is early to judge the intent and the outcome of the decisions taken so far, a trend can be easily identified.
Instead of analysing the efforts taken by the new government in terms of individual countries, it would be useful to identify the broad parameters under which the relationships are being pursued and their effectiveness. In this context, three distinct trends could be identified, in terms of strategies adopted by the new government – the core, outer core and the periphery. Rather than looking through the geographic prism of the immediate neighbourhood, the extended region and the rest, the relationships should be viewed based on their importance and impact.
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| 18 |
ID:
137123
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| Summary/Abstract |
What of the future? Most importantly, unless Pakistan changes course radically towards India, SAARC as SAARC will essentially limp along. Even if India takes initiatives in the interests of the region, Pakistan will stymie them as it will not want India’s ‘hegemony’ to be consolidated. Pakistan’s attitude will not change unless it’s internal polity changes. This is not likely to happen given the dynamics inside Pakistan and the broader Islamic region with which it associates itself.
At the Kathmandu summit, India warned that regional integration will proceed with all, or without some, which suggests that if Pakistan does not cooperate, others can go ahead without it. If that happens, it will mean, of course, the emasculation of the idea of SAARC. However, Pakistan will not be easily isolated, as most other SAARC countries will seek to keep it involved in order to balance India’s weight. Side-tracking Pakistan will also mean that the integration of Afghanistan into SAARC will become practically impossible. BIMSTEC, which groups all SAARC countries except Pakistan and Maldives, provides an option for regional cooperation for India and others, with the added advantage of providing a seamless link to Southeast Asia through Myanmar and Thailand, the other two members of BIMSTEC. The SAARC charter does provide for sub-regional cooperation, but with the concurrence of the rest. This makes Pakistan’s role a major road block.
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| 19 |
ID:
134585
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| Summary/Abstract |
Qatar has been one of the most active states during the Arab Spring. It has broadly supported the uprisings with media coverage on Al Jazeera, the Doha-based news channel, as well as with financial, diplomatic and material support for protagonists. Often Qatar threw its support behind Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to the extent that some kind of direct, intimate relationship was assumed to exist between the two.
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| 20 |
ID:
137121
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| Summary/Abstract |
SAARC has not really realised its full potential because conditions do not exist in the neighbourhood for economic cooperation. Bilateral disputes plague the association and, without mutual trust, no regional organisation can function effectively. India has gained more by its association with the ASEAN rather than with SAARC. Even the declarations of SAARC are rarely implemented
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of SAARC becoming a corner stone of India’s foreign policy has already suffered a setback. Pakistan raised bilateral issues on the floor of the United Nations even in September 2014, thus violating the spirit of bilateralism and regional cooperation. Other states in the region are also not ready yet to work in a spirit of cooperation. In the meantime, SAARC can operate only on the basis of the lowest common denominators among its members. India would continue to improve its relations with each of its neighbours so that SAARC could become a true regional organisation like the European Union or the ASEAN. In the current situation in the Asia Pacific, characterised by rivalry between the US and China, such a transformation may be hard to accomplish.
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