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| 1 |
ID:
134515
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| Summary/Abstract |
What is the relationship between respect for labor rights and foreign direct investment (FDI)? This study explores this connection with an emphasis on the strategic role of governments in attracting FDI. We present a formal model demonstrating that governments can do so by setting the level of labor rights protection and, as a consequence, investors will choose to invest in the face of tough labor regulations or cease investing, anticipating that the costs of abiding by these regulations will be too high. The model also suggests that governments will have an incentive to implement labor regulations when enforcement costs are sufficiently low or the profits from investment are sufficiently high. Using data from developing countries across time, error correction models test the dynamic nature of these hypotheses and find support for them: strict labor laws tend to decrease inflow of FDI, but more FDI tends to encourage better labor practices.
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| 2 |
ID:
134516
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does domestic political unrest deter foreign direct investment (FDI)? And what are the longer term impacts of unrest upon the market? Most theories suggest that investors are deterred by unrest. However, empirical research returns only marginal support. We argue that these mixed results stem from the conflation of the distinct tactics and outcomes of political unrest. Violent forms of unrest increase uncertainty and risk. By comparison, nonviolent forms of unrest are shown to more frequently achieve their goals and increase the prospects for democratic change and market stability. In addition, investors avoid markets where campaigns have ended in failure, defined as the campaign not achieving their stated political aims. Failed campaigns often precipitate a cycle of unrest that create greater uncertainty over the long-term stability of a state. We find strong evidence in favor of our propositions, even after taking political motivation and non-random selection into account.
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| 3 |
ID:
136677
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There is an increasing trend in developing countries to reform their higher education sectors towards internationalisation. The Government of India's policy stand on foreign direct investment in higher education so far suggests it considers this a useful strategy in addressing the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies of the sector. Advocates argue that the introduction of an element of competition through the entry of foreign providers would result in greater efficiency and quality in the overall educational service provision. This paper however supported by theoretical, empirical and policy data as well as an in-depth consideration of the facts states that the competition argument does not hold in the case of education and is in fact a matter of misplaced faith. This has significant implications for the rationality of the strategy of internationalisation as a desirable policy for reforming the sector.
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| 4 |
ID:
134887
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| Summary/Abstract |
Industrial competitiveness (IC) is a country's ability to produce and export manufactured goods competitively. How does foreign direct investment (FDI) affect IC in China? The significance of the topic, besides the intrinsic importance of IC, is heightened by outstanding performance of the Chinese industry and massive increase in FDI flows into China in the past decade. Yet empirical studies on the issue in the literature have been limited. This article attempts to close the gap by estimating the role of FDI with a large panel data of 21 manufacturing sectors for 31 regions in six years (2005–2010). We construct, following the method of UNIDO (2002), the IC index to measure multidimensional industrial performance. Several empirical specifications are developed for IC level and IC growth with both panel and cross-section data. Results suggest that FDI has large positive effects on China's industrial performance; such effects are much greater on low-tech manufacturing than medium- and high-tech industries, and the contribution is enhanced by FDI's interaction with local human capital. The role of FDI increases with FDI inflows over the period, and changes in FDI affect changes in industrial performance.
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| 5 |
ID:
135980
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| Summary/Abstract |
The empirical literature on China's outward foreign direct investment mainly relies on aggregate data from official statistics, but the reliability of such data is currently a matter of concern because it does not take account of relevant features such as industry breakdown, ownership structure and entry mode. A novel firm-level database, EMENDATA, compiled by matching data from several available sources on various types of cross-border deals and including information on group structure, provides a more accurate picture and enables new empirical analyses of the rapidly increasing presence of Chinese companies abroad. Based on this database, this paper offers a more precise assessment of the geographical and sector specialization patterns of Chinese outward foreign direct investment into Europe and suggests new avenues for future research.
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| 6 |
ID:
137062
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1990, governments around the developing world have broken contracts made with multinational corporations (MNCs), but the incidence of breach varies across countries and over time. I argue that shared firm nationality is a key determinant of contract sanctity. MNCs are likely to divert investments or exit in response to breach with a firm of the same nationality but unlikely to react in ways costly to the host government otherwise. At the level of the economy as a whole, host governments gain permissive space to trade-off among national groups of investors when a greater diversity of foreign direct investment nationalities is present. I use national-, firm-, and dyadic-level data from 1990 to 2008 to demonstrate nationality-tied firm responses to breach. Counterintuitively, deeper integration with more nationally diverse MNCs enables more breach, as governments gain space to prioritize other goals over the property and preferences of foreign capital.
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| 7 |
ID:
135899
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Building on recent works showing the role that legal institutions can play in attracting foreign capital (Jensen 2003, 2006; Li and Resnick 2003; Li 2006; Biglaiser and Staats 2010; Staats and Biglaiser 2012), and drawing on insights obtained from Powell and Rickard (2010), we use panel data for 114 developing countries from 1970 to 2007 to demonstrate that developing countries with common law legal systems attract greater foreign direct investment (FDI) than countries that have civil law or Islamic legal systems because common law systems are more inclined to promote the rule of law and protect property rights and can be understood to provide more efficiency in the law, better contract enforcement, more judicial autonomy, and more market-oriented regulations.
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| 8 |
ID:
134639
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper explores the motivations behind the outward foreign direct investment (ofdi) decisions in the past decade of an East Asian government-linked corporation (glc), the largest company of its kind in the world in terms of sectoral specialisation. This glc has travelled far from its origins as an agent of European imperialism to its current controversial role spearheading postcolonial extra-territorialisation strategies. I argue that financial predation is the synechdoche for territorialisation in the new imperialism. Consequently emerging economies pre-empt the financial siege by embarking on ofdi strategies themselves to create economic buffer territory. I construct a psychoanalytical framework for examining how anxiety is acted out in the global economy. I apply concepts of the traumatic moment, anxiety and the defence mechanisms of disavowal, splitting, introjection and projection to analyse the glc’s investments as territorial displacements of the libidinal economy.
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| 9 |
ID:
134978
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that immigration policy formation in the United States after 1950 can only be understood in the context of the increasing integration of world markets. Increasing trade openness has exposed firms that rely on immigrant labor to foreign competition and increased the likelihood that these firms fail. Increasing openness by other states to foreign direct investment (FDI) allowed these same firms to move production overseas. Firms' choices to close their doors or to move overseas decrease their need for labor at home, leading them to spend their political capital on issues other than immigration. Their lack of support for open immigration, in turn, allows policymakers to restrict immigration. An examination of voting behavior on immigration in the US Senate shows that the integration of world capital and goods markets has had an important effect on the politics of immigration in the United States and shows little support for existing theories of immigration policy formation. In addition to increasing one's understanding of immigration policy, this article sheds light on how trade openness and firms' choice of production location can affect their preference for other foreign economic policies as well as domestic policies such as labor, welfare, and environmental policies.
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| 10 |
ID:
136614
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper argues that the foreign direct investment (FDI) data commonly used to test political science theories about FDI often diverge from the theorized about phenomena in ways that can introduce bias and complicate hypothesis testing. I describe some of the key conceptual issues surrounding the quantification of FDI, how commonly used data deals with these issues, and the extent to which those coding rules allow or prevent these data from speaking to political science theories. I show that the empirical relationship between democracy, political risk, and multinational corporations behavior is significantly impacted by “getting the measure right.” I conclude by arguing that political science theories about FDI speak to such a wide variety of empirically and conceptually distinct phenomena that conflating them as “FDI” does a disservice to the complexity of the topic.
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