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| 1 |
ID:
136651
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the take-over of power by the military on May 22, 2014, under General Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, the chief of army, Thailand has gone full circle in coup d’états, from democratic deficit to fractious political struggle between different social groups leading to acute and irreconcilable political instability that gives leverage to the army to finally intervene and seize power by suspending the constitutional processes. Democracy in Thailand is not only a recent phenomenon, but is also periodic and short-lived. It is not democracy and political legitimacy of elected leaders that has held the country together and provided political and economic stability, but deep reverence for the monarchy, fear of the armed forces and the strength of the civil service. Thailand’s political system is in a state of atrophy in the midst of irreconcilable differences between those who want to cling to power through constitutional means, fair or unfair, of elections and populist policies and those who believe that constitutional means have brought about a tyranny of majority and unbridled corruption, which they want to reform through extraordinary measures, including suspension of electoral democracy and an unelected People’s Council. Will the military be able to resolve the political crisis in Thailand, bring stability and usher the country to constitutional democracy with political institutions matching the nation’s economic progress? If the complete failure of the previous coup in 2006 to improve Thailand’s political situation is any indication, there are reasons for concern and scepticism. Moreover, the degree of polarisation and intolerance in society now is more severe than it was eight years ago. To end decades of political instability and immaturity will require fundamental changes in the way Thai society functions and the way its people view their nation’s future.
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| 2 |
ID:
135999
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| Summary/Abstract |
Today, most military regimes have either given way to some form of democracy or been transformed into another form of authoritarianism. This article formulates a framework for the analysis of the detachment of militaries from politics and applies it to the case of Burma/Myanmar, which is an example of deeply entrenched military rule. It is argued that after the retreat from direct rule the military is still in control, although the regime has embarked on a series of reforms that have liberalized the political system. The article identifies the internal dynamics within the military regime as a prime motive. External factors played only an indirect role, as the growing dependence on China was seen as a threat among nationalistic circles. The military decided to bridge the internal impasse and end the external isolation only after it consolidated its own power, finally allowing the leadership succession to run smoothly.
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| 3 |
ID:
134604
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This article examines political exile as a particular form of migration, with reference to Indonesians living in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) when the military regime came to power in their homeland. With the rise in Jakarta of the New Order under Major-General Suharto after 1 October 1965, thousands of Indonesians in socialist and communist states abroad were effectively isolated. Faced with detention or execution if they returned home, Indonesian leftists and other dissidents who were scattered across some dozen states spanning the Sino-Soviet divide became unwilling exiles. Several thousand Indonesians were then studying in the USSR, where they were one of the largest foreign nationalities in Soviet universities and military academies. Many spent nearly half a century as exiles, struggling to survive first the vicissitudes of the cold war and then the global transformations that came with the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. The most influential grouping of Indonesians who remained in the USSR after 1965 was known as the Overseas Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party. In China, a separate party leadership emerged, known as the Delegation of the Indonesian Communist Party. Mirroring Sino-Soviet rivalries, the Delegation urged Indonesian leftists in the USSR to join them in China. Hundreds did so. These rival factions were separated by mutual distrust until they each disbanded toward the close of the cold war. This article analyzes the changing fate of Indonesians caught in the contradictory relationship between New Order Indonesia and the USSR and in the tensions between the USSR and China as these unwilling exiles were buffeted by geopolitical transformations well beyond their influence.
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| 4 |
ID:
136967
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| Summary/Abstract |
The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between type of welfare regimes and military expenditures. There is a sizeable empirical literature on the development of the welfare state and on the typology of the welfare regimes. There appear to be, however, no empirical studies that examine welfare regimes with special attention to military spending. This study aims at providing a comprehensive analysis on the topic by considering several different welfare regime typologies. To do so, we use dynamic panel data analysis for 37 countries for the period of 1988–2003 by considering a wide range of control variables such as inequality measures, number of terrorist events, and size of the armed forces. We also replicate the same analyses for the political regimes. Our findings, in line with the literature, show that there is a positive relationship between income inequality and share of military expenditures in the central government budget, and that the number of terrorist events is a significant factor that affects both the level of military expenditure and inequality. Also, the paper reveals a significant negative relationship between social democratic welfare regimes and military expenditures.
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| 5 |
ID:
135910
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the coup of 22 May 2014 in Thailand, the military has striven to narrow the democratic space while curtailing many forms of freedom. But even with the worst kind of authoritarianism, political legitimacy remains fundamental for the longevity of the regime. To prolong its political life, the military has embarked on distributing economic benefits to the people in an effort to acquire acceptance and loyalty through various populist programs, a practice made famous by its political nemesis, the Shinawatra political clan. For example, the military has ordered the disbursement of funds owed to poor farmers by the previously deposed government under a rice subsidy program. For the military, its survival depends on popular appeal. To keep the people happy, the military must demonstrate its ability to deliver economic benefits; and this partly hinges on how much the West perceives the suspension of democratic freedoms as a threat. Thailand is vulnerable to sanctions as it is linked to global supply chains of crucial commodities. The disruption of these links would impact the local economy and thus local consumers. Here, international sanctions have the potential to influence the behavior of the Thai junta. The United States and the European Union have warned that they may take more aggressive measures, including boycotting Thai products, if the military fails to restore democracy soon. Harsher sanctions will affect the economic livelihood of Thais and could consequently defy the legitimacy of the military regime.
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| 6 |
ID:
134511
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since its independence in 1956 until September-October 2013, at the completion of this study, Sudan has had seven civilian or military regimes. All of them, excluding the military regime headed by General Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Hasan Siwar al-Dahab (1985–86) and the current Bashir regime, were overthrown. These regimes focused only on remaining in power and did little to relieve Sudan's desperate hardships. This study, which surveys the decade (1989–99) under the two-headed leadership of Bashir and Turabi, will explore the truth of this claim. The Bashir-Turabi regime marked a unique and important chapter in Sudan's political history and had crucial ramifications for Sudan's politics in the twenty-first century.
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