| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
099148
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| 2 |
ID:
067350
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| 3 |
ID:
069190
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| 4 |
ID:
067352
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| 5 |
ID:
095341
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| 6 |
ID:
052644
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| 7 |
ID:
100560
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| 8 |
ID:
062692
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| 9 |
ID:
056472
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| 10 |
ID:
068011
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| 11 |
ID:
067348
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| 12 |
ID:
066151
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| 13 |
ID:
022063
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| Publication |
April-June 2002.
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| Description |
220-235
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| 14 |
ID:
059770
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| Publication |
Oct-Dec 2004.
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| 15 |
ID:
067351
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| 16 |
ID:
133898
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
An assessment of the foreign policy balance-sheet of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) administration reveals its ineptitude in resolving the issue of water-sharing of the Teesta River with Bangladesh, the legacy of which has been inherited by its successor, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government, under the leadership of Narendra Modi, who adorned the Prime Minister's Chair on 26 May 2014. The legacy of this contentious bilateral issue can be traced back to the Second Phase of the UPA administration (UPA-II) in 2011, when the Chief Minister of the Indian state of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee refused to budge on her decision of not sharing the Teesta river water with Bangladesh.
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| 17 |
ID:
067349
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| 18 |
ID:
106934
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| 19 |
ID:
067353
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| 20 |
ID:
106935
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Water scarcity is popularly associated with inter-state conflict, yet the academic literature also touts scarcity as an important variable for understanding cooperation over international freshwater. Building on studies that consider the relationship between scarcity and hydro-political cooperation, this paper empirically investigates why water treaties are negotiated for some rivers and between some riparians, and not others. Rather than considering a linear relationship between scarcity and cooperation, this study hypothesizes a curvilinear relationship expecting agreements to emerge in situations where scarcity is moderate rather than very low or high. Additional variables considered for understanding treaty formation include level of governance among the riparian states, prevailing power dynamics along the river, overall inter-riparian relations (measured by trade, diplomatic ties, and militarized disputes), and the geographical configuration of the entire river. The hypothesized curvilinear relationship between water scarcity and cooperation finds significant support in the empirical analyses. Governance, diplomatic relations, and trade are likewise found to be salient in explaining the levels of cooperation. The geographical configuration of the river was significant in only part of the estimates, and the militarized disputes variable was found to be insignificant across all models. Finally, while results confirm that cooperation may not depend on power asymmetries within riparian dyads, as suggested by some theories, the paper does find support for the contention that more developed states are in a position to provide incentives, such as financial transfers, to less-developed states so as to facilitate an international agreement.
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