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ID:
135650
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Indian nuclear doctrine has become a regular feature of discussion and debate at most strategic meets. A fair amount of literature on the doctrine has been published by think tanks in India and the West. The first reason for debate is that India had formally placed the draft doctrine in 1999 before the international community, and thereafter, India issued a summary of the doctrine in a press release in 2003, to inform the world of the formalisation of the doctrine, thus, there are specifics to delve on. The second reason for debate is doubts about the credibility of the doctrine, the main doubt being on massive retaliation and No First Use (NFU). This article will examine issues related to the NFU policy.
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| 2 |
ID:
135618
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| Summary/Abstract |
India declared its nuclear doctrine (summary) on 4 January 2003, a refinement of the draft doctrine made public on 17 August 1999. India had unique requirements to address in the strategic environment that forced it to operationalise the nuclear deterrent, concurrently decide on the policy, the strategy and the doctrine to be followed, from this doctrine emerged the concept of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrent’ (CMD). The doctrine is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security.
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