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| 1 |
ID:
143595
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| Summary/Abstract |
Illiberal practices of liberal regimes have been extensively studied by critical security studies. The literature on risk emphasises the idea of imminent dangers and the logic of worst-case scenarios, which eventually unsettle the balance between security and liberty by always favouring the former in its most coercive and exceptional forms. This paper, by drawing on (in)securitization theory, attempts to explain how particular illiberal practices with respect to the control and management of immigration on the fringe of the EU become normalised. It argues that (in)securitization of immigration and illiberal practices are effects of the very functioning of a transnational field of (in)security professionals that are produced through the structural competition between different actors of this field over the definition of security and the appropriate control and management of immigration. In this respect, it uses Greece as a case study and draws on material gathered through interviews with Greek security professionals in Athens, Lesvos, Orestiada, and Alexandroupoli, and analysis of their discourse in dissertations they prepared during their study in police academies.
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| 2 |
ID:
091802
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many problems that Afghanistan faces today are rooted in the legacy of its relationship with the international community. Weaknesses in governance, poor institution-building, absence of democracy, problems relating to its role in the war against terror and lack of accountability in foreign aid usage are some.
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| 3 |
ID:
094843
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The international intervention in Afghanistan has contributed to entrenched state weakness and rising insecurity. Despite increased references to the need for reconciliation with the Taliban and a political solution to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, few specifics have been offered by academics or policymakers. Building on research into conflict resolution and an analysis of the composition and motivation of the insurgency, this article addresses this gap by asking whether conditions are currently "ripe" for a negotiated settlement, how "ripeness" may be achieved, and, once achieved, how a political settlement might best be pursued.
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| 4 |
ID:
151190
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the extension of counter-radicalisation practice into the National Health Service (NHS). In the 2011 reformulation of the UK Prevent strategy, the NHS became a key sector for the identification and suppression of ‘radicalisation’. Optometrists, dentists, doctors and nurses have been incorporated into counter-terrorism and trained to report signs of radicalisation in patients and staff. This article explores how calculative modalities associated with big data and digital analytics have been translated into the non-digital realm. The surveillance of the whole of the population through the NHS indicates a dramatic policy shift away from linear profiling of those ‘suspect communities’ previously considered vulnerable to radicalisation. Fixed indicators of radicalisation and risk profiles no longer reduce the sample size for surveillance by distinguishing between risky and non-risky bodies. Instead, the UK government chose the NHS as a pre-eminent site for counter-terrorism because of the large amount of contact it has with the public. The UK government is developing a novel counter-terrorism policy in the NHS around large-N surveillance and inductive calculation, which demonstrates a translation of algorithmic modalities and calculative regimes. This article argues that this translation produces an autoimmune moment in British security discourse whereby the distinction between suspicious and non-suspicious bodies has collapsed. It explores the training provided to NHS staff, arguing that fixed profiles no longer guide surveillance: rather, surveillance inductively produces the terrorist profile.
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| 5 |
ID:
118194
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| 6 |
ID:
149479
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| Summary/Abstract |
While international relations has increasingly begun to recognize the political salience of Indigenous peoples, the related field of security studies has not significantly incorporated Indigenous peoples either theoretically or empirically. This article helps to address this gap by comparing two Arctic Indigenous peoples – Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway – as ‘securitizing actors’ within their respective states. It examines how organizations representing Inuit and Sámi each articulate the meaning of security in the circumpolar Arctic region. It finds that Inuit representatives have framed environmental and social challenges as security issues, identifying a conception of Arctic security that emphasizes environmental protection, preservation of cultural identity, and maintenance of Indigenous political autonomy. While there are some similarities between the two, Sámi generally do not employ securitizing language to discuss environmental and social issues, rarely characterizing them as existential issues threatening their survival or wellbeing.
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| 7 |
ID:
160220
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| Summary/Abstract |
The commencement of opal mining in Ethiopia a decade ago has attracted the involvement of poor peasants, wealthy traders and traffickers. Although the academic and official literature on artisanal small-scale opal mining (ASOM) has primarily focused on the loss of wealth owing to a lack of skill and its traditional nature, this study explores the multidimensional insecurity that the discovery and mining of opal stones in the Delanta wereda of Wollo has brought about. This study contends that the ASOM industry has brought a new and previously unknown body of wealth to a society that is not used to the circulation of huge amounts of money in its narrow geography of commerce, engendering multidimensional insecurity. To make things worse, the network of patrimony and rentierism connecting locals with powerful people at the regional and federal level has given licence to illegal wealth extraction at the cost of exacerbating local insecurity. The qualitative data for the study was collected using interviews, focus group discussions, non-participant observations and document analyses at Delanta mining sites, the Wegel Tena town administration and Dessie city.
