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| 1 |
ID:
134906
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides a new perspective on Thomas C. Mann, a Foreign Service officer best known for serving as Lyndon Johnson’s assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs and coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. Mann is commonly portrayed as unsympathetic toward aiding Latin American development, often accused of dismantling John F. Kennedy’s idealistic aid initiative, the Alliance for Progress, supporting repressive regimes, and vigorously promoting U.S. private investment throughout the hemisphere. By focusing on Mann’s early career, up to and including the Kennedy–Johnson transition, this article seeks to undermine the common image of Mann, revealing instead a dedicated Latin Americanist who consistently advocated aiding hemispheric development. A more accurate understanding of Thomas Mann can provide a starting point for rethinking assessments of the Alliance for Progress, a crucial presidential transition, and Lyndon Johnson’s Latin American record.
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| 2 |
ID:
134902
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Between 1820 and 1848, one hundred and forty-eight American Protestant missionaries arrived in the Hawaiian Islands. How did these Americans, eschewing private property and their U.S. homeland, move from devotion to the Hawaiian monarchy to support for U.S. annexation? It is a dramatic story best told from within the confines of household economics: The problems of parenthood and costs associated with raising children. This essay examines the U.S. role in the world through the influence of American families living abroad. In the case of the Hawaiian Islands, the transition of idealistic evangelists to harried parents had intense political ramifications for both the United States and Hawaiian Kingdom, and missionary children would reap the economic fruits of their parents’ labors.
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| 3 |
ID:
134908
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Before Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, China was bound by historical, nationalistic, ideological, and treaty considerations to support North Korea against South Korea and the United States militarily and politically. The U.S.–China rapprochement in the 1970s had far-reaching effects on international relations in and around the Korean peninsula. But up to now, there is no article-length study on how China adjusted its policy toward North Korea and managed to maintain a close relationship with Pyongyang during this process. Making use of documents from the Chinese, U.S., and East European archives, this article traces China’s policy toward North Korea from 1970 to 1975. It examines China’s views and positions on the Korean issue during the U.S.–China rapprochement negotiations, and China’s policy and tactics toward the Korean issue at the subsequent United Nations deliberations. It attempts to address the questions of how and why China could maintain an alliance relationship with Pyongyang while seeking détente with the United States—North Korea’s enemy No. 1. The article argues that it was in North Korea’s interest to maintain good relations with Beijing in order to achieve Korea’s unification on Pyongyang’s term. For China’s revolutionary credential, it was important to retain North Korea on its side. To achieve this purpose, China provided large economic and military aid to Pyongyang and was North Korea’s most important donor during this time. But China’s primary foreign policy goal during this period was to maintain détente with Washington in order to counter the Soviet Union, and prevent the resumption of war on the Korean peninsula. Thus, China’s policy toward North Korea was made mainly due to national security and geopolitical concerns, rather than ideological affinities.
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| 4 |
ID:
134904
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| Summary/Abstract |
Examining a series of anti-base protests at Tachikawa Air Force base between 1955 and 1957, this article presents a new interpretation of postwar U.S.–Japanese relations. In contrast to previous emphases on a harmonious U.S.–Japanese partnership, it argues that Japanese desires to secure a representative postwar democracy deeply shaped the U.S.–Japanese alliance by fostering constant tensions, negotiations, and compromises between governments and the public. Using a wide range of governmental and nongovernmental American and Japanese sources, it asserts that these protests ultimately encouraged U.S. policymakers to rethink the utility of U.S. bases in mainland Japan and the broader expression of U.S. Cold War power. By exploring the social, political, and diplomatic tensions surrounding U.S. military bases, this article highlights the vital role that weaker allies and foreign publics played in the U.S. global calculations, policy outcomes, and its understanding of its own role in the world.
