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| 1 |
ID:
135924
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Second World War the United States sent billions of dollars worth of military equipment and supplies to the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease program. In the Soviet official memory of the war, however, Lend-Lease aid was either marginalized or disappeared completely. Past scholars and even Soviet rulers have given different reasons for this amnesia, which often include a paranoid Stalin or high tensions during the Cold War. This essay argues instead that Marx’s ideology was mainly responsible for marginalizing the memory of U.S. aid to the Soviet Union. For many, World War II legitimized the Soviet’s collective economy. The memory of aid from the capitalist West did not fit the ideological narrative and thus was forgotten. It also demonstrates how memory can be shaped to fit an ideological view.
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| 2 |
ID:
135345
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It is widely recognised that the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ fluctuated following the Second World War. A “Persistent rivalry” was especially evident in policy towards the Middle East and its oil. Immediately after the war, the American attitude to Palestine seemed to complicate British policy. Events in Iran also reflected the clash between the British imperative to protect its national and imperial interests in the region on the one hand, and the American preoccupation with the Cold War and containment on the other. The subsequent differences over Egypt/ Nasser are a matter of public record as are the problems which arose over the British withdrawal from “East of Suez”. Perhaps the very closeness of the relationship between the UK and the US served to heighten expectations.
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| 3 |
ID:
135874
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The article looks at structural analogies between the strategic situation in Europe in the summer of 1914 and in East Asia today, with particular emphasis on the probability of the outbreak of a major war. The author examines analogies regarding the nature of the international system, i.e. is the international system characterized by outright anarchy or by a more or less developed and institutionalized understanding among the main actors about the way to preserve peace and to organize economic exchange? The article addresses domestic factors (nationalism, democratic, authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes) and investigates military dynamics against the backdrop of geography and the availability of military equipment and technologies. Possible routes of military escalation are also discussed. Special attention is paid to states that have isolated themselves and that dispose of military means that might promise swift victory. The article comes to the conclusion that there are very few similarities between Europe in 1914 and East Asia today, but that both the high degree of militarization of the Korean peninsula and the evolving military competition between the US and China in the region do imply the possibility of a major armed conflict in a not too distant future
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| 4 |
ID:
135554
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| Summary/Abstract |
What the British historian Eric Hobsbawm called “the long 19th century” ended 100 years ago, in 1914, in Sarajevo, with the two pistol shots that sparked World War I. Another historian, Fritz Stern, described that war as “the first calamity of the 20th century … the calamity from which all other calamities sprang.” These disasters included the Great War itself, which claimed some 20 million lives, including victims of the new century’s first genocide, in Turkey; the October Revolution in St. Petersburg, which gave birth to an ideological empire that would kill tens of millions of people and imprison hundreds of millions more; the rise of Nazism out of Germany’s defeat; World War II, with another 60 million deaths, including genocide on an unprecedented scale; the upheavals and wars beyond the borders of Europe that followed the end of colonialism; and the division of the postwar world into two nuclear-armed camps, which fought each other through proxies in post-colonial lands.
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| 5 |
ID:
134968
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| Summary/Abstract |
A mixed perception of the Canadian contribution to the North West Europe campaign exists in the body of the literature. Some refer to the Canadian Army as the ‘Cinderella Army’ relegated after Normandy to clearing up the Channel coast, fighting with limited resources and largely unsung. This paper critically analyses the Canadian Army’s role in the campaign and considers the influences over its generation and employment from a political and military perspective. Through a comprehensive historical analysis this paper concludes that, despite political neglect, Canadian fighting power increased significantly as the campaign progressed due primarily to the experience and confidence gained by the operational level commanders. This is emphatically illustrated by a case study comparison of Operation ‘Spring’and the operations to clear the Scheldt Estuary to open the strategically important port of Antwerp.
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| 6 |
ID:
137100
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay examines a highly significant but little known incident—the “Campbell affair”—during the first six months of Winston Churchill’s premiership (May–October 1940). As the Battle of Britain raged, an equally important campaign was waged between the Air Ministry and the new Ministry of Aircraft Production, headed by the bumptious Canadian-born peer, Lord Beaverbrook. Corrosive remarks by Beaverbrook, which were reported to Canada’s mercurial premier, W. L. Mackenzie King, and then relayed back to London by Sir Gerald Campbell, Britain’s high commissioner in Ottawa, threatened not only to unhinge Anglo-Canadian wartime relations at a pivotal juncture of the war, but also to jettison the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.