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| 8 |
ID:
169362
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In 2016, the spiritual base of Boko Haram, known as ‘Camp Zero’ was captured. With such success, most had thought that the chicken has finally come home to roost. Unfortunately, it was not to be. Because aside from Boko Haram, the country seems to experience other vagaries of insecurity. This range from kidnapping, cult and ritual groups in the south—such as female pant hunters, Badoo—oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism, cattle rustling and herdsmen–farmers crises, among others. Against this backdrop, this study is an attempt to trace the history of the terror group and examine the numerous insecurity challenges across the country despite international collaborations. The study revealed among other things that the perpetuation of terror and insecurity in the land is a reflection of the nature of the state itself—a failing, weak state. The study recommends that until there is a solution to the nature of the state itself, the insecurity will continue. Some of the solutions suggested are entrenchment of good leadership, political will, rule of law, good governance, eradication of poverty and illiteracy, and inclusive policies, among others.
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| 9 |
ID:
131327
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study presents a framework and models for the analysis of government budget allocation into defense and civilian expenditures in situations of uncertainty about the incidence of war. The models display the intricate relationships between security levels, subjective probabilities of the occurrence of war, and potential war damages. We show that poor countries tend to perceive greater probabilities of war than their richer rivals, and that the psychological burden of insecurity is larger when the country's wealth is larger and when its preference for security is higher. We apply our models to the Israeli-Syrian arms race and show that the higher rate of growth of Israel's gross domestic product relative to that of Syria is expected to lead to an increase in Syria's perception of the likelihood of war and to a decrease in Israel's perception of such a likelihood. We also show that if Syria's regime becomes ideologically more extreme, the monetary cost of maintaining Israel's security at the level that it enjoyed prior to the change will be very high, whereas the monetary cost of maintaining Israel's welfare will be moderate.
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| 10 |
ID:
177008
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria has been a victim, at one time or the other, of intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic, religious, and communal conflicts which have undermined the human security of her citizens. Nigeria’s corporate existence had also been threatened by 3 years (1967–1970) civil war which impacted negatively on the well-being of its people. In addition, the inability of the Nigerian Police to cope with the magnitude of the surge of violence in recent years has brought about the idea of involving the military, a core component of traditional security apparatus to deal with internal insecurity. This article is anchored on human security paradigm with reliance on secondary data to analyze the operations of the Nigerian Military in counterviolence campaigns between 1999 and 2017. This article points out that the involvement of the military in internal security has worsened the problem of insecurity due to the military’s unprofessional approach and, at times, deliberate targeting the civilian populace which it is supposed to protect. It, therefore, recommends among others, the need for the Federal Government of Nigeria to urgently review the role of the armed forces in addressing internal security situations in a way that will bring about respect for the rule of engagement in internal security operations and adherence to global best practices.
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| 11 |
ID:
129172
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| 12 |
ID:
101767
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This aim of this paper is two-fold. The first aim is to expand on a claim that an 'Arc of Insecurity' stretches across sub-Saharan Africa. The second is to explore the difficulties of chronic crises within this arc. The paper will contrast countries that have experienced the following three indicators used to highlight the acute phase of a chronic crisis: conflict-related mortality, displacement and climatic disasters. The second part of the paper discusses 'chronic crisis' situations by utilising a case study of Karamoja, northeast Uganda. Karamoja is characterised by the worst humanitarian and development indicators in Uganda and its problems are indicative of other chronic situations. While countries, or more specifically, situations within countries, can be insecure, every situation remains unique. Responses to chronic situations need to be based on a solid understanding of the political-economic causation of crisis.