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| 5 |
ID:
134909
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars remain divided about how Western governments handled the issue of proliferation during Iran’s turn toward nuclear technology in the seventies. The present essay provides an interpretation that takes into account economic strategy during the global petroleum crisis. Rather than focus on the dangers of proliferation, European and American scientists and diplomats encouraged Iran to build a nuclear-intensive future, laying the foundation of Iran’s controversial nuclear community. Western nations used the promises of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to persuade Iran to commit itself to long-term capital expenditures in the nuclear realm, as a coordinated strategy for breaking the power of the petroleum cartel. However, the politics of nonproliferation by the mid-seventies frustrated Western governments’ plans to use the NPT in this way. Parties on both sides gradually learned that Iran’s goal of creating a knowledgeable nuclear community in Iran had become incompatible with the changing Western interpretation of the NPT.
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| 6 |
ID:
134903
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This article challenges the standard narrative of interwar U.S. involvement in the Middle East by arguing that the United States did have both interests in and a policy concerning Iraq during that time. Despite being non-belligerents with the Ottoman Empire during the First World War and non-members of the League of Nations thereafter, the U.S. government consistently advanced the claim that the American contribution to the Allied victory entitled it to equal political and economic opportunities in the Middle East and to a voice in postwar Middle Eastern affairs. U.S. officials vigilantly intervened in the region throughout the period to ensure not only American access to petroleum resources, but also, as is shown in Iraq, to insist on political relations unmediated by Great Britain. British acceptance of this implies that the foundations had thereby been laid for an independent American role in the Middle East, preceding the later thresholds usually cited by historians. The open door policy the U.S. government set out in the correspondence with Britain in 1920–21 represents a full and cogent policy on Iraq that was advanced throughout the interwar period to protect American interests and standing in that country.
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| 7 |
ID:
134910
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American journalists radically changed the tenor of the media coverage about South Korea during the seventies. By reporting instances of human rights abuses perpetrated by South Korea’s Park Chung-hee government, they brought into question the longstanding U.S. support of the Park government. Their reporting played a central role in the 1976 congressional probe of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The controversy that emerged from the investigation helped generate public skepticism for the Park government and create public support for the confrontational policies toward South Korea adopted by the Carter administration. Their role in the KCIA investigation suggests journalists were important actors in the emergence of human rights diplomacy during the seventies. Through their documentation of human rights abuses in places like South Korea, they contributed to wider efforts to halt U.S. support for authoritarian regimes and make human rights a factor in U.S. foreign policy.
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| 8 |
ID:
134907
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| Summary/Abstract |
In February 1967, officials from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were horrified when the American west-coast magazine, Ramparts, exposed the U.S. intelligence organization's longstanding financial relationships with a number of international educational institutions and cultural bodies. In a series of articles, reproduced in The New York Times and The Washington Post, Ramparts documented the CIA's provision of covert funding to, among others, the National Students Association, Asia Foundation, and Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). In India, an outpouring of public indignation ensued when it became clear that the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, a local offshoot of the CCF, had accepted money from the CIA. The global spotlight cast upon some of the CIA's more questionable activities had a profound and enduring impact upon Indian perceptions of the United States' government and its external intelligence service. In the wake of the Ramparts scandal, the CIA came to occupy a prominent place in Indo–U.S. cultural and political discourse. For the remainder of the twentieth century, and beyond, anti-American elements inside and outside India drew repeatedly upon the specter of CIA subversion as a means of undermining New Delhi s relationship with Washington.
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| 9 |
ID:
134905
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines South Vietnamese and American efforts to aid in the migration and resettlement of nearly one million northerners during the mid-1950s. I argue that those efforts were not the overwhelming success that policy makers claimed, but instead failed to satisfy critical goals such as enlarging Ngo Dinh Diem’s political base and increasing South Vietnam’s chances of survival.
This article also concludes that refugee resettlement laid the groundwork for future American involvement in Vietnam and foreshadowed tensions that ultimately doomed the partnership between Diem and the United States. Their experiences during the refugee period instilled in American policy makers and civilian aid workers a misplaced optimism about Diem as well as the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to support and “modernize” the South Vietnamese state. Understanding this critical episode illuminates some of the previously overlooked explanations for the failures of U.S. nation building and the tragedy of the war in Vietnam.
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