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ID:
093717
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Until the 2007 Duma election, the Russian polity displayed several characteristics that should have allowed regional leaders to have an impact on deputies: a federalist system, an electoral system that encouraged regional representation, weak political parties, and regional leaders with electoral resources. Recent research on Russian mixed-member Duma elections argues that governors influenced the election of single-member district deputies. This raises the spectre that governors could have influenced the behaviour of these deputies. Using data from the third post-communist Duma, I demonstrate that single-member district deputies backed by regional leaders in the 1999 Duma election behaved differently from others in two critical areas: parliamentary party choice and support for the presidential legislative agenda. Governor support did not, however, affect committee choice.
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| 2 |
ID:
110023
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses the relationship between presidentialism and democracy by examining the role of parties in legislative bargaining in the 2000-2003 Russian Duma. Using a novel methodological approach, I empirically identify legislative voting coalitions to investigate whether the president's preference for party-based legislative bargaining prevailed. I find that in contrast to the 1996-1999 Duma, legislative voting coalitions closely followed party lines and that factions representing narrow interests were less relevant. The results demonstrate that presidential politics dominates electoral incentives in this political system and, more broadly, that political parties could be indispensable for regimes in transition to authoritarianism.
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| 3 |
ID:
022350
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| Publication |
July 2002.
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| Description |
701-724
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