| Summary/Abstract |
This article adds to the literature explaining a rise in the levels of violence and intimidation against the Islamic sect Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. In contrast to approaches that stop at describing the actors or doctrinal differences involved, this article situates the anti-Ahmadiyah discourse in wider processes of maintaining or securing political and social authority. The author first describes how charges of heresy have historically served to consolidate state and political authorities. This analysis is then extended into the post-Soeharto landscape by showing how the charges of heresy against Ahmadiyah have supported fragments of the New Order state to claw back some of the authority lost after the 1998 political transition. Finally, the author situates this process in the context of increased competition among religious authorities. The implications of using such an approach are twofold: first, the Indonesian state's role in the conflict is not defined only by its absence but also by its active involvement; and second, understanding the rise of conservative ulama as part of a wider process of an increase in many different voices weakens the claim that Indonesia is becoming more religiously conservative. The more general conclusion is that the role of academic writing should be to contextualize contemporary discourses of heresy by revisiting some of the methods used in classic heresiology.
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