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| 1 |
ID:
134995
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| Summary/Abstract |
Australia’s foreign and security policy debate has become focused on how to manage the fundamental change in strategic and economic circumstances brought about by China’s rise. For the first time in the
nation’s history, Australia’s chief trading partner is neither an ally, nor the ally of an ally, and does not share its democratic outlook and values. This change comes against the backdrop of an increasingly
contested Indo-Pacific Asia. This article addresses two questions. First, how does Australia perceive a rising and increasingly powerful China? Second, how is Australia responding? It is argued that Australia possesses a discernable China strategy, although questions remain about its implementation, effectiveness and sustainability. That strategy has two broad strands—engagement and hedging—and the hedging strand contains several important sub-strands, namely, internal balancing (modernizing Australia’s own military) and external balancing (especially strengthening the US alliance). Each of these hedging approaches carries its own problems and questions, particularly regarding Australia’s willingness to fund an advanced military and whether the net effect of a strengthened US alliance can be stabilizing.
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| 2 |
ID:
134993
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia” has many elements of continuity with past policy, including recognition that rapid growth and economic dynamism have greatly expanded the Asia-Pacific region’s economic and strategic weight and importance to U.S. interests. Administration officials emphasize that the rebalance involves a comprehensive diplomatic, economic, and military approach that pays more attention to India, Southeast Asia, and regional institutions; that the timing was dictated largely by the need for clear priorities to guide force development in an era of declining spending; and that demand by U.S. allies and partners for an increased U.S. commitment to the region played an important role in shaping the rebalance. U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military efforts to implement the rebalance demonstrate a significant increase in strategic attention to the Asia-Pacific region, matched by commitments of diplomatic, economic, and military resources, including the time of senior U.S. leaders. Chinese officials and scholars have reacted by expressing concern and skepticism about the stated U.S. rationale, lamenting the “lack of strategic trust” between Washington and Beijing, urging greater respect for Chinese “core interests,” and stressing negative consequences of the rebalance for Asian security (especially its supposed role in emboldening U.S. allies and partners to challenge Chinese maritime territorial claims). At the same time, they have redoubled efforts to stabilize Sino-U.S. relations and to build a “new type of great power relations.” A key implementation challenge is making the rebalance robust enough to reassure U.S. allies and partners of the U.S. capability and will to maintain its presence in Asia over the long-term, while not alarming Chinese leaders to the point where they forego cooperation with Washington. U.S. and Chinese leaders should work to expand and deepen the scope of bilateral cooperation on common interests, while seeking ways to limit and manage competitive aspects of U.S.-China relations.
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| 3 |
ID:
134996
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s rise signifies a gradual transformation of the international system from unipolarity to a non-unipolar world. As an organization of small and middle powers, ASEAN faces strategic uncertainties
brought about by the power transition in the system. Deepening economic interdependence between ASEAN and China has amplified the economic cost for the ASEAN states to use traditional military
means to deal with China’s rise. Applying institutional balancing theory, this paper examines how ASEAN has adopted various institutional instruments, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the ASEAN Community, to constrain and shape China’s behaviour in the region in the post-Cold War era. It argues that due to globalization and economic interdependence, the power transition in the 21st century is different from the previous ones. ASEAN can potentially make a great contribution to a peaceful transformation of the international system. How to resolve the South China Sea disputes peacefully will be a critical task for both the ASEAN and Chinese leaders in the next decade or two.
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| 4 |
ID:
134994
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| Summary/Abstract |
The U.S. strategy of pivot/rebalancing to Asia, unveiled during the first Obama term, has generated and still generating in mainland China heated debate about the nature and implications of the American strategy. How do strategic analysts in mainland China assess the U.S. pivot/rebalancing to Asia and what are the policy prescriptions they provide to the leadership in Beijing? In this paper, we outline the scholarly and policy debates in mainland China regarding the U.S. pivot/rebalancing strategy. In the process of doing so, we will examine the theoretical outlook of the Chinese discourses. We will also show that whereas policy makers in mainland China largely remain sober-minded and stress the importance of cooperative, non-adversarial relations with the United States, the U.S. pivot/rebalancing strategy has nevertheless increased the sentiment of insecurity and sense of being threatened among elites and the public in mainland China. As a result, the U.S. pivot/rebalancing has contributed to the emerging security dilemma between mainland China and the United States
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| 5 |
ID:
134997
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| Summary/Abstract |
Japan occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands in 1939 and annexed both islands into the administrative jurisdiction of Taiwan. After World War II, the troops of the Republic of China were responsible for receiving both of the islands upon the surrender of the Japanese army. On April 28, 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was signed, with both treaties stipulating that Japan renounce the right, title and claim to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. According to the principle of utipossidetis and occupation, the Republic of China has had the priority right of occupation to hold the right of sovereignty to both islands since that critical date.
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