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| 7 |
ID:
135514
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In hindsight, it is evident that the decade of the 1930s was full of ominous foreshadowing. It began with the London naval disarmament conference in 1930, and ended with the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939 the marked the onset of World War- II
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| 8 |
ID:
135925
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When studying the battle for Kursk, one of the climactic engagements in the German-Soviet war (1941–1945), many authors have maintained that the Germans would have won the battle had they not delayed their attack from May until early July 1943. This article subjects that assertion to recently released archival materials to conclude that this premise is patently incorrect.
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| 9 |
ID:
135818
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On War’s unfinished state has been a source of difficulties for interpretation for 180 years. By establishing a hierarchy of revision among the parts, we propose a criterion that can bring any part of On War in line with the most advanced stage of Clausewitz’s thinking. We exemplify the utility, illustrate the underpinnings and appreciate the potential of this criterion. We argue that the criterion offers the prospect of a shared, coherent, fully consistent and faithful rendering of Clausewitz’s theory of war.
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| 10 |
ID:
135927
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This article is the second installment of a three-part study into combat at the tactical level in the battle of Smolensk in 1941. The preceding article published in Journal of Slavic Military Studies (Volume 26, Issue 4) documented the formation, movement, and initial assignments given to 900th Rifle Regiment before it engaged the enemy. This article picks up with the regiment’s first engagement on 25 July 1941 against the elements of the German 3rd Panzer Group and takes us through 5 August 1941, when the regiment was engaged with elements of the German 9th Army and applied new tactics of night combat. Chronologically this article corresponds to events described in Barbarossa Derailed, Chapter 5: The First Soviet Counteroffensive, and the Struggle for the Smolensk Pocket 24–31 July 1941, and Chapter 7: Armeegruppe Guderian’s Destruction of Group Kachalov and the Reduction of the Smolensk Pocket, 31 July–6 August 1941.1
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| 11 |
ID:
134512
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| Summary/Abstract |
Middle Eastern Studies Vol.50, No.6; Nov.2014: p.1006-1026
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| 12 |
ID:
134609
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars are divided over the role of transitional justice trials. Hannah Arendt has argued that any attempt to add a didactic role to the court process risks politicization. In contrast, Judith Shklar has argued that it is a legal fable to argue that politics can be kept from the courtroom. This article reevaluates the legacy and collective memory of the Nuremberg, Frankfurt Auschwitz, and Majdanek trials in West Germany as a tool of public education. While these trials certainly affected the external legal culture, through radio, television, theater plays, films, and other forms of popular culture, the lessons Germans learned were not always the ones that prosecutors had hoped for.
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| 13 |
ID:
136306
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Airplanes were part of technological advance that rendered traditional forms of warfare obsolete. The war began with pilots shooting pistols and ended with planes equipped with machine guns and bombs. The article “The Evolution of Aviation in Times of War and Peace,” by Sarah Jane Cox, takes a look at the dynamic relationship between the evolution of aviation and society, for purposes of both peace and war. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Convention on International Civil Aviation in Chicago, born out of the ashes of WWI, which began 100 years ago. Since that convention was signed, globalization has increasingly developed, and the airplane has played a significant role in this. However, regulations have not kept apace with either social or technological changes. The concept of absolute state sovereignty does not have the power it did 70 years ago, as many social institutions have become global. Aviation is one of those instituions. She makes a case to revisit and update international aviation conventions in ways that serve the cause of peace and human happiness.
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| 14 |
ID:
135015
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This article empirically examines how British 21st Army Group produced a functional doctrine by late 1944. How much weight to give Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery in the outcome remains unclear despite significant scholarly literature. This article shows his openness to the “bubbling up” of operational methods from subordinate commanders. He closely managed this process, actively promulgated its output, and determined when he had gleaned sufficient feedback from it. His doctrinal contribution to the British Army’s final push against the Germans developed into British doctrine for many decades, and many Commonwealth countries followed the British lead. This article examines its roots.
