| Summary/Abstract |
This paper investigates the implications of transitional politics to the processes and outcomes of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme targeted to the Maoist ex-combatants in Nepal. It shows that the DDR programme in Nepal was unconventional because of (a) following its own context-specific model developed outside of an established DDR framework, (b) being a process led by national actors in the absence of external intervention, and (c) offering no space for non-state actors such as civil society and business to engage in designing and implementing management of the Maoist arms and armies. Highly politicized by conflicting needs and interests of key political actors, the DDR programme was stalled for nearly six years before a resolution about the future of the ex-combatants was forged. Failure of the political actors to forge a common shared outcome of the DDR programme, lack of clarity in the peace negotiation document in terms of processes of rehabilitation and integration of the ex-combatants, and minimal political will of the Maoist to participate in the DDR programme have been identified as key political constrains that have significantly implicated and altered the modality, function and outcome of the DDR programme in Nepal.
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