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| 13 |
ID:
117464
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The purposes of this article are twofold: (1) to consider the extent to which Dialogue of Civilisations (DoC) initiatives, as alternative visions of post-secular world order, are likely to address insecurities that they identify; and (2) to point to other insecurities that are likely to remain unidentified and unaddressed in the process. In their present conception, DoC initiatives risk falling short of addressing the very insecurities they prioritise (the stability of inter-state order) let alone attending to those experienced by non-state referents, which they overlook. The article advances three points in three steps. First, I point to how projects of civilisational dialogue have bracketed civilisation, thereby leaving intact the Huntingtonian notion of civilisations as religiously unified autochthonous entities. Second, I argue that while contributing to opening up space for communication, DoC initiatives have nevertheless failed to employ a dialogical approach to dialogue between civilisations. Third, I tease out the notion of security underpinning DoC initiatives and argue that the proponents DoC, in their haste to avert a clash, have defined security narrowly as the absence of war between states belonging to different civilisations. Theirs is also a shallow notion of security insofar as it fails to capture the derivative character of security and insecurity.
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| 14 |
ID:
119718
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Northern development policies in African countries affected by war are shaped by security concerns and have neoliberal and realist elements. The neoliberal economic policy purports to be inclusive, but when it meets non-compliance, realist ambitions are pursued through the use or strategic oversight of force. The liberalisation of mining in Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo, was promoted through northern policy and was exclusive in strengthening unaccountable domestic governance. This marginalised the majority of the population politically and economically and reinforced the international political economy. Consequently, northern intervention has increased insecurity in Congo, and is potentially destabilising in contravening reciprocity in international relations.
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| 15 |
ID:
114917
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India-China relations, though occasionally showing signs of peace and cooperation, have often been afflicted by tension and mistrust. With the potential to make big contributions to regional peace and development, these two Asian powers have, by design or accident, themselves been the sources of regional tension and insecurity to some extent. Besides their internal dynamics, the interplay of interests and moves of their neigbours, and several external powers would have significant bearing on the equation and relations between them.
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| 16 |
ID:
073204
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| 17 |
ID:
123085
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
ANDREW FLIBBERT discusses the Iraq war and its aftermath. He argues that most of the pathologies in Iraqi political life since 2003, from sectarian mobilization to insurgent violence, are best understood as consequences of forced state failure. He contends that the war should not be viewed as badly conducted so much as badly conceived, claiming that the same ideas that led to the war also determined the shape of the peace in subsequent years.
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| 18 |
ID:
097212
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| 19 |
ID:
119254
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Changes in how we think about nuclear weapons cannot strip them of their strategic value. Only a transformation of the nature of international politics or the emergence of an alternative means of strategic deterrence can do that. The structural realist analysis that I present argues that there are two basic constraints on the role that nuclear weapons play in international politics. The first constraint stems from the anarchic and competitive nature of the international system, which leads to insecurity and encourages states to acquire the most effective weapons possible as part of their quest for security. The second constraint stems from the material characteristics of nuclear weapons; these characteristics, most notably their destructive power, mean that nuclear weapons can serve as, but are also limited to the role of, a strategic deterrent. Together, these constraints mean that nuclear weapons will continue to be valued as a strategic deterrent. Any devaluing that occurs in the foreseeable future will be limited and will not extend to 'deep devaluing' and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Two common counter-arguments - lessons from chemical and biological disarmament, and the imperative from disarmament thought to stem from nuclear proliferation - do not challenge this conclusion. The key question we face is not how to devalue and eliminate nuclear weapons, but what sort of nuclear world maintains sufficient deterrence while minimizing the possibility of nuclear use.
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| 20 |
ID:
192061
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines how the COVID-19 emergency has impacted crime across different locations in Nigeria. Data were collected from a sample of residents from across Nigeria and analysed using mean ratings, percentages and chi-square. Based on the residents’ perceptions, certain crime types have decreased (e.g. home break-ins and assaults), some remain unchanged (e.g. stealing and pilfering) and others have increased (e.g. cybercrime and domestic violence). The findings show concentrations of crime in urban centres, states on total lockdown and geographical areas with poor economic indicators. The times that most crimes are perpetrated remain unchanged, except for the night time, where there has been a significant increase. Generally, individual responses to crime remain unchanged, although the use of security guards and special security door locks has changed significantly. Conversely, neighbourhood-level responses have changed significantly, particularly with the use of vigilante groups, police and military patrols as well as restrictions of human and vehicular movement. Although some of the causes of this crime change existed before COVID-19, new crime opportunities are also acknowledged. The findings suggest that Nigerian cities may face a severe battle to recover from crime even after the COVID-19 emergency has passed. Policy and further research implications are discussed.
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