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| 15 |
ID:
136305
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article, “Greece and the Road to World War I” by George Kaloudis, focuses on the nature of nation-state alliances and the configuration of great powers vs. smaller powers. It discusses the impact World War I had on a smaller state. Smaller states were lured into alliances with larger powers both for promises of protection and promises of a share of victory spoils. In the case of Greece, the war divided the nation internally as the king sided with the Central Powers while the democratically elected leader sided with the Allied Powers. The goals of modern democratic states are often determined by large institutional interests, rather than the head of state, as described by outgoing U.S. President Eisenhower’s famous warning about the “military-industrial complex.”
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| 16 |
ID:
135923
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prior to the war, young Jewish soldiers turned out to be largely a loyal group within the Red Army toward the Bolshevik regime. However, akin to the general population, some Jewish soldiers and officers, whether in the ‘core’ Soviet Union or in the new territories, were dissatisfied with or even resentful of the regime. The German attack on the USSR promptly transformed all Jewish soldiers and officers into the staunchest anti-Nazi force and hence, probably one of the most reliable groups in the Red Army.
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| 17 |
ID:
134517
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| Summary/Abstract |
A large body of work points to diverging civil–military views on the initial decision to use force, yet there is little sense if similar differences hold over appropriate conduct in the midst of armed conflict. The rise of international laws governing behavior during war has similarly raised the question of whether these rules can shape the beliefs of various domestic actors. This paper seeks to address both gaps in the literature by leveraging the use of experiments embedded in a pair of US national surveys to examine the impact of international law and military experience on individual attitudes toward torture. The results show veterans are significantly more likely to support torture compared to civilians without any prior military background. International law further reduces civilian support for torture, while veterans are largely unaffected by general legal appeals. However, when facing highly precise rules, or where the threat of punishment is delegated to third parties, more legalized agreements can significantly reduce veteran support for torture. The results have implications for the study of institutional design, the differential effects of legal norms on nonstate actors, and the potential for greater awareness of the laws of war to influence attitudes toward wartime violence.
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| 18 |
ID:
135816
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| Summary/Abstract |
How does morale relate to tactical and operational failure? Is it a cause or an effect? Using the Italian Army at Caporetto as a case study, this article explores the cyclical relationship between battlefield performance and morale. Combining quantitative analysis of army statistics with qualitative analysis of various official and private sources, this article analyses morale before the battle and during its opening phase. Italian morale appears surprisingly resilient and decisions to surrender or desert frequently relied on objective assessment of events rather than demoralisation. In this case it was battlefield defeat which turned disaffection into a full- scale morale crisis.
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| 19 |
ID:
135814
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| Summary/Abstract |
What makes soldiers fight? This question has interested historians since the dawn of war itself. The contributions of anthropology, psychology and sociology to the study of combat in the twentieth century have greatly deepened our understanding of morale and combat motivation. The publication of John Keegan’s seminal The Face of Battle in 1976, together with an upsurge of oral history, has stimulated a generation of scholarship on what Paul Kennedy has called ‘war from below’: individuals' experience of fighting.1 As a result, we know better than ever before what put the average soldier in his slit trench and kept him there.2 What remains poorly understood, however, is the connection between individuals' combat motivation, the morale of a unit or formation, and success and failure on the battlefield.
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| 20 |
ID:
135817
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| Summary/Abstract |
The state of the German Army’s morale in 1918 is central to our understanding not only of the outcome of World War I, but also of the German Revolution and, indeed, through the pernicious ‘stab-in-the-back-myth’, on Weimar politics and the rise of the Nazis, too. This article presents new evidence from the German archives, blended with statistical analysis, to show that the morale of some units held up better than previously thought almost to the end, and thus to suggest three things. First, it proposes that some historians have placed too much reliance on English-language sources alone, such as British Army intelligence reports, which have various flaws as evidence. Second, it argues that, while historians have increasingly moved away from generalisations about German morale, this process has further to run. Third, it suggests that no single tipping point can be identified, and that morale alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for battlefield defeat. Indeed, much of the data can only be explained if the tactical realities of the war in late 1918 are clearly understood.
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