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| 1 |
ID:
135509
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| Summary/Abstract |
The optimized fleet response plan will allow the Navy to maximize operational availability while providing greater predictability for sailor and adaptability for policy makers.
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| 2 |
ID:
136402
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article discusses the use of blast protection simulation software to analyse blast effects, to improve existing equipment and vehicles and to protect from improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It mentions the blast simulators made by companies involved in counter-IED training which use propane and oxygen to replicate IEDs that produce loud but harmless explosions and assessment of a helmet prototype by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory with defense firm Allen Vanguard for the same.
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| 3 |
ID:
135531
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US Navy has an order for a small surface combatant to fill, and it should look to the Danish Navy for inspiration
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| 4 |
ID:
136353
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| Summary/Abstract |
As China’s global maritime influence grows, it navy is crossing paths with the US navy more regions. Professor Andrew Erickson considers the US debate over its naval relations with China
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| 5 |
ID:
136903
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| Summary/Abstract |
Knowledgeable energetic-materials experts are retiring faster from naval warfare centers than they can be replaced. This trend must be reversed.
In July 2007, all F/A-18 aircraft were grounded across the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps when a rocket in the ejection-seat system of an F/A-18D parked at China Lake, California, activated. Dispatched experts found its propellant had destabilized and initiated in the cockpit at around 165 degrees Fahrenheit—a concern for naval aircraft in hot climates such as the Middle East. (Near- and long-term fixes are under development and being implemented.)
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| 6 |
ID:
135515
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| Summary/Abstract |
By breaking down the Marine Air-Ground task force into individual components that can be arranged and combined depending on the situation at hand, the service can better tailor any response.
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| 7 |
ID:
136026
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| Summary/Abstract |
US Navy and US Marine Corps (USMC) planners are developing a new connector strategy that is meant to account for the new likely greater distances involved in ship to objectives involved in ship-to-objective manoeuvre (STOM) operations as well as for the loss of a high speed amphibious combat vehicle, the erstwhile expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV)
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| 8 |
ID:
135517
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Navy must replenish its inventory with smaller and more numerous combatants such as a frigate helicopter dock.
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| 9 |
ID:
135511
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| Summary/Abstract |
To stay prepared for future conflicts, the US Navy must once again recognize the importance of arming sailors with a common set of principles and guidelines
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| 10 |
ID:
135756
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US navy is continuing efforts to improve the integrated ship self-defence capability of its non-aegis fleet, Richard Scott Report
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| 11 |
ID:
135671
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| Summary/Abstract |
DARPA and Lockheed Martin are moving ahead with follow-on development of the long range anti ship missile to meet the US Navy’s near term OASuW increment.
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| 12 |
ID:
136385
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| Summary/Abstract |
Collaboration between unmanned underwater vehicle (UUVs) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in mine countermeasure (MCM) operations has taken a significant operations has taken a significant step forward following the disclosure of a UK royal navy and US navy exercise in Bahrain.
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| 13 |
ID:
136898
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the Navy modifies its next surface combatant, it would do well to learn from the mistakes made with the littoral combat ship.
The Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) has undergone a stream of criticism since its inception in 2001. Instead of slowly diminishing, the criticisms—from Congress, the Government Accountability Office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and even within the Navy—continued and grew more serious. In a February 2014 memo, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel confirmed what had been leaked in January: Instead of a planned fleet of 52 LCSs, “no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward.” In the memo, he directed the Navy to submit proposals for alternative small surface combatants “generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.”
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| 14 |
ID:
136897
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Navy needs a practical platform—one that is economic and adaptable—to fulfill its missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has faced few challenges to its core missions of projecting power ashore, forward presence, and sea control. A relatively benign threat environment and the legacy of the 1980s build-up allowed the Navy to effectively conduct a range of additional missions from traditional maritime interception and counter-piracy to supporting theater security cooperation efforts and providing humanitarian relief. Unfortunately, its ability to continue conducting these missions is being tested by two trends: the spiraling cost of new platforms and the return of credible threats.
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| 15 |
ID:
136030
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US defence science and technology community is researching and demonstrating novel networked concepts intended to reverse the operational advantage enjoyed by the quiet diesel-electric submarine.
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| 16 |
ID:
135533
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article focuses on the Operation Forage, which is the invasion of Mariana Islands and Palau by the U.S. in 1944, along with information on the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). Topics discussed include American invasion depicting efforts of its military to achieve joint operational access, use of long-range antiship warfare by Japan's forces to slow the progression of the U.S. Navy and signing of the JOAC by Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in January 2012.
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| 17 |
ID:
135510
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Navy’s readiness-evaluation system is perilously flawed; in the face of rising challenges it must be reformed sooner rather than later.
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| 18 |
ID:
136900
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| Summary/Abstract |
Shipboard rituals have a place at the helm when it comes to how skippers should be treated by their subordinates. It’s all in the authority that comes with nautical lore.
One evening in 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Grand Isle (WPB-1338) let go her anchor in Salem Harbor, Massachusetts, to pass the night. At 29 years old and with 7 years of sea duty under my belt, I was the captain of the vessel and responsible for her successful operation and the safety of the crew of 17. As the anchor line paid out, the cutter drifted astern with the current at a good pace. Normally we help set the anchor by ordering a quick shot of astern propulsion—yet this time it wouldn’t be necessary. I instructed the conning officer to withhold the normal shot of backing bells. Instead of the expected “aye, aye” response, I received a perplexed look and the question, “why?”
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| 19 |
ID:
135009
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| Summary/Abstract |
The willingness to take risks made Rear Admiral David Glasgow Farragut, victor at New Orleans in 1862 and Mobile Bay in 1864, the Union’s leading naval commander in the Civil War. Farragut’s boldness contrasted strongly with the lack of decisiveness shown in the failure in April 1863 to seize the port of Charleston, South Carolina, by Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont, whose capture of Port Royal Sound in South Carolina in November of 1861 had made him the North’s first naval hero of the war. Du Pont’s indecisiveness at Charleston led to his removal from command and a blighted career, while the risk-taking Farragut went on to become, along with generals U.S. Grant and William T. Sherman, one of the principal architects of Union victory.
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| 20 |
ID:
136902
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cost overruns in the billions, construction fiascoes, and a vexing dearth of oversight—welcome to the troubled world of Navy ship contracts.
With nearly 300 active ships, the U.S. Navy is by far the world’s largest—larger, in fact, than the next 13 navies combined. Although the Navy does operate its own shipyards, they are not equipped to handle all of the maintenance and repair requirements to maintain a Fleet of this size. Therefore, given the oscillating requirements for ship-repair work, the Navy routinely contracts out a portion of its ship-repair work during peak workloads. This process has benefited the Navy by acquiring technology and management skills that it might not otherwise possess while maintaining a fully employed and qualified workforce. However, if the Navy fails to provide proper quality oversight and a contractor is not effectively monitored, the results can be devastating to the government